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“The regulation of auditing oscillates between concerns  
about the limits of state intervention and of self-regulation.”  
(Rogowski, 1994, p. 19) 
 
Introduction  
The Politics of Auditing 
Financial reporting and auditing are vital elements of global capital markets. While financial 
reporting, by providing corporate disclosures and financial statements, enables investors and 
stakeholders to make decisions on to how best to allocate their capital, auditing ensures that the 
information is accurate and reliable and that it faithfully represents the state of the enterprise. 
The belief in the market’s efficiency is bolstered, in particular, by the trust placed in auditing 
being able to operate as an external monitoring function, something that has led to the audit 
profession being perceived as the “guardians of truth in markets” (Volcker, 2002). However, 
concerns over these guardians’ responsibilities, and over their trustworthiness, are raised on a 
regular basis every time it transpires, in the face of serious accounting scandals, that the 
profession has failed to meet societal expectations.1 On this view, audit regulation is a direct 
response to emerging distrust in the audit profession in order to preserve the public’s belief in 
the role and mission of financial auditing (Guenin-Paracini & Gendron, 2010; Power, 1993, 
2003).  
 To begin with, audit regulation is centred on the discussion, development and implementation 
of audit standards. These standards are principle-focused and provide a framework for 
performing and promoting financial auditing. Moreover, it is concerned with mechanisms 
designed to ensure that these standards are applied in practice with the aid of a bundle of 
monitoring and enforcement processes.2 Finally, and at the heart of audit regulation, there are 
those questions that centre on the changing relationships between the profession and the state, 
on the limits of self-regulation and on the role played by state actors in the configuration and 
organization of auditing (Puxty, Willmott, & Lowe, 1987; Robson, Willmott, Cooper, & Puxty, 
1994) – debates that are heavily influenced by the profession’s demand for regulation by the 
profession, in preference to regulation of the profession.  
                                                     
1In the accounting literature, the value and purpose of the statutory audit is discussed in the context of the so-
called "audit expectations gap“ debate, which refers to the discrepancy between actual audit practices and the 
perceptions harboured by those stakeholder on whose behalf auditing is being carried out (e.g. Bui & Porter, 2010; 
Humphrey, Turley, & Moizer, 1992; Porter, 1993; Power, 1993). 
2 It is important to emphasize that audit regulation should not be confused with accounting regulation, as the latter 
encompasses not just audit regulation, but, financial reporting regulations, too. 
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Self-regulation has traditionally been seen as epitomizing the hallmark of professional services 
and procedures. It asserts the independence of the professions’ technical practices from socio-
political “interferences” by the state or by other actors and has fed the reputational base of the 
“profession” by signifying and confirming its integrity and its expertise (Robson et al., 1994). Yet 
in the last decade, the pendulum has swung away from self-regulation towards state actors 
playing a more active role, a trend that was initiated at the beginning of this century, when the 
detection of massive accounting frauds and of seriously manipulated financial statements at 
Enron, WorldCom and other U.S. major companies severely put the public’s belief in financial 
markets in general and in auditing in particular to the test. As early as the 1970s and 1980s, the 
collapses of large U.S. companies resulted in questions being raised over the profession’s ability 
to regulate itself properly (Federal Committee, 1976, p. 22), but these audit failures were 
successfully “particularised” with a view to preserving financial self-regulation. The events 
surrounding Enron, however, brought the debate to a new level. At Enron alone, investors lost 
approximately $67 billion, and they lost a further $161 billion at WorldCom, and the U.S. stock 
exchange dropped by more than 22 percent within just six months (Humphrey & Loft, 2011), at 
a time when the U.S. economy was in any case already turning down. An outcry from the public 
for the political actors to “do something” (Mulford & Comiskey, 2011, p. 423) put legislators 
under pressure, particularly as the U.S. midterm elections were about to take place (Romano, 
2004). Faced by this political and economic tsunami, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) in July 2002. The legislation represents a turning point in audit regulation, as it replaced 30 
years of self-regulation by profession-independent oversight under the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). Having been treated for decades as something that was 
sacrosanct, fiercely protected and safeguarded not just by the profession, but by state actors, too, 
self-regulation suddenly turned into something that jeopardized the stability and integrity of 
financial markets. This regulatory volte-face in the U.S. was observed somewhat sceptically on 
the old continent.  
Although in various European countries, debate over the external quality assurance provided by 
auditing began to emerge as an issue in audit regulation in the 1990s, there was general consensus 
that ensuring audit quality was the core element of professional self-regulation. Europe’s strong 
emphasis on substance over form, in contrast to the allegedly more legalistic, rule-bound 
traditions seen in U.S. financial reporting, in combination with the high educational standards 
that statutory auditors were perceived to have, were felt to constitute barriers that would prevent 
any European version of Enron from happening. However, serious accounting scandals in Italy 
(Parmalat), Denmark (Nordisk Fjer) and in the Netherlands (Ahold), demonstrated the need for 
serious reflection on audit regulation in Europe (Humphrey, Loft, & Woods, 2009). Eventually, 
in 2006, the European Union revised the regulatory framework on statutory auditing, thus 
responding not just to these national incidents of accounting fraud, but also to pressure from 
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U.S. legislators, who did not believe that the European framework was sufficiently rigorous. The 
new Directive on the auditing of company accounts specified the requirements for external 
quality assurance and required Members States to introduce “public oversight” into their national 
regulatory frameworks. Although, the focus of the national oversight entities lies on the audit 
practices at the national level, their emergence is a key element in broader trends at a global level.  
In response to major economic turbulence in the mid-1990s, such as the devaluation of the peso 
in Mexico 1994 and the financial crisis in Asia in 1997, international organizations such as the 
European Union, the World Bank, the International Organization of Securities Commissions or 
the Financial Stability Board both supported and strategically mandated the establishment of a 
new international financial architecture. The logic underlying the new regulatory dogma was 
based on an orientation to global capital markets, with the global use of standardized market 
valuation practices being perceived to be necessary for financial stakeholders and for a rapidly 
globalizing economy alike (Bengtsson, 2011; Perry & Nölke, 2005). The objective was to stabilise 
globally integrated financial markets by diffusing universal standards and global codes of conduct 
(Humphrey et al., 2009; Wade, 2007a). From this perspective, the emergence of audit oversight 
entities on the local level is one visible outcome of a move away from a doctrine that wants to 
“liberalize the market” towards one that wants to “standardize the market” so as to safeguard 
and to bolster confidence in the quality of financial reporting and globalized financial markets 
(Wade, 2007b). As a result of this global regulatory trend, the notion of independent oversight 
over statutory auditors emerged, within one decade, to become a pivotal instrument for tackling 
perennial problems with corporate financial reporting and auditing; today, audit oversight 
constitutes an essential feature of audit regulation.  
The implementation of audit oversight regulation in the local context shapes, changes and 
destabilises the institutions in which accounting and the audit profession had traditionally been 
embedded. It is the interplay of tensions created by this institutional umbrella that informs the 
four studies constituting this PhD thesis. In a nutshell, the first chapter of this thesis sheds light 
on the U.S. historical causes behind the current global regulatory structures and assesses, on the 
basis of an analysis of research findings, the shift from self-regulation to regulation independent 
of the profession. Based on a cross-country research approach, the second chapter offers insights 
into how “independent” oversight regulation has been understood and implemented by 
European Member countries. In the third chapter, the local institutional struggles that inevitably 
accompany such institutional shifts are unveiled and analysed by re-reading the implementation 
and development of the German oversight system from a critical qualitative research perspective. 
The fourth chapter reveals the side-effects of regulation and practices that are increasingly 
aligned with international demands and it outlines the intra-professional conflicts between large 
  
 
5
accounting firms operating on a global scale, on the one hand, and small, local firms, on the 
other hand.  
Chapter 1: What do we know, and what is lacking? – the shift from self-regulation to public oversight in the U.S. 
By reviewing and synthesising 30 years of research on U.S. audit regulation, the first chapter of 
this thesis assesses the extent to which the shift from self-regulation to government regulation 
can be supported through research. To this end, the literature on the former self-regulatory peer-
review system under the aegis of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA) and the literature on the current PCAOB system are analysed, categorised and 
contrasted through a framework drawn from regulation literature. In this way, the study outlines 
whether peer reviews and inspections produce valid results, whether these results are considered 
in financial decision-making, and, ultimately, whether conclusions can to be drawn on the impact 
exercised by the two approaches to audit regulation on audit quality. As such, the study extends 
prior assessments of the regulation of public company auditing in the U.S. (Abernathy, Barnes, & 
Stefaniak, 2013; Glover, Prawitt, & Taylor, 2009; Kinney, 2005; Palmrose, 2013), as it is only the 
direct analytical comparison of self-regulation and regulation carried out independently of the 
profession that makes it possible for conclusions to be drawn as to the legitimacy of the 
institutional change from self-regulation to public audit oversight. 
As outlined above, once public audit oversight had been established in the U.S., regulators 
around the globe emulated the forms and practices set up by the PCAOB in order to monitor 
financial auditing and to enhance their own legitimacy. The outcome of this powerful 
demonstration of coercive and mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) forms the 
focus of the second chapter.  
Chapter 2: Same but different – the diffusion of a European audit oversight system 
By analysing, measuring, and comparing the independence of the audit oversight systems used in 
all the European member states, the second chapter highlights how the European member states 
have translated the concept of “independence” into regulatory outcomes. The concept of 
“regulatory independence” is operationalized on the basis on public policy research. The results 
are visualized by a Partial Order Scalogram Analysis (POSAC), which allows us to draw 
conclusions about the similarities exhibited by various countries and about their relative levels of 
independence. In revealing the strong interrelations between regulators and the audit profession 
in a whole multitude of countries, the results challenge the notion of “independent” audit 
regulation.  
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The reason for regulatory divergence is that regulatory changes take place within a tangled web of 
multifaceted and intertwined national, cultural and politico-economic institutions (Ordelheide, 
2004; Puxty et al., 1987).3 Regulatory reforms and changes involve the multiple combinations and 
varied power settings made up by public, private and societal actors. They constitute the 
“intervening variable” in the adaptation process, shaping the scope and extent of national 
responses to exogenous regulatory dynamics (Blavoukos, Caramanis, & Dedoulis, 2013, p. 142; 
see also Lodge, 2000). As a result of the clientelist political system in Greece, for instance, the 
local audit regulator “has failed to come to a decisional point in the flow of influence, power, and 
policy in the realm of accounting” (Caramanis, Dedoulis, & Leventis, 2015, p. 26).4 The impact 
of the German politico-economic intervening variable in the process of establishing audit 
oversight mechanisms is the focus of the third chapter of this thesis.  
Chapter 3: Chance to remain the same – the establishment of German audit oversight  
Studies on German audit oversight structures generally revolve on the question of how the audit 
regulation is designed, implemented or organised (Baker, Quick, & Mikol, 2001; Gabor, 2005; 
Keller & Schlüter, 2003; Köhler, Marten, Quick, & Ruhnke, 2008; Marten, 2001; Marten & 
Köhler, 2000, 2005; Marten, Köhler, & Meyer, 2003; Niehus, 2000; Paulitschek, 2009). By 
contrast, this chapter focuses on the questions of why and how the German audit oversight system 
was established and developed in its specific way. The German counterpart to the PCAOB, the 
APAK, was initially established in the form of “embedded oversight”. In this kind of oversight 
system, which is a widespread phenomenon in audit regulation, committees that claim to embody 
genuine public representation oversee (private) accounting bodies (Loft, Humphrey, & Turley, 
2006). The extent to which such a regulatory approach adheres to or alters the logic of self-
regulation remains, however, an empirical question. Answers to this specific question and to the 
general interplay between the German audit profession, the regulators and the political actors are 
provided by blending Lawrence and Suddaby’s (2006) conceptualisation of institutional work.  
Institutional work is a concept within new-institutional analysis. The main feature of the concept 
is that it relaxes the assumption of neo-institutional thinking that individuals or organizations are 
“cultural dopes” (Muzio, Brock, & Suddaby, 2013, p. 708) who are completely unaware of their 
institutional environment. Institutions are social-political structures that are deeply embedded in 
                                                     
3 The effect of country-specific factors was also identified in other accounting research areas. Studies on the degree to 
which accounting standards in different jurisdictions have been harmonised, for instance, have revealed the extent to 
which there has been an international divergence in financial reporting as a result of cultural traditions (Baydoun & 
Willett, 1995), socio-economic traditions (Nobes, 1990; Theunisse, 1994), legal traditions (Chung, Farrar, Puri, & 
Thorne, 2010; Evans & Nobes, 1998; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1998, 2006; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997), political factors (Luther, 1996) or a combination of various factors (Salter, 1998; Saudagaran 
& Diga, 1997; Williams, 1999).  
4 It should be noted that the institutional settings exert influence on normative and coercive pressures. Ordelheide 
(1999, 2004) demonstrated that European Directives were least successful in harmonising accounting rules in those 
member states that have a long tradition of regulating accounting (Ordelheide, 1999, 2004).  
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time and space, maintained by rules and convictions, strong relations and entrenched resources 
(Scott, 2008). Neo-institutional theory is based on the assumption that organizations tend to 
comply with institutional pressures, and it focuses on explaining organizational homogeneity 
within institutional environments by identifying the mechanisms that determine organizational 
structure (e.g. DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). However, from the late 1980s onwards scholars began 
to criticize the lack of agency within institutional analysis, in particular, when institutional change 
rather than institutional stability was the object of the empirical analysis. Scholars began to focus 
on the possibility that actors might act intentionally to contribute to institutional change, and 
they documented the ability of actors holding key strategic positions or possessing other forms of 
power to make a significant contribution to preserving or, alternatively, disrupting existing 
institutions (DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 1997; Greenwood, Hinings, & Suddaby, 2002; Holm, 
1995; Meyer & Jepperson, 2000; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Based on this development, 
Lawrence and Suddaby (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009) 
conceptualized a useful taxonomy of institutional work, which associates specific types of 
institutional work with institutional outcomes: institutional change, maintenance or disruption.  
The German case is representative of both institutional continuity and institutional change, 
demonstrating how different actors are intertwined within the organizational field. The fluid 
German context lends itself particularly well to the concept of institutional work, as in this 
specific context actors are more likely to be fully aware of – and to become engaged in – acts of 
institutional agency (Muzio et al., 2013, p. 709). The analysis reveals how different actors were 
involved in parallel, but interlinked through multifarious dimensions of institutional work – with 
both intended and unintended institutional outcomes. It suggests the existence of a strategic 
allegiance between the professional institute and large audit firms, the “accounting 
establishment” (Durocher, Gendron, & Picard, 2014, p. 7), and political actors – one designed to 
preserve the self-regulatory logic of audit regulation. In addition, the rereading of trends in 
German oversight demonstrates the particular impact exerted by intra-professional dynamics on 
relations between the state and the profession and shows how professions can be both the 
mechanism for, and the primary target of, institutional change and transformation.  
Chapter 4: Side-effects of global regulations – The intra-professional conflicts in the German context 
The fourth chapter puts the intra-professional dynamics of the German audit profession under 
the microscope and illustrates a rare example of local resistance from small auditors against the 
accounting establishment. These intra-professional conflicts resulted from the major 
transformations that have been taking place in the audit profession over the last twenty years. 
The regulation of practices, rules, and accounting standards started to be relocated from 
national sites to a new, international regulatory environment. This setting is dominated by 
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internationally linked audit firms, which have transformed themselves into powerful 
international entities. Yet, the “new logics of post-professionalism” (Suddaby, Cooper, & 
Greenwood, 2007, p. 356), are accompanied by the strategic attempts by these firms to preserve 
the historical and economic privileges of a “profession” at the national level, because debates 
on the role, functioning and interpretation of the audit profession are particularly problematic 
for this segment of the profession: “Big firms can only exist as ‚great‘ firms because they are 
part of the same profession as small firms“ (Ramirez, 2013, p. 860). However, conflicts between 
large audit firms and small audit firms have always existed in the German history of auditing. 
It was because the profession lacked any real cohesion that auditing became institutionalized 
comparatively late in Germany. In the 1920s, so-called book examiners, various professional 
groups, and audit firms controlled by banks had starkly diverging ideas on how the legal 
arrangements governing German accounting and audit regulation should be organised and 
institutionalised in detail (Evans, 2003; Harston, 1993). As a result, the state embarked on a 
course of active interference through which it introduced a statutory audit and formally 
established the profession of the public accountant (Wirtschaftsprüfer) (Gietzmann & Quick, 
1998; Quick, 2005). In the following decades, the underlying tensions between different segments 
of the profession continued to simmer, though they were kept under control by the Institute of 
Public Auditors in Germany (IDW) and the Federal Chamber of Public Accountants (WPK) 
until the late 1990s. Starting from this date, the chapter offers a critical analysis of the micro-
politics of the professional groups in Germany and outlines the multifarious economic and 
political factors, which led to the mobilisation of small- and medium-sized auditors that 
eventually culminated in the takeover of the Federal Chamber of Public Accountants. In this 
way, the chapter provides a counterweight to the vast volume of literature highlighting the 
national and international dominance enjoyed by the Big Four (e.g. Suddaby et al., 2007).  
The conflicts are analysed through the lense of practice theory (Nicolini, 2012; Schatzki, 1996, 
2001). The basic idea of practice theory is to understand phenomena such as power, language, 
social institutions and transformation as being the result of interacting fields of social practices 
and material arrangements. Practices are “sets of material activities that are fundamentally 
interpenetrated and shaped by broader cultural frameworks such as categories, classifications, 
frames, and other kinds of ordered belief systems.” (Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007, p. 996). 
The perspective enables the identification of the differing practices pursued in the working 
environments of large audit firms, on the one hand, and small auditors, on the other. The study 
demonstrates the negative side effects bound to be produced by any system of standardized audit 
regulation that fails to differentiate between different segments of the profession.  
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From a methodological point of view, the third and the fourth chapters are both longitudinal 
qualitative critical case studies, which are based on a variety of data sources and triangulation 
research methodology (Denzin, 2009; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). From a theoretical perspective, 
both chapters share a multidimensional view of agency in which agency and structure are 
inextricably linked to each other. Both concepts, practice theory on the one hand, and 
institutional work on the other hand, aim to find more balance between methodological 
individualism and social determinism. In fact, in order to solve the “embedded agency paradox”, 
a term that refers to the old structure vs. agency debate in social sciences (Seo & Creed, 2002), 
scholars started to explicitly integrate elements of practice theory into neo-institutional thinking 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Both concepts therefore introduce both some degree of reflexivity 
about how actors engage with their institutional environment and an active capacity that has the 
potential to cause variation in institutionalized patterns of reproduction (Battilana, Leca, & 
Boxenbaum, 2009; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Muzio, Brock, & Suddaby, 2013). The 
application of the concepts is based on a constructivist research approach that regards theory as a 
frame that helps to produce novelty in the understanding of previously unappreciated aspects of 
German audit regulation and to orient the research process in line with certain assumptions 
(Power & Gendron, 2015). Hence, the production of credible, trustworthy and interesting 
insights into audit regulation is the overall aim of both chapters.  
Audit regulation is currently caught up, to a degree that has perhaps never been witnessed before, 
in an enormously dynamic process of fundamental change that are caused by multiple, 
interrelated trends. These include the transformation of domestic audit firms into powerful,  
international actors (Greenwood et al., 2002; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2002), the proclaimed 
death of traditional professional bodies (Cooper and Robson, 2006), the global diffusion of 
international standards (Botzem, 2010; Botzem & Quack, 2005) and the increasing importance of 
the international regulations laid down by both formal and informal organizations (Arnold, 2005; 
Humphrey et al., 2009; Humphrey & Moizer, 2008). Within this empirical environment, I hope 
that this thesis with the following four chapters can contribute to our understanding of audit 
regulation – both from a theoretical and from an empirical standpoint. 
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“If accountants can’t solve their problems, someone will.”  
(Congressman Jack Brooks in Larson, 1987, p. 118) 
 
Chapter 1 
Changing from self-regulation to public oversight: a literature review 
of 30 years of research on external quality assurance  
in the U.S. 
 
Abstract 
This paper reviews empirical research of the past 30 years to assess and extend our knowledge of 
audit regulation. The traditional self-regulatory system of the U.S. accounting profession came to 
an end in 2002, when, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) was 
established to oversee the audits of publicly traded companies. This paper contributes to the 
controversial debate about the two concepts of external quality assurance – government 
oversight versus the profession’s self-regulation – by reviewing the academic literature about the 
former profession’s peer review system and the current PCAOB system. The research findings of 
the former self-regulatory peer-review system and the current PCAOB system are categorised 
and compared through a framework drawn from the literature on regulation. The ensuing 
analysis reveals that the introduction of peer reviews improved audit quality. However, when 
peer reviews became mandatory, review reports were neither recognised by decision makers nor 
perceived as instruments for signalling audit quality. Moreover, the analysis reveals how empirical 
studies demonstrate the PCAOB’s positive effect on audit quality yet the audit profession 
remains rather sceptical about the PCAOB’s effectiveness. Finally, the comparison identifies 
striking issues that have not undergone further research.5 
Keywords: external quality assurance, self-regulation, peer review, PCAOB inspection 
 
 
                                                     
5 This chapter benefited from the feedback of William Messier, Brian Shapiro, Robert Day, Robert Kirsch, Sytse 
Duiverman, James Dalkin, and participants at the 2013 European Auditing Research Network Symposium (EARNet) 
in Trier, the 2014 American Accounting Association (AAA) Public Interest Section in San Diego, and the 2014 British 
Accounting and Finance Association (BAFA) Annual Conference in London.  
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1.1 Introduction 
How can audit quality be enhanced and will this reassert public confidence in financial auditing? 
These are questions that frequently arise in discussions on how to react suitably to accounting 
manipulations. One course of action is to control the service quality of audit firms through 
external quality controls. Regulating quality assurance in the U.S. began in the 1980s when the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) initiated a voluntary peer-review 
programme (Sperry, Spede, & Hicks, 1987). A system of this kind subjects audit firms’ quality 
control systems and audit engagements to an external review that is conducted by another 
professional audit firm. Peer review became mandatory in 1988 and remained, with some 
modifications, in operation until 2002. Then, however, corporate reporting went through a 
particular crisis when trust in financial reporting was undermined by a series of severe fraud 
scandals, which brought into question whether the self-regulatory system of the profession can 
adequately guarantee a high level of audit quality. As a direct result, Congress passed the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, which replaced the traditional self-regulatory system of the 
accounting profession with a system of public oversight, making the SOX the most incisive 
corporate-governance legislation since the Securities Acts in the 1930s (Boster, 2007; Church & 
Shefchik, 2012; Humphrey, Moizer, & Turley, 2006). Although the Act led to a variety of 
fundamental changes in financial reporting (Kinney, 2005), the most important element was the 
introduction of mandatory governmental inspections.  
This study focuses on research findings on the mode of external quality assurance in two 
regulatory regimes: the PCAOB’s inspections and the peer reviews of the former self-regulatory 
regime.6 External quality controls aim at assessing whether audit firms have developed 
appropriate quality control policies and procedures, and whether these are followed in practice in 
order to comply with professional accounting and auditing standards (Arens, Elder, & Beasley, 
2011). Although quality assurance is only one element of the broader notion of audit regulation 
(Simnett & Smith, 2005, p. 47) it is argued that, in particular, the way a system of external quality 
control is organised, implemented, and overseen does have an effect on the degree to which the 
broader regulatory framework achieves its goal of protecting the interests of investors and the 
public (Carcello, Hollingsworth, & Mastrolia, 2011; Francis, Andrews, & Simon, 1990; Palmrose, 
2013).7 The importance of external quality control mechanisms is reflected in the post-SOX 
period, when many other countries reformed their legal system by introducing public oversight, 
including systems of profession-independent inspections (Canning & O’Dwyer, 2013; Caramanis, 
                                                     
6 The term “review” is used for quality assurance of the former AICPA self-regulatory system and the term 
“inspection” refers to the current PCAOB oversight system.  
7 Other elements are the educational system, the licensing, and registration of statutory auditors, as well as standard-
setting or disciplinary systems, which can all either be organised within the accounting profession or under the control 
of a government agency. 
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Dedoulis, & Leventis, 2015; Hazgui & Gendron, 2015; Malsch & Gendron, 2011). Given the 
U.S. transition’s significant influence on the organisation of auditing, on the local and global 
regulatory landscape, it is important to review the effects of the PCAOB and to assess whether 
the transition was successful and, if so, in which aspects. A better and holistic understanding of 
the different systems is necessary for further reforms and to decrease the risk of producing 
politically unintended and potentially dysfunctional consequences. This paper contributes to the 
controversial debate about the two concepts of external quality assurance—government 
oversight versus the profession’s self-regulation—by reviewing the academic literature about the 
former profession’s peer review system and the current PCAOB system. The purpose of this 
paper is to provide a comprehensive analysis and synthesis of empirical research on the external 
quality assurance mechanisms of U.S. audit firms. To this end, the study incorporates the 
findings on the former AICPA peer-review system and contrasts them with research results on 
the current PCAOB system. As such, the study extends prior assessments of the regulation of 
public company auditing in the U.S. (Abernathy, Barnes, & Stefaniak, 2013; Glover, Prawitt, & 
Taylor, 2009; Kinney, 2005; Palmrose, 2013), as only the direct analytical evaluation of the two 
regulatory regimes allows drawing conclusions about the legitimacy of the institutional change 
from self-regulation to public oversight. 
The categorising of prior research findings is based on a framework that is derived from 
regulation literature. The framework serves as a benchmark for assessing the legitimacy of each 
of the two regulatory regimes in three ways: first, it analyses whether peer reviews and PCAOB 
inspections yield valid results; second, it considers whether peer reviews and inspection results 
were used in financial decision-making processes; third, the framework focuses on the impact of 
peer reviews and PCAOB inspections on the level of actual audit quality. Hence, the multiple 
findings of each research study were unbundled and arranged according to the three aspects of 
the developed framework. The sources of this study were articles in accredited journals and 
working papers. Relevant papers were identified by searching the databases (e.g. Business Source 
Premier, EBSCOhosts, Emerald Management eJournals, and Jstor databases) with the following 
keywords: peer reviews, self-regulation, AICPA, inspections, PCAOB, Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board, and audit quality. In addition, the reference section of each study is 
reviewed to detect papers not identified during the initial database search.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines the framework for 
categorising the research findings and describes the historical development of external quality 
controls in the U.S. as principles, structures, and tendencies of audit regulation become clearer 
when viewed in their historical, economic, and political context. In the next two sections the 
research findings on peer review and on PCAOB inspections are separately analysed, followed by 
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a comparison in the subsequent section. This is followed by an outline of further research and 
concluding remarks.  
1.2 Organising framework 
To assess regulatory regimes, it is necessary to be clear about the relevant benchmark. In audit 
regulation there has never been much agreement concerning the assessment of mechanisms 
regulating the audit profession (e.g. Mautz, 1984). Disunity results, due to methodological and 
conceptual problems of identifying assessment measures as well as disputes on who should 
determine and define them (Arens et al., 2011; Sutton & Lampe, 1991). The benchmark for this 
paper is based on arguments from regulation literature that are presented when regulatory 
arrangements and performance are discussed, analysed and evaluated.  
Baldwin et al. (2012) argue that five principles constitute the legitimacy of a regulatory regime. A 
legitimate regulatory regime must be validated and supported by a legislative mandate. The 
second principle refers to the accountability of the regulatory regime that has to be properly 
accountable to, and controlled by, democratic institutions. The third principle is that fair, 
accessible, and transparent procedures have to be guaranteed in terms of intra-organisational 
processes and with respect to those who are regulated. The fourth principle centres on the 
sufficient level of expertise and technical knowledge, which have to be incorporated in the 
regulatory regime. The last principle demands that a regulatory regime has to yield efficient 
outcomes. Although the five principles are fraught with difficulties, they constitute a set of 
benchmarks for assessing regulatory regimes.  
The first two principles are not included in the analysis as they relate to the policy process, which 
established the specific regulatory regime. The study concentrates on the latter three criteria – the 
expertise, transparency, and efficiency principles – and applies them to the field of audit 
oversight regulation and external quality controls. 
Regulatory expertise 
In the context of external audit assurance, the expertise principle is associated with the 
knowledge and proficiency of reviewers and inspectors. Expertise in the field of audit 
engagement has to be ensured to understand the underlying business environment processes, 
especially when financial estimates rest on complex and future-oriented uncertainties (Peecher, 
Solomon, & Trotman, 2013). However, in the field of financial auditing, the expertise principle is 
inextricably linked with the degree of independence and objectivity of the reviewers and 
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inspectors.8 Paraphrasing DeAngelo (1981), reviewers and inspectors not only have to be able 
but also have to be willing to discover and report a breach in the audit firm’s quality control 
system. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the literature on audit regulation argues that the 
change from self-regulation to government inspections represents a trade-off of expertise for 
independence (e.g. Carcello et al., 2011; DeFond, 2010; Palmrose, 2006). This trade-off arises 
from the perception of government regulators as being more independent than self-regulators 
but lacking in industry expertise (Bellovary & Mayhew, 2009; DeFond, 2010; Grumet, 2005). 
Expertise and independence are therefore of vital importance to determine the validity of 
external quality assurance processes. In other words, the judgments must be objective and based 
on reliable and valid information and justification.9 Validity refers to the degree to which a 
measurement tool (i.e. reviews and inspections) measures what it claims to measure (i.e. audit 
quality). Based on these considerations, the first way in which the research studies are categorised 
is stated in the following research question:  
RQ1: Do peer reviews and inspections lead to valid results? 
Insights about the validity of peer reviews and PCAOB inspections were found in a variety of 
studies with various research approaches. Some studies have examined whether there is evidence 
for a relationship between reviewer characteristics and review findings (Colbert & Murray, 1998; 
Wallace, 1991), or whether review and inspection results are biased by the information advantage 
of reviewers and inspectors (Emby, Gelardi, & Lowe, 2002; O’Keefe, King, & Gaver, 1994). 
Other studies have drawn conclusions on the validity of the results from a comparison of peer 
review and PCAOB reports about the same firm (Anantharaman, 2012; Ragothaman, 2012). 
Moreover, the analysis of the responses of audit firms to reviews and inspection outcomes 
(Bishop, Hermanson, & Houston, 2013; Blankley, Kerr, & Wiggins, 2012; Church & Shefchik, 
2012; Wallace & Cravens, 1994), or to surveys about the opinion on the external assurance 
processes (Daugherty & Tervo, 2010; Ehlen & Welker, 1996; Newman & Oliverio, 2010), 
allowed for conclusions about the validity of the system. 
Regulatory transparency 
The transparency criterion leads to the second principle that concerns how the research findings 
are categorised. Research has shown that market participants reward companies that employ 
high-quality auditors (Barton, 2005; Knechel, Krishnan, Pevzner, & Stefchik, 2013). From this 
perspective, transparency relates to whether peer review and inspection reports allow market 
                                                     
8 Although the concepts of independence and objectivity have a substantial overlap, they cannot be used entirely 
synonymously. Whereas “independence” is more an organisational attribute, “objectivity” relates to the unbiased 
mental attitude of reviewers and inspectors. 
9 For the interconnection of “independence” and “regulatory expertise” in regulation theory see also Ottow (2015, pp. 
1–13).  
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participants to draw conclusions on the service quality of the specific audit firms. This is based 
on the assumption that investors use the results of external quality controls as surrogates for the 
unobservable quality of financial statement in processes of financial-decision making. The 
literature on regulation suggests that transparent oversight aids the efficiency of supervision 
(Ottow, 2015, p. 12). By linking this argument to audit regulation, the recognition of review and 
inspections outcomes by market participants exerts pressure on the audit firm to improve audit 
quality based on the valid findings of the reviews and inspections. The second approach to 
categorisation is therefore stated as:  
RQ2: Do financial markets recognise peer reviews and PCAOB reports as useful instruments for 
decision-making? 
Empirical studies have shed light on this question by analysing the variability in audit fees 
(Francis et al., 1990; Giroux, Deis, & Bryan, 1995) and by examining the number of clients that 
the audit firm gained or lost (Daugherty, Dickins, & Tervo, 2011; Hilary & Lennox, 2005; 
Lennox & Pittman, 2010). Changes in those dependents are attributable to the market’s reaction 
to peer review and PCAOB results. In other studies, questionnaires and surveys (Alam, Hoffman, 
& Meier, 2000; File, Ward, & Gray, 1992; Schneider & Ramsay, 2000; Woodlock & Claypool, 
2001), or experimental designs (Payne, 2003; Robertson & Houston, 2010; Robertson, Stefaniak, 
& Houston, 2014; Wainberg, Kida, Piercey, & Smith, 2011) have been used to reveal whether 
financial experts recognise peer review and PCAOB results as being useful for decision-making. 
Common to all studies is that the analysis of the informative value of peer review and inspection 
results allows conclusions to be drawn on how the systems will be perceived to affect audit 
quality. It remains an open question whether peer reviews and inspections improve audit quality. 
Regulatory Outcomes 
Regulation must be able to meet the goals of regulation. Therefore, regulation literature defines 
regulatory efficiency as a condition for a legitimised regulatory regime. Efficiency is defined in 
terms of achieving given objectives at the lowest possible cost. However, so far, studies that 
incorporated the cost into their analysis do not exist in the field of audit regulation. Therefore, 
the third approach of the framework focuses on the effectiveness of the peer review system and 
the PCAOB inspection. This is in line with Ottow (2015), who uses the notion of effectiveness 
rather than efficiency as a principle that regulatory agencies in general have to fulfil (Ottow, 
2015). From this understanding, a regulation is effective if it makes quantifiable improvements in 
the results concerned. The audit oversight’s main objective is to maintain, respectively to 
improve audit quality. Thus, the third and final question is:  
RQ3: Do peer reviews and inspections improve audit quality? 
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Empirical work on the association between external quality assurance and audit quality is 
hampered by the lack of observable measures of audit quality. In other words, much of the 
difficulty in assessing the external quality control instruments for improving audit quality is 
related to the “elusiveness of the concept itself” (Alam et al., 2000, p. 410). Nevertheless, 
conclusions about the effect of external quality controls on audit quality were identified in many 
research studies. Empirical work on the former peer-review system has applied alternative 
evaluation methods to assess whether reviewed firms provide higher audit quality than non-
reviewed firms (Deis & Giroux, 1992; Krishnan & Schauer, 2000; O’Keefe et al., 1994; Rollins & 
Bremser, 1997). In contrast, research on the PCAOB inspections has used audit client-specific 
measures to evaluate the extent to which inspection contributes to audit quality (Abbott, Gunny, 
& Zhang, 2013; Carcello et al., 2011; Gramling, Krishnan, & Zhang, 2011; Gunny & Zhang, 
2013; Offermanns & Peek, 2011). Other studies have researched the effect of inspection on the 
composition of the audit market (DeFond & Lennox, 2011), which allows conclusions about the 
general level of audit quality. Others have directly asked financial experts about the effect of peer 
reviews and PCAOB inspections on audit quality (Blankley et al., 2012; Daugherty & Tervo, 
2010; Felix & Prawitt, 1993; McCabe, Luzi, & Brennan, 1993; Newman & Oliverio, 2010).  
1.3 Background: development of U.S. audit regulation  
1.3.1 The emergence of external quality controls 
External quality control has been a central element in the debate on maintaining and enhancing 
audit quality, ever since in the 1960s, for the first time, questions about the performance, the 
credibility, and the role of audit firms began to rise (Zeff, 2003).10 The collapse of large 
companies resulted in huge losses to their investors and heightened congressional concern for 
the safety of customer funds (Federal Committee, 1976a). As a result of several disciplinary 
actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), large audit firms organised sporadic 
firm-on-firm reviews (Fogarty, 1996; Sperry et al., 1987). However, the debate about auditing 
came back in 1973 when detection of massive accounting frauds at Equity Funding and Penn 
Central Railroad brought the profession under serious attack by the U.S. Congress. For the first 
time, the profession’s legitimacy for self-regulation was heavily questioned. In particular, the 
investigations of two congressional subcommittees put the profession on the defence.  
The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation (Federal Committee, 1976a) criticised the 
self-regulatory framework of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 
for insufficiently serving the public interest, and regarded the SEC’s “hands-off approach” 
                                                     
10 Until the 1960s, the rapid increase in importance of audit companies in financial markets remained almost 
unobserved by the public and the media (Zeff, 2003, p. 196). 
 
  
 
22
concerning the organisation and supervision of the accounting profession as insufficient to 
protect public investors (Federal Committee, 1976a, pp. 31, 83). The Subcommittee on the 
Accounting Establishment (Federal Committee, 1976b) went as far as to mark the AICPA an 
aggressive lobbyist association combating government intervention in the profession’s affairs 
(Federal Committee, 1976b, pp. 11, 66, 103, 104). Because the regulatory setting was perceived as 
inadequately designed, the Subcommittee demanded the introduction of an inspection 
programme under a governmental authority:  
“The Federal Government should itself periodically inspect the work of independent 
auditors for publicly-owned operations. Such a mandatory inspection programme should 
be designed to provide assurance to the public and Congress that independent auditors 
are performing their responsibilities competently in accordance with proper standards of 
conduct. Periodic quality review could be conducted by the General Accounting Office, 
the SEC, or a special audit inspection agency” (Federal Committee, 1976b, p. 22). 
Although the proposal did not find a political majority, it was clear that the profession had to 
enhance its system of quality assurance. According to William Gregory, the institute’s board 
chairman in 1979/80, reforms became necessary because the council of the AICPA believed that 
Congress would enact new legislation to regulate the profession if “immediate steps were not 
then taken to bolster the profession’s system of self-regulation” (Gregory in Zeff, 2003, p. 201). 
Eventually, a voluntary peer-review programme was officially initiated by the AICPA in 1976 
(Giroux et al., 1995, p. 65). 
1.3.2 The voluntary peer-review system from 1977 to 1988 
Two different sections within the AICPA administered the peer review programme: the SEC 
Practice Section (SECPS) for firms auditing SEC clients and the Private Companies Practice 
Section (PCPS) for all the other firms. Members of the programme were required to undergo a 
peer review at least every three years and were required to adhere to the AICPA’s quality control 
standards (Loscalzo, 1979, p. 78; Sperry et al., 1987, p. 382). The programme was opposed by 
smaller audit firms, which considered the costs of a review process to be excessive (Fogarty, 
1996, p. 244). However, since the programme was established on a voluntary basis, audit firms 
were able to avoid the costs of a peer review by leaving the programme. Although the idea of a 
mandatory programme was frequently discussed (e.g. in the Anderson Committee of 1983), it 
was not implemented as it was argued that the costs would lead to a substantial erosion of 
membership (AICPA, 2005). This explains why the review programme never attracted a critical 
mass of practice units: by the mid-1980s, of about 46,000 AICPA member firms, only 13 per 
cent have been peer reviewed (Huff & Kelley, 1989, p. 35). However, the profession’s rejection 
of the programme soon became problematic.  
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In the 1980s, the increasing competition among the large audit firms worsened the professional 
climate and weakened the position of the audit firms in their relationship with their corporate 
clients (Donabedian, 1993). In addition, the saturation of the audit market and the continuous 
expansion of consulting services caused the traditional business models of the big accounting 
firms to be changed. The changing environment came along with the detection of several cases 
of fraudulent financial reporting and corporate failures. Once again, congressional hearings began 
to focus on the role of inappropriate audit practices. In 1987, the Treadway Commission, 
financed by the AICPA, was established to analyse “the extent, if any, to which the regulatory 
and law enforcement environment unwittingly may have tolerated or contributed to the 
occurrence of […] fraud” (Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 1989, p. 2). Eventually, 
the Commission concluded that the regulatory instruments were functioning well and as intended 
(Treadway Commission, 1987, p. 68). Thus, it considered but finally dismissed the possibility of 
replacing the existing private-sector regulation with direct government regulations and only called 
for a requirement for audit firms with public clients to participate in a peer review programme. 
This was in part due to the general understanding in the 1980s, in which government regulation 
was forced back by the government and the SEC adopted a less outwardly confrontational 
posture towards the accounting profession. Nevertheless, the AICPA was set under pressure to 
enhance the acceptability and perception of its peer review system. To this end, in particular the 
peer review’s participation rate had to increase significantly.  
In April 1987, the AICPA asked its members to vote whether the participation of the peer review 
programme should become mandatory for audit firms auditing one or more SEC clients. 
However, the profession rejected the introduction of a mandatory peer review system. Peer 
review became a divisive topic for the auditing community, pitting small audit firms that opposed 
it against larger firms that supported it (Berton, 1986). The later became indirectly supported by 
SEC, which threatened to launch its government review programme if the profession continued 
to reject peer reviews. This caused the AICPA to start broad-based lobbying actions among the 
profession. In a second vote in January 1988, AICPA members voted to adopt a mandatory peer 
review system, yet, a significant minority of almost a quarter of the members still opposed the 
introduction of a mandatory peer review in the final ballot (Berton, 1988). Nevertheless, the peer 
review system became mandatory.  
1.3.3 The mandatory peer review system from 1988 to 2002  
Audit firms had the choice to become a member of the SECPS or to enrol in the newly created 
AICPA Quality Review Programme (QRP). The procedures of the QRP and the SECPS review 
were similar and were designed as a compliance test to ensure the appropriateness of the firms’ 
quality systems. The only major difference was that the results in the SECPS were available for 
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the public, whereas the content of the QRP’s reviews were confidential. The fact that for SEC 
auditing firms two similar but separate peer review programmes were in operation caused 
confusion within the profession and towards its stakeholders (American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA), 1995). As a result, from 1990 onwards, Certified Public 
Accountancy (CPA) firms with public company clients were required to join the SECPS (Russell 
& Armitage, 2006, p. 47).11 Audit firms in the SECPS were reviewed every three years and each 
review covered a 12-month period. Audit firms could choose to be reviewed by a team which 
was either assembled by the AICPA, a private CPA association, or a review team where all 
members belonged to another audit firm, the latter being chosen in more than 90 per cent of the 
cases (Gunny & Zhang, 2006).  
Following the major reform in 1987, the profession’s mandatory peer review system operated for 
14 years. The fundamental transition from the third to the fourth regime was then executed 
within just a couple of months when, between autumn 2001 and spring 2002, a wave of 
revelations of accounting fraud at large U.S. companies eroded the financial and political 
establishments (Romano, 2004, p. 116).  
In the autumn of 2001, Enron, at that time, the seventh-largest company in the U.S. collapsed. 
The detected fraud involved misreported cash flows, fictitious income, and off-balance sheet 
liabilities. In January 2002, Global Crossing filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and was 
accused of being engaged in various fraudulent accounting practices. In March, Tyco 
International’s top management was accused of the theft of over €100 million from the 
company. In the same month, the fraud of Adelphia Communications, which was the fifth largest 
cable company, became public after the company announced that it had lied about its financial 
condition, and in June, the company collapsed into bankruptcy. Then, when the U.S. markets 
were just beginning “to recover from the hangover left after the fraud-induced bankruptcy at 
Enron (Mulford & Comiskey, 2011, p. 422), another multi-billion fraud became news. In June 
2002, WorldCom filed for bankruptcy; its assets had been inflated by about $11 billion, nearly $4 
billion was added improperly to property, plant, and equipment—all unnoticed by the auditor.  
Both Enron and WorldCom were audited by Arthur Andersen, which received an unmodified 
peer review conducted by Deloitte & Touche in December 2011 (Mason, 2005, p. 6). These 
corporate scandals resulted in an outcry from the public for the political actors to “do 
something” (Mulford & Comiskey, 2011, p. 423). As a lobbyist put it: “When the WorldCom 
scandal hit, it became to me, a bit of a very different attitude and atmosphere, if not a political 
tsunami” (in Romano, 2004, p. 145). Within that tsunami, Congress passed, almost unanimously, 
                                                     
11 In 1995, the QRP and the PCSP were merged into the AICPA Peer Review Programme, which from that moment 
organised peer reviews for non-SEC auditors. 
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the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) legislation in July 2002, which replaced the 30-year-old self-regulation 
by one statutory regulation, overseen by Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB).12 
1.3.4 Governmental inspections under the PCAOB regime 
The goal of the SOX was to improve audit quality and to increase the liability of audit firms to 
third parties relying on audited financial reports, and it contains 11 titles13. Although the creation 
of the PCAOB is not the only feature of the SOX, it is unquestionably the primary focus and it is 
explicitly committed to:  
“oversee the audit of public companies […] in order to protect the interests of investors 
and further the public interest in the preparation of informative, accurate, and independent 
audit reports” (SOX Sec. 101 (a)).  
Since it comprises elements of both private and governmental bodies, the regulatory architecture 
of the PCAOB is described as a unique “quasi-public” entity (Boster, 2007, p. 135). The PCAOB 
is overseen by the SEC, which appoints the members of the PCAOB’s Board and approves new 
rules and auditing standards for it (SOX Sec. 101 (e); Sec. 107 (a)). Most importantly, the SOX 
grants the SEC the right to modify the powers of the PCAOB and holds the authority over the 
organisation’s budget (SOX Sec. 109 (b)). At the same time, the SOX explicitly established the 
PCAOB as an independent, private, non-profit entity (SOX Sec. 101 (1)). This releases the 
organisation from the administrative burdens of a federal agency because it benefits, for example, 
from the higher flexibility in the recruitment process of employees (Lennox & Pittman, 2010, p. 
86). The SOX mandates that three members have to be independent from the accounting 
profession while two members must be certified public accountants (SOX Sec. 101 (e)). 
To fulfil its tasks, SOX vested the PCAOB with a sustainable funding system. By Sec. 102 (f) and 
Sec. 109 (e) public companies are annually obliged to pay, based on their equity market 
capitalisation, an accounting support fee to the PCAOB, which represent 99 per cent of the 
PCAOB’s operating revenues (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 2011). The 
PCAOB has about 800 staff members who are located in 16 offices throughout the U.S. It 
                                                     
12 The passing of the Act was accelerated by midterm elections in autumn 2002 (Romano, 2004) and the down 
swinging of the U.S. economy. Banner (1997) concluded that most of the major instances of securities regulation have 
come right after sustained price declines, when dropping prices removed the opposition to regulation. 
13 Title I establishes the new regulatory body, the PCAOB, and determines its powers. Title II aims at strengthening the 
audit firm’s independence and prohibits actions that may cause a conflict of  interest. Title III increases the 
accountability of  the top management when an audit is executed and strengthens the role of  the Audit Subcommittee 
in the corporate governance process. Title IV improves the integrity and reliability of  financial disclosures, prohibits 
personal loans from a company to its directors or executive officers, and requires the establishment and reporting of  
an internal control system for SEC-registered companies. Title V specifies the regulation of  analyst reports, while Title 
VI and VII address and strengthen the role of  the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC). Title VIII reinforces the 
penalties on corporate and criminal frauds. Title IX is related to white collar crime and Title X to corporate tax return. 
Title XI reviews additional guidelines regarding the rules and punishments concerned with fraudulent corporate 
activities. 
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performs its work through four programme areas: the development of new auditing standards, 
the registration of public accounting firms, the inspection of public accounting firms, and the 
enforcement and investigation process in cases of violations of laws and the PCAOB’s rules.  
Undeniably, the inspection process is the PCAOB’s most crucial task, as it is seen as the primary 
vehicle for improving overall auditing quality (Boster, 2007, p. 131; Carcello et al., 2011, p. 85; 
Church & Shefchik, 2012, p. 45; Roybark, 2006; Wegman, 2008, p. 8). Likewise, former PCAOB 
chairman Daniel Goelzer stated that the inspection programme is the “fundamental tool 
Congress gave to the Board to restore public confidence in audited financial reporting” (Goelzer, 
2005, p. 1). PCAOB inspections examine a firm’s work on selected audit engagement and the 
firm’s quality control system (SOX 104 Sec. 104 (d); PCAOB, 2011, p. 5). More than half of its 
budget is used to fund inspections, and more than 60 per cent of PCAOB staff work in the field 
of registration and inspection (Hanson, 2012; Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 
2011). The inspection aims at identifying:  
“any act or practice or omission to act by the registered public accounting firm, or by any 
associated person […] that may be in violation of this Act, the rules of the Board, the 
rules of the Commission, the firm’s own quality control policies, or professional 
standards” (SOX Sec. 104 (c)).  
All auditing companies with publicly traded securities in the U.S. must be registered with the 
PCAOB, and thereby are subject to the PCAOB’s oversight system (SOX Sec. 102 (a)).14 The 
PCAOB distinguishes between annual and triennial inspections: audit firms with more than 100 
clients are inspected every year, firms with 100 or fewer clients every three years (SOX Sec. 104 
(b); PCAOB Rule 4001). Broadly, the inspection process covers a wide spectrum of activities, 
from the evaluation of an audit firm’s tone-at-the-top, partner compensations, and compliance 
with professional codes of conduct for the proper application of audit procedures and 
documentation, as well as assessing the appropriateness of the audit evidence collected (Glover et 
al., 2009, p. 230). During an inspection, the inspectors have access to any record in the firm and 
receive information by oral interviews and written responses (PCAOB Inspection Rule 4006). 
The selection of the audits for inspection is based on a risk-assessment, meaning that all the 
audits conducted by the audit firm are unlikely to be subjected to evaluation (Blankley et al., 
2012, p. 76; Wegman, 2008, p. 9).  
For every inspection, the PCAOB prepares an inspection report (SOX Sec. 104 (g)). The report 
is reviewed by the PCAOB, which then issues a final inspection report (SOX Sec. 104 (b), (f)). 
                                                     
14 At the end of 2011, 2,388 firms were registered with the PCAOB, 38 per cent of which were non-U.S. firms (Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board, 2011). As a result of the SOX, the AICPA restructured its peer review system. 
The AICPA Peer Review Programme is today the single programme for all AICPA firms subject to peer review. Thus, 
many audit firms with public firms as clients are today subject to monitoring by both the PCAOB and the AICPA’s 
peer review system (Bellovary & Mayhew, 2009, p. 8). 
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Until the final transmission of the report to the SEC, the inspected audit firm has several chances 
to ask for modifications or to attach comments to the report (PCAOB Inspection Rule 4008). 
The findings are disclosed in two sections. The first section is related to the inspection of the 
firm’s audit engagements. The report distinguishes between “clean reports”, where no audit 
defects in the selected audits are identified, and “deficiency reports” that list all serious 
weaknesses found in the chosen engagements. The second section describes the deficiencies 
identified by the inspectors in the internal quality control system. In addition, the report includes 
the audit firm’s response to the findings. Until 2009, statistical information about the specific 
inspection was only provided in reports for triennially inspected audit firms. Since 2010, all 
reports contain a broader scope of information, putting the discovered deficiencies into statistical 
context (Wainberg et al., 2011). The PCAOB issues all reports on its website. However, the 
report is only partially published: SOX Sec. 104 (g) and PCAOB Rule 4009 state that observed 
weaknesses in the firm’s quality control system will only be published if the firm fails to address 
these deficiencies within one year.15 Identified weaknesses, which were resolved, remain 
unknown to the public. The only possibility for the PCAOB to advise the public of the results of 
its inspections are summaries, compilations, or general reports where the identification of the 
firm to which the quality control criticism is related is not possible (PCAOB Inspection Rule 
4010). If no violations with the PCAOB’s rules or standards are identified, the inspections 
process ends with the disclosure of the report.  
In the next section, the research findings on the former self-regulatory peer review system and 
the current inspection PCAOB system are categorized and analysed along the framework, and 
finally compared.  
1.4 Analysis of the AICPA Peer-Review System 
1.4.1 Outcome validity of peer reviews 
As outlined in the organising framework, the validity of an external quality control system is 
determined by the independence and expertise of the reviewer and the inspector respectively. 
Wallace (1991) was the first to research whether the results of peer reviews were affected by the 
reviewer’s degree of independence from the reviewed audit firm. Independence was 
operationalised, classifying the reviewer into three main categories: an AICPA appointed review 
team, firm-on-firm arrangement, or an association-sponsored review team. As, however, no 
significant relationship was found between the type of reviewer and peer review outcomes, the 
                                                     
15 The PCAOB has not explained why defects in the quality control system are not made public (Hilary & Lennox, 
2005). Hodowanitz and Solieri (2005) argue that the effective lobbying of the Big 4 to ensure censorship of the more 
sensitive findings as the reason for keeping the findings concerning the quality control system under lock. 
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study concluded that peer reviews provided valid and reasonable results. More recent studies, 
however, conflicted with the results of Wallace (1991).  
Hilary and Lennox (2005) and Anantharaman (2012) provided evidence that reviewing firms 
were more likely to issue unfavourable opinions if they were a direct competitor of the reviewed 
firm, whereby the local distance between the two firms served as proxy for competition. 
Anantharaman (2012) showed that firms that chose their reviewers were more likely to obtain 
more favourable peer reviews compared to firms which were reviewed by a review team 
composed by the AICPA. In addition, the study demonstrated that experienced reviewers were 
more likely to issue unfavourable review reports that less experienced reviewers. Lennox and 
Pittman (2010) examined whether an audit firm was more likely to switch to another reviewer if 
its previous peer review outcome was cautious or adverse. The strategic reviewer change by audit 
firms would be consequential to the revealed relationship between a specific reviewer and review 
outcome (Wallace, 1991). Indeed, the findings indicated that audit firms were more likely to 
switch to another reviewer if their previous peer review opinions were modified or adverse. In 
this sense, the peer review programme caused audit firms to strategically select their reviewers as 
the type of reviewer had a considerable effect of the review outcome. 
The information advantage of the reviewer over the audit firm was identified by King et al. 
(1994) and Emby et al. (2002) as another factor affecting the validity of the review’s outcome. 
They found that reviewers were unable to disregard outcome knowledge in the peer review 
process, which led to biased peer review results. King et al. (1994) showed that the allegation of 
lack of independence of the audit firm negatively impacted the reviewer’s assessment of the audit 
quality of the firm under review. This ultimately resulted in less favourable review results. Emby 
et al. (2002) demonstrated that auditors who knew about a specific negative outcome rated 
outcome-consistent evidence items as more important while positive outcome information did 
not appear to affect the reviewers’ evidence evaluation.  
Although the majority of research findings provide evidence that the validity of peer reviews was 
impaired for several reasons, the accounting profession had an opposing view. Ehlen and Welker 
(1996) documented that audit firms have a positive perception of their reviewers and the system 
in general. The accounting profession’s satisfaction with self-regulation can also be seen in the 
study of Wallace and Cravens (1994) and their analysis of statements by reviewed firms about 
their review reports. Based on a descriptive analysis of response letters to the AICPA, the study 
concluded that the majority of the reviewed firms accepted the proposed suggestions from the 
reviewers.  
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Taking the different studies together, an interesting picture emerges: while the accounting 
profession publicly emphasised that the peer review system worked effectively in terms of 
improving audit quality (Ehlen & Welker, 1996; Wallace & Cravens, 1994), it seems that they also 
actively took advantage of the existing loopholes of the system (Hilary & Lennox, 2005; Lennox 
& Pittman, 2010). Table 1 provides an overview of empirical studies with findings concerning the 
validity of the peer review system.  
Table 1: Findings on the outcome validity of peer reviews 
Authors & date Method* Research design Sample Key findings 
     Wallace  
(1991) 
 
A Statistical analysis of the 
relationship of the type of 
peer reviewer and review 
findings. Three different 
reviewer kinds: AlCPA-
appointed review team; 
CPA firm; state sponsored 
team.  
352 public peer 
review files from 
1980 through 1986. 
The type of reviewer did 
not affect the number of 
negative review findings.  
          Wallace & Cravens 
(1994) 
A Descriptive analysis of peer 
reviewee response letters to 
the AICPA. 
AICPA cover letters 
accompanying review 
files from 1980 
through 1986. 
The majority of the 
reviewed firms accepted 
the proposed suggestions 
from the review team. 
          King et al.  
(1994) 
E Experiment on the effect 
of a reviewer’s knowledge 
of a proceeding against the 
audit firm.  
49 experienced 
auditors reviewed an 
attestation 
engagement 
performed by 
auditors from small 
accounting firms. 
Peer reviewer’s 
knowledge of a negative 
allegation negatively 
influences a peer 
reviewer’s evaluation.  
          Ehlen & Welker 
(1996) 
S Survey among CPA firms 
about peer review. 
586 reviewed firms 
nationwide. 
Reviewers were seen as 
fair in the review process.  
          Emby et al.  
(2002) 
E Examination of the 
influence of prior outcome 
knowledge on peer 
evaluation judgments of 
audit partners. 
122 audit partners 
from Canada and the 
United States. 
Auditors who received 
outcome information 
tended to rate outcome-
consistent items of 
evidence as more 
important. 
          Hilary & Lennox 
(2005) 
A Statistical analysis of the 
relationship between peer 
reviewer characteristics and 
review findings. 
Sample of 1,001 
reviews issued in the 
years 1997 to 2003. 
Several characteristics of a 
peer reviewer affected the 
review outcome. 
          Lennox & Pittman 
(2010) 
A Statistical analysis of the 
association between review 
outcome and the change of 
an audit firm's reviewer.  
545 PCAOB 
inspection reports in 
2007; 1,001 peer 
review reports 
between 1997 to 
2003.  
Audit firms chose their 
reviewers strategically.  
          Anantharaman 
(2012) 
A Comparison of peer review 
reports and PCAOB 
inspection reports. 
407 firms’ last peer 
review and first 
PCAOB inspection 
report. 
The type of reviewer 
affected the review result.  
          
A: archival, E: experimental, S: survey. 
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1.4.2 Recognition of peer reviews by the financial market 
The recognition of review results was analysed in empirical archival research and in studies 
focusing on individual participants. 
Archival research used different indicators for the reaction of the financial market to analyse 
whether peer review outcomes were used and perceived as a quality-differentiating factor 
(Francis et al., 1990; Giroux et al., 1995; Hilary & Lennox, 2005). The first insights about the 
market’s reaction to review results was provided by Francis et al. (1990). They hypothesised that 
in the case of perceived quality differentiation among audit firms, peer reviewed firms would 
charge higher audit fees. However, they did not identify audit fees as being associated with 
participation in the (at that time) voluntary peer-review system. Giroux et al. (1995) extended the 
study to the public sector audit market. In contrast to Francis et al., they found that firms that 
had been reviewed positively were able to charge significantly higher audit fees because the 
specific public sector audit market was characterised by a high level of competition and a broad 
range of low quality audit suppliers. Hilary and Lennox (2005) used the changes in the number of 
clients as being indicative of the audit market’s awareness of peer reviews. As in their sample, 
reviewed firms that achieved clean opinions gained clients, whereas firms given modified 
opinions lost clients. The authors concluded that peer reviews were able to provide credible 
information to audit clients and that the audit market reacted to the information provided by 
peer review reports.  
The second broad research strand examined the perceptions and attitudes of individual actors 
(e.g. individual investors, clients of audit companies) towards peer review (Bellovary & Mayhew, 
2009; Deis & Giroux, 1992; File et al., 1992; Schneider & Ramsay, 2000; Woodlock & Claypool, 
2001).  
File et al. (1992) asked bankers and auditors for their opinion on the influence of several factors 
on their judgment of an auditor’s credibility. The findings support Francis et al. (1990) and 
identified peer review reports as having the least influence on financial judgments. Similar results 
were found in the study by Schneider and Ramsay (2000), in which bank lending-officers 
executed an ex-post evaluation of audit quality. The authors found that peer reviews did not 
directly affect the willingness of the bank lending-officers to approve lines of credit. This is 
consistent with Woodlock and Claypool (2001), who revealed that almost two thirds of audit 
committees of public companies did not consider peer review reports when recommending an 
audit firm to the management of the company. In line with these results, Bellovary and Mayhew 
(2009) showed with experimental research design that peer review reports did little to enhance 
quality choices. 
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Surveys among audit firms about the perception of their stakeholders towards review reports 
revealed a similar and critical attitude from audit firms. In the survey of Elsea and Stewart (1995), 
over 90 per cent of CPA firms doubted that their clients were interested in their review results 
and only 20 per cent believed that companies referred to review results when selecting a CPA 
firm for auditing services. Consequently not even half of the members used their reviews as 
promotional or marketing instruments. Similar results were revealed in a survey study by Ehlen 
and Welker (1996), in which a large majority shared the opinion that their client firms did not 
seem to care about the reviews. Interestingly, in both surveys, audit firms that had been 
conducting reviews for a longer period of time were less critical than auditors who had just 
begun to work as peer reviewers, which might suggest that experiencing a review reduced the 
initial negative attitude to it.  
Payne (2003) identified the timeliness of a report’s issuance as a factor which would explain the 
financial market’s disinterest for review results, as found by the majority of studies (Alam et al., 
2000; Ehlen & Welker, 1996; Elsea & Stewart, 1995; File et al., 1992; Francis et al., 1990; 
Schneider & Ramsay, 2000; Woodlock & Claypool, 2001). He assumed that the ability of an audit 
firm’s client to deduce audit quality from the peer review findings decreased as the time between 
peer reviews increased. In fact, the results of his experiment indicate that a one-year review 
period, in contrast to the three-year review period at that time, would have allowed clients to 
identify high-quality auditors. This is consistent with a survey by Russell and Armitage (2006), in 
which audit firms stated that a three-year cycle provided a two-year window for performing 
substandard work. The peer review’s complexity was identified as an alternative and/or 
additional explanation by Alam et al. (2000), who showed that review experts questioned the 
investment community’s ability to understand the underlying procedures and mechanisms of a 
peer review process, which would lead the investors to disregard review results in decision-
making processes.  
Table 2 provides an overview of empirical studies with findings concerning the perception and 
recognition of peer reviews in financial decision-making.  
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Table 2: Findings on the perception and recognition of peer reviews by financial actors 
 
Authors & date Method* Research design Sample Key findings 
 Francis et al. 
(1990) 
A Audit fees as proxy for 
audit quality, to see 
whether reviewed firms are 
perceived as quality-
differentiated auditors. 
208 audit 
observations in 
1984/1985.  
Voluntary membership in the 
peer review programme did 
not affect the audit fees of 
audit firms.  
          File et al.  
(1992) 
S Perception of bankers and 
auditors about peer 
reviews. 
Questionnaires sent 
to 100 bankers and 
100 randomly 
selected auditors. 
Peer review reports had only 
marginal effect on financial 
judgments of financial experts. 
          Elsea & Stewart 
(1995) 
S Perception of CPA firms 
about the peer reviews 
system. 
437 questionnaires 
from reviewed 
Colorado CPA firms. 
Audit firms did not think that 
their clients were interested in 
their peer review results.  
          Giroux et al. 
(1995) 
A Audit fees as proxy for 
audit quality, to see 
whether reviewed firms are 
perceived as quality-
differentiated auditors. 
232 quality review 
control audits 
conducted by the 
Texas Education 
Agency for its fiscal 
years 1985 to 1988. 
Peer reviewed audit firms 
charged higher audit fees 
compared to non-reviewed 
firms. 
          Ehlen & Welker 
(1996) 
S Perception of CPA firms 
about peer review. 
586 reviewed firms 
nationwide. 
Audit Firms believed that their 
clients would not show interest 
in review results. 
          Alam et al.  
(2000) 
A Perception of financial 
analysts, banks, and audit 
clients of peer review. 
233 usable 
responses: 42 per 
cent from CPA 
firms, 42 per cent 
from banks, and 18 
per cent from 
financial analysts. 
Participants did not believe 
that audit firms clients and 
investors understand the 
procedures and mechanisms of 
a peer review. 
          Schneider & 
Ramsay (2000) 
S Perception of bank lending 
officers about peer 
reviews. 
Survey of 193 bank-
lending officers. 
Peer reviews did not directly 
affect the financial judgment of 
bankers. 
          Woodlock & 
Claypool (2001) 
S Perception of peer reviews 
by audit committees. 
Checklist survey of 
68 audit committees 
serving large publicly 
traded corporations. 
Audit committees selected 
audit firm without considering 
peer review reports. 
          Payne (2003) E Experiment designed to 
investigate audit quality 
and pricing under settings 
that manipulate the timing 
of the peer review process. 
Eight multi-period 
laboratory markets 
contracting via a 
computerised sealed-
offer auction. Each 
market has four 
buyers (clients) and 
four sellers 
(auditors). 
The three-year review cycle 
impeded market’s reaction 
towards peer review.  
          Hilary & Lennox 
(2005) 
A Association between peer 
review reports and changes 
in number of clients. 
1,001 reviews issued 
in the years 1997–
2003. 
Reviewed firms gained (or lost) 
clients after they received clean 
(or modified/adverse) 
opinions. 
      
A: archival, C: commentary, E: experimental, I: interview, R: review, S: survey. 
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1.4.3 Impact of peer reviews on audit quality  
As outlined in the framework, the third aspect of categorising the research focuses on the link 
between external quality controls and the audit quality delivered. To draw conclusions about the 
peer review system’s effect on audit quality, various studies have used alternative audit quality 
measures, and analysed whether reviewed audit firms in comparison with non-reviewed firms 
provided higher audit quality (Casterella, Jensen, & Knechel, 2009; Deis & Giroux, 1992; 
Krishnan & Schauer, 2000; Rollins & Bremser, 1997).  
Deis and Giroux (1992) compared the peer review findings for small CPA firms, which were 
auditing school districts, with findings of external quality controls conducted by the Audit 
Division of the Texas Education Agency. They concluded that peer-reviewed audit firms 
performed higher quality audits. Rollins and Bremser (1997) analysed whether certain audit firm 
characteristics were related to enforcement actions against the auditor. In fact, the logistic 
regression model showed that peer-reviewed firms were less likely to receive SEC sanctions than 
non-reviewed audit firms. Krishnan and Schauer (2000) used the level of compliance with 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) as being indicative of audit quality. They 
examined the financial statements of various companies to evaluate whether the required 
accounting disclosures had been made in different areas. They found that the statements of peer-
reviewed firms complied more with GAAP than those of non-reviewed audit firms. Casterella et 
al. (2009) associated audit quality with the occurrence of litigation or claim of malpractice against 
an audit firm. On the basis of a regression model, they revealed that the number of weaknesses 
identified in peer review reports was associated with audit failure. 
Instead of an alternative audit quality measurement, Giroux et al. (1995) used audit fees as being 
indicative of audit quality. The study revealed that peer-reviewed audit firms charged significantly 
higher audit fees. As no fee differences were identified on a per-hour basis, the authors 
concluded that higher fees correlate with more extensive audit procedures, which in turn 
indicated a higher level of quality audits.  
The empirical findings which demonstrated the peer review’s positive impact on audit quality was 
supported by Grant et al. (1996), who modelled auditing as a multi-person social dilemma. In a 
series of laboratory experiments, they showed the difficulty of obtaining a high level of average 
audit quality in a setting with no external quality controls, whereas audit quality increased in a 
peer review system.  
In contrast, Alam et al. (2000), O’Keefe et al. (1994), and Shafer et al. (1999) neglected the 
positive link between peer reviews and audit quality. Similarly to Krishnan and Schauer (2000), 
O’Keefe et al. (1994) analysed the violations of the GAAS. However, in their analysis the 
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participation in peer reviews was not significantly related to violations. Shafer et al. (1999) 
questioned whether adverse peer review opinions were viewed as deterrents to aggressive 
reporting decisions. In an experiment, professional auditors were asked to estimate the likelihood 
of a material misstatement being detected as a result of a peer review. Most of the participants 
stated that the effect of peer reviews was marginal, leading the authors to conclude that peer 
reviews did not provide adequate incentives for firms to reduce the incidence of financial 
statement misstatements. Alam et al. (2000) asked audit firms, audit clients, financial analysts, and 
bankers to rank the importance, and evaluate the effectiveness, of different aims of the peer 
review programme. The results show that the peer review instrument was not perceived as an 
adequate instrument for reducing audit failures and detecting audit fraud in financial statements. 
Interestingly, the peer review programme was identified as an important and effective measure to 
maintain the self-regulatory system of the profession.  
Surveys among audit firms that participated in peer reviews provided similar results. Although 
there was a generally positive orientation towards peer reviews, audit firms questioned the 
programme’s contribution to audit quality (Ehlen & Welker, 1996; Felix & Prawitt, 1993; 
McCabe et al., 1993). In the survey of McCabe et al. (1993), almost all respondents reported that 
peer review increased a firm’s ability to comply with professional standards. At the same time, 
almost half of the respondents doubted that peer review improved the likelihood of detecting 
material misrepresentation. The negative view concerning the association between peer review 
and delivered audit quality is consistent with the figures of Felix and Prawitt (1993). In their 
study, only one third of respondents reported positive changes in their audit practices as a result 
of peer review. This revelation is also supported by the study of Ehlen and Welker (1996) in 
which almost every firm that had been reviewed more than once described reviews as more 
cosmetic than substantial. 
Russell and Armitage (2006) identified several loopholes within the peer review system which 
might explain the profession’s sceptical view of the system’s effect on audit quality. The authors 
showed how particular aspects of the systems allowed audit firms with defective quality control 
systems to successfully pass a review process. Through a questionnaire, reviewed firms were 
asked whether they used actions that were defined as potential loopholes. Almost half of the 
audit firms responded that they worked on selected engagement documents before these were 
submitted to the reviewer. One fifth of the firms were even able to self-select the engagement 
subject for review and the majority selected cases with a low risk of receiving negative peer-
review comments.  
Table 3 provides an overview of empirical studies with findings on the effect of peer reviews on 
the audit quality delivered.  
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Table 3: Findings on the effect of peer reviews on the audit quality delivered 
 
Authors & date Method* Research design Sample Key findings 
     Bremser & 
Gramling (1988) 
A Number of comments as 
proxy for educational 
contribution to audit quality. 
66 CPA firms that had 
been peer reviewed at 
least twice. 
The participation in a 
peer review decreased 
the number of 
comments in review 
reports.  
          Deis & Giroux 
(1992) 
A Relationship between peer 
review membership and 
governmental control 
findings.  
308 quality control 
reviews from 1984 to 
1989. 
Peer review improved 
the quality of audit 
services. 
          Felix & Prawitt 
(1993) 
S Perception of CPA firms 
about the peer review 
system. 
115 questionnaires filled 
by audit firms.  
30 per cent of CPA 
members reported 
positive changes in their 
audit practices as a result 
of peer reviews. 
          McCabe et al. 
(1993) 
S Perception of CPA partners 
about the peer review 
system. 
195 firms participating in 
peer reviews.  
The majority of firms 
doubted that peer review 
increased a firm’s ability 
to detect material 
misrepresentation.  
          O’Keefe et al. 
(1994) 
A Statistical analysis of the 
relationship between peer 
review and violations of 
GAAS reporting standards.  
935 reports from 1986.  The participation in peer 
review was not related to 
violations of reporting 
standards. 
          Giroux et al. 
(1995) 
A Time of audit engagement as 
a surrogate for audit quality. 
232 quality review 
control audits conducted 
by the Texas Education 
Agency between 1985 to 
1988. 
Reviewed firms spent 
more time on audit 
engagements.  
          Grant et al. 
(1996) 
E Experimental design, 
auditing modelled as a multi-
personal social dilemma. 
A series of laboratory 
experiments using 142 
upper level under-
graduate accounting 
majors and first-year 
MBA students as 
subjects. 
Audit quality increased in 
a self-regulatory regime. 
          Rollins & 
Bremser (1997) 
A Relationship between peer 
review and enforcement 
actions. 
91 enforcement cases. The participation in peer 
reviews decreased the 
likelihood of receiving 
SEC sanctions. 
          Colbert & 
Murray (1998) 
A Statistical relationship 
between reviewee 
characteristics and peer 
reviewer’s’ review findings. 
422 small CPA firms. Firms with a larger 
number of previous 
reviews received more 
favourable ratings. 
          Shafer et al. 
(1999) 
E Experiment about the impact 
of formal sanction threats on 
auditors’ behaviour.  
Research instruments 
were mailed to a random 
sample of AICPA 
members. 
Peer review did not 
provide adequate 
incentives for audit firms 
to reduce the incidence 
of financial statement 
misstatements. 
          Krishnan & 
Schauer (2000) 
A Relationship between peer 
review and compliance with 
GAAP. 
35 clients of Big-6 firms, 
129 clients of non-Big-6 
firms. 
Participation in peer 
review increased 
compliance with GAAP.  
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Alam et al. 
(2000) 
S Survey on the effectiveness 
of peer review in improving 
audit quality among key 
constituents. 
233 usable responses: 42 
per cent from CPA 
firms, 42 per cent from 
banks, and 18 per cent 
from financial analysts.  
Peer review did not 
effectively reduce audit 
failures and detecting 
audit fraud in financial 
statements. 
          Casterella et al. 
(2009) 
A Relationship between files of 
insurance company 
specialising in professional 
liability and peer review 
reports.  
158 files of an insurance 
company that specialised 
in professional liability 
coverage for local and 
regional accounting 
firms. 
Peer review was 
identified as an effective 
mechanism for 
differentiating quality 
among audit firms. 
          
A: archival, C: commentary, E: experimental, I: interview, R: review, S: survey. 
 
1.5 Analysis of the PCAOB Inspection system 
1.5.1 Outcome validity of PCAOB inspections  
In the developed framework, the validity of external quality controls is determined by the 
independence and expertise of the individuals involved. However, from the studies on PCAOB 
inspections, particular insights about the technical skills and knowledge of PCAOB inspectors 
can be found (Blankley et al., 2012; Glover et al., 2009; Newman & Oliverio, 2010), while the 
independence of PCAOB inspectors remained neglected. 
Glover et al. (2009) found individual cases in which inspectors failed to look at the riskiest areas 
of an audit, or drew incorrect conclusions, due to the technical complexity or their lack of prior 
experience in the specific field of engagement. Blankley et al. (2012) were then the first who 
analysed the audit firms’ comments on the inspection report. The inspection results were 
classified as “deficient”, “severely deficient”, and “pervasive failure” reports. Most firms with 
engagement deficiencies disagreed with the inspections and stated that the critical findings were 
the result of inadequate documentation and/or the incorrect application of accounting principles 
by the inspectors, but they did not indicate actual audit deficiencies. In general, studies highlight 
that in particular the audit firms with detected deficiencies showed high levels of disagreement 
and dissatisfaction with the competencies and technical knowledge of the inspectors (Blankley et 
al., 2012; Newman & Oliverio, 2010), while inspectors were generally perceived as 
knowledgeable, competent, and fair (Newman & Oliverio, 2010) and appropriately prepared 
(Daugherty & Tervo, 2010). While most of the studies solely analysed triennially inspected audit 
firms, Church and Shefchik (2012) also included Big 4 firm data in their analysis. They found that 
the Big 4 firms disagreed more frequently with PCAOB findings than second-tier firms.  
Ragothaman (2012) demonstrated PCAOB inspectors to be tougher than peer reviewers. She 
compared the non-remediated weaknesses in the quality control system of triennially inspected 
audit firms with quality control weaknesses identified in peer review reports. The comparison 
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revealed that PCAOB quality reports disclosed a higher number of weaknesses regarding 
engagement performance and independence than were detected by modified and adverse peer 
review reports. However, it has to be noted that the absence of an overall grading of the PCAOB 
reports creates serious methodological problems. Depending on whether the study used modified 
or unmodified AICPA peer reviews as the unit of comparison, entirely different results occurred. 
Table 4 provides an overview of empirical studies with findings concerning the validity of the 
PCAOB inspection system.  
Table 4: Findings on the validity of the PCAOB inspections 
 
Authors & date Method* Research design Sample Key findings 
     Glover et al. 
(2009) 
C Evaluation of the PCAOB inspection 
process.  
Anecdotal evidence. Inspectors did not 
possess appropriate 
knowledge to assess 
audit engagements. 
          Daugherty & 
Tervo (2010) 
S Perception of triennially inspected 
audit firms of PCAOB inspections.  
146 accountants of 
small, registered 
public accounting 
firms. 
The performance of 
the PCAOB 
inspection team was 
seen as appropriate.  
          Newman & 
Oliverio (2010) 
S A survey, which focused on the 
PCAOB inspection process, of no-
deficiency firms. 
From a list of 251 
firms, a random 
sample of 115 firms 
was selected with no 
attention to whether 
they had received 
one or two no-
deficiency 
inspections. 
The majority of firms 
viewed the inspectors 
as knowledgeable, 
competent, and fair. 
          Blankley et al. 
(2012) 
A Content analysis of the response 
letters to the PCAOB from 
triennially inspected audit firms  
1,081 response 
letters. 
Firms with 
engagement 
deficiencies were 
more likely to 
disagree with the 
PCAOB’s assessment.  
          Church & 
Shefchik (2012) 
R Analysis of the inspection reports of 
large accounting firms. 
All 2004–2009 
inspection reports 
from large 
accounting firms.  
Big 4 firms disagreed 
more frequently with 
findings than second-
tier firms.  
          Ragothaman 
(2012) 
A Comparison of quality control 
deficiencies in PCAOB reports and 
peer review reports.  
106 PCAOB reports 
for triennially 
inspected firms: 
2,355 AICPA peer 
review reports for 
firms with less than 
100 SEC audit 
clients. 
PCAOB inspectors 
are tougher than peer 
reviewers as  
PCAOB quality 
control reports 
contained a 
significantly higher 
number of 
deficiencies than peer 
review reports.  
          
A: archival, C: commentary, E: experimental, I: interview, R: review, S: survey. 
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1.5.2 Recognition of PCAOB inspections by the financial market 
Research has revealed the reaction of financial markets to PCAOB reports in two particular ways. 
Empirical studies, on the one hand, have tested whether PCAOB reports are associated with 
client changes (Abbott et al., 2013; Daugherty et al., 2011; Lennox & Pittman, 2010) or with 
stock price movements of clients (Offermanns & Peek, 2011). Experimental studies, on the other 
hand, have focused on the evaluations of financial experts concerning audit opinions based on 
PCAOB reports (Robertson & Houston, 2010).  
Lennox and Pittman (2010) analysed the association between the number of weaknesses (none, 
one, or many) in the PCAOB report and the changes in the number of clients following the 
report. Studies on the association between PCAOB reports and client changes (Abbott et al., 
2013; Daugherty et al., 2011; Lennox & Pittman, 2010) are based on the assumption that, to 
evade market-imposed penalties (e.g., higher costs of capital), public companies dismiss audit 
firms with deficiencies. They therefore expected a relevant increase, or decrease, in market share 
in terms of clients after receiving favourable, or unfavourable, reports. However, as no significant 
relationship was found, the study concluded an audit firm’s market share to be insensitive to 
PCAOB inspection reports. As their data consisted of triennially inspected firms, the three-year 
inspection cycle could be the reason because it creates a barrier that isolates high-quality auditors 
from low-quality providers, as revealed by Payne (2003) and Russell and Armitage (2006) in their 
studies on the peer review system. Another explanation could be seen in the way the template of 
the PCAOB reports is composed. In contrast to the former review system, which used 
predefined result categories (unmodified, modified, and adverse opinion), PCAOB reports do 
not provide users with a concluding and overall grading. Hence, it is not surprising that 76 per 
cent of audit firms with no-deficiency reports would prefer the PCAOB to introduce an overall 
measure of audit quality (Newman & Oliverio, 2010).  
However, the findings of several other studies show that PCAOB outcomes are perceived and 
recognised for financial decision-making by the financial markets (Abbott et al., 2013; Daugherty 
et al., 2011; Offermanns & Peek, 2011; Robertson & Houston, 2010, p. 20). 
Daugherty et al. (2011) pointed out that deficiency reports were positively associated with 
dismissal of audit firms by their clients. In addition, the analysis shows that companies that 
dismissed audit firms with reporting deficiencies were more likely to hire an audit firm with clean 
reports.16 Abbott et al. (2013) came to the same result. They examined the association between 
GAAP-deficient reports and changes in the number of clients. The authors found that triennially 
                                                     
16 However, interestingly, Daugherty et al. (2011) did not find evidence that non-remediated quality control deficiencies 
(which are made public when they have not been solved after a period of 12 months) lead to a loss of audit clients, 
which conflicts with multiple studies (Hodowanitz & Solieri, 2005; Lennox & Pittman, 2010; Newman & Oliverio, 
2010) that have criticised the PCAOB’s policy of keeping findings of the quality control system under lock. 
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inspected audit firms were more likely to be dismissed by their clients compared to audit firms 
without reported GAAP deficiencies. 
Robertson and Houston (2010) and Offermanns and Peek (2011) also found evidence for the 
financial market’s perception of PCAOB reports. Robertson and Houston (2010) demonstrated 
that, under certain conditions, PCAOB reports can serve as a tool for signalling the credibility of 
audit opinions. They categorised deficiencies into “low-severity” deficiencies (failures that do not 
materially affect the financial statements) and “high-severity” deficiencies (failures that increase 
the probability that an audit will fail to detect a material misstatement). Then, financial experts 
were asked on a nine-point Likert-type scale to state their opinion about the ability of the 
inspection reports to positively affect the credibility of the firm’s future opinions. Overall, 
participants believed that PCAOB inspections improve the credibility of future audit opinions. 
Offermanns and Peek (2011) found that shareholders are sensitive to the information contained 
in PCAOB inspection reports and view them as a meaningful signal of audit quality to investors. 
The researchers analysed the reaction of stock price movements of the audit firms’ clients to 224 
first-round and 134 second-round PCAOB inspection reports issued between 2005 and 2010. 
They demonstrated that the magnitude of market response to issuance of inspection reports 
corresponded to about 29 per cent of market response to earnings announcements.  
With the exception of the findings of Lennox and Pittman (2010), the majority of empirical 
research indicates that financial markets are sensitive to PCAOB inspections. However, from a 
methodological point of view, the absence of an overall assessment hampers the cross-study 
comparison. Studies on the PCAOB regime use different approaches to categorise PCAOB 
reports into “good” and “bad”. While several studies consider all identified deficiencies to be of 
economically equivalent importance and classify the reports according to the number of 
deficiencies (Hermanson, Houston, & Rice, 2007; Lennox & Pittman, 2010; Offermanns & Peek, 
2011) or the rate of deficiencies (Daugherty et al., 2011), other studies distinguish between the 
kind of deficiency (Abbott et al., 2013) or between the degree of severity of the inspected 
deficiencies (Blankley et al., 2012; Robertson & Houston, 2010).  
Even if PCAOB reports are considered by those making decisions, Wainberg et al. (2011) and 
Robertson et al. (2014) point out the risk of misreading the reports. Wainberg et al. (2011) asked 
experienced managers to make an auditor engagement decision on the basis of the PCAOB 
inspection reports for the audit firms. It appears that auditors continued to focus on anecdotal 
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deficiencies and failed to consider the implications of the statistical data provided in the reports.17 
Robertson et al. (2014) showed how PCAOB reports gave rise to a perception that was actually 
worse than reality, because the information provided in the reports was not taken into 
consideration equally: they showed how negative information in the reports had more of an 
effect on the judgment of financial experts concerning the credibility of the audit firm than did 
the positive information. Table 5 provides an overview of empirical studies with findings 
concerning the perception and recognition of PCAOB inspections in financial decision-making.  
Table 5: Findings on the perception and recognition of PCAOB inspections by financial actors 
Authors & date Method* Research design Sample Key findings 
     Lennox & 
Pittman (2010) 
A Association between the 
number of inspection 
findings and the change in 
the number of clients of 
small and large audit firms.  
545 PCAOB inspection 
reports through 2007; 
1,001 peer review reports 
between 1997 and 2003. 
No association was 
found between 
PCAOB inspection 
outcome and client 
losses.  
          Robertson & 
Houston (2010) 
E Association between the type 
of deficiencies and the 
anticipation of future audit 
opinions. 
142 MBA students as a 
proxy for non-professional 
investors. 
PCAOB reports served 
as a useful tool to 
improve the credibility 
of audit opinions.  
          Offermanns & 
Peek (2011) 
A Variance in stock return of 
auditors’ clients as an 
indication for market 
reaction to PCAOB 
inspection reports.  
224 first-round and 134 
second-round inspection 
reports from 2005 to 2010. 
PCAOB inspection 
reports affected the 
value of an audit firm’s 
client through their 
effect on information 
quality.  
          Wainberg et al. 
(2011) 
A Association between 
PCAOB reports and 
perceived and actual audit 
quality. 
1,129 PCAOB reports for 
small audit firms for the 
years 2004 to 2010. 
PCAOB reports were 
identified as ineffective 
instruments for 
signalling audit quality. 
          Daugherty et al. 
(2011) 
A Association between 
deficiency reports and the 
client loss of triennially 
inspected firms.  
748 inspections performed 
on triennially inspected 
firms for the years 2005 to 
2008. 
Negative PCAOB 
reports increased the 
likelihood of losing 
clients involuntarily; 
deficiencies related to 
the quality control 
system had no effect. 
          Robertson et al. 
(2012) 
S Association between 
PCAOB reports and 
perceived audit quality.  
90 responses from 
independent mailings to 
U.S. public company 
financial executives. 
PCAOB inspection 
reports decreased 
perceived audit quality. 
          Abbott et al. 
(2013) 
A Relation between the 
PCAOB inspection reports 
with GAAP deficiencies, and 
the audit firms and their 
clients. 
521 triennially inspected 
non-foreign accounting 
firms; PCAOB inspection 
reports filed from 2005 to 
2007. 
PCAOB inspections 
served as signal of audit 
quality for smaller 
firms. 
          
A: archival, C: commentary, E: experimental, I: interview, R: review, S: survey. 
                                                     
17 In the PCAOB’s first years, it was even more critical to base the assessment of the audit quality of large accounting 
firms upon the number of deficiencies: PCAOB reports of large audit firms were anecdotal in nature and did not 
provide users with statistical information that would allow them to assess the relative frequency of the detected 
deficiencies which caused misperceptions of audit quality. Following critics concerning the informative value of the 
PCAOB reports, the PCAOB began to add statistical information to all of their reports since 2010. 
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1.5.3 Impact of PCAOB inspections on audit quality 
The first insights about the impact of PCAOB inspections on audit quality can be found in 
studies which focused on the audit market composition. They showed how PCAOB inspections 
pushed “low-quality” auditors out of the market, which was interpreted as an increase of overall 
audit quality (Daugherty et al., 2011; DeFond & Lennox, 2011; Hermanson & Houston, 2008; 
Read, Rama, & Raghunandan, 2004).  
Read et al. (2004) demonstrated that small audit firms were much more likely to cease performing 
SEC audits in the post-SOX period than in previous periods due to the perception of a more 
stringent oversight by PCAOB. According to Hermanson and Houston (2008) this was 
particularly the case for small audit firms, as the research data shows that firms that inadequately 
addressed their quality control defects were among the smallest firms in terms of partners and 
employees per client. The vast majority of quality control defects were thereby related to audit 
performance issues, followed by independence, monitoring and addressing identified weaknesses, 
partner workload, and review of interim financial statements.  
The impact of PCAOB inspections on the segment of small auditors was also revealed by 
DeFond and Lennox (2011). The study indicates that from 2002 to 2004 almost every second 
small audit left the audit market. The exiting firms were of relatively low quality in terms of the 
total number and severity of weaknesses detected in inspections. The study used the likelihood of 
firms being issued with going-concern opinions as being indicative of audit quality, thereby 
determining that existing firms did in fact belong to the group of low-quality audit firms. The 
underlying assumption of studies using the frequency of going-concern opinions being indicative 
of audit quality (Gramling et al., 2011; DeFond & Lennox, 2011; Gunny & Zhang, 2013) is that 
that low-quality audit firms are more likely to yield to the pressure of their client, and therefore 
issue fewer going-concern opinions. The result was supported by Daugherty et al. (2011), who 
found that deficiency reports caused involuntary and voluntary client losses. The figures show 
that low-quality audit firms voluntarily resigned from their clients because the costs associated 
with regulatory compliance outweighed the benefits of auditing publicly traded companies.  
Several other studies have followed the approach of DeFond and Lennox (2011) and have 
utilised client-specific measures of audit quality, such as the frequency of going-concern opinions 
(DeFond & Lennox, 2011; Gramling et al., 2011; Gunny & Zhang, 2013) or the quality of 
earnings management (Carcello et al., 2011), to determine whether PCAOB inspections affect the 
quality provided by audit firms. The results point out the positive effect of PCAOB inspections 
on audit quality.  
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Gramling et al. (2011) based their analysis on inspection reports of triennially inspected audit 
firms from 2004 to 2006. They showed that audit firms with deficiency reports were more likely 
to issue going-concern opinions for financially distressed clients after their inspection than prior 
to their inspection. In contrast, Gunny and Zhang (2013) did not find a correlation between 
inspection outcome and the propensity to issue going-concern opinions. However, Gunny and 
Zhang (2013) also used abnormal accruals and restatements as an indication of audit quality. This 
is based on the idea that higher quality audit firms are more likely to limit management’s 
accounting policy choices, thereby reducing earnings management, than low-quality audit firms. 
The authors grouped the PCAOB reports into three categories and matched the clients to each 
triennially inspected auditor. The figures showed that low-audit-quality audit firms were 
positively associated with firms receiving a seriously deficient inspection report. Carcello et al. 
(2011) used reduced earnings management as being indicative of audit quality. They compared 
the financial statements of Big 4 clients over the 12-month period before the issuance of the 
inspection report and the 24-month period subsequent to the issuance of the inspection report. 
A significant decline was found in accruals following each of the first and the second PCAOB 
inspections. Thus, the study showed that PCAOB is an effective instrument for reducing 
earnings management.  
Another approach was followed by Gunny and Zhang (2006) who, similarly to Ragothaman 
(2012) and Anantharaman (2012), compared the outcomes of a firm’s first PCAOB inspections 
with its last peer review report and used the level of accounting discretion and earning’s 
informativeness as indicators of earnings quality. Their results identified PCAOB reports to be 
superior to peer reviews at distinguishing earnings quality across the portfolio of small audit 
firms. 
Studies that have surveyed audit firms have revealed the positive attitude of the profession 
concerning the system’s effect on audit quality. The findings suggest that small and large 
accounting firms evaluate the inspections differently. Whereas smaller firms do not agree with 
the statement that the inspection process has affected their audit services, large firms feel 
inspections have positively affected their audit business. Congruently, smaller firms do not agree 
that PCAOB inspections have improved overall audit quality, while larger firms view inspections 
as a positive contributor to audit quality (Daugherty & Tervo, 2010). Not surprisingly, the 
majority of firms with no reported deficiencies believe that the system contributes positively to 
the actual quality. Interestingly, although firms responded that, after having implemented reforms 
following their first inspection round, they received a no-deficiency report in their second 
inspection, still more than two thirds would prefer a five-year inspection cycle to a three-year one 
(Newman & Oliverio, 2010). Table 6 provides an overview of empirical studies with findings on 
the effect of PCAOB reports on audit quality.  
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Table 6: Findings on the impact of PCAOB inspections on audit quality 
 
Authors & date Method* Research design Sample Key findings 
     Lennox & 
Pittman (2010) 
A Association between the 
number of inspection 
findings and the change in 
the number of clients of 
small and large audit firms.  
545 PCAOB inspection 
reports through 2007; 
1,001 peer review reports 
between 1997 and 2003. 
No association was 
found between 
PCAOB inspection 
outcome and client 
losses.  
          Robertson & 
Houston (2010) 
E Association between the type 
of deficiencies and the 
anticipation of future audit 
opinions. 
142 MBA students as a 
proxy for non-professional 
investors. 
PCAOB reports served 
as a useful tool to 
improve the credibility 
of audit opinions.  
          Offermanns & 
Peek (2011) 
A Variance in stock return of 
auditors’ clients as an 
indication for market 
reaction to PCAOB 
inspection reports.  
224 first-round and 134 
second-round inspection 
reports between 2005 and 
2010. 
PCAOB inspection 
reports affected the 
value of an audit firm’s 
client through their 
effect on information 
quality.  
          Wainberg et al. 
(2011) 
A Association between 
PCAOB reports and 
perceived and actual audit 
quality. 
1,129 PCAOB reports for 
small audit firms for the 
years 2004 to 2010. 
PCAOB reports were 
identified as ineffective 
instrument for 
signalling audit quality. 
          Daugherty et al. 
(2011) 
A Association between 
deficiency reports and the 
client loss of triennially 
inspected firms.  
748 inspections performed 
on triennially inspected 
firms for the years 2005 to 
2008. 
Negative PCAOB 
reports increased the 
likelihood of losing 
clients involuntarily; 
deficiencies related to 
the quality control 
system had no effect. 
          Robertson et al. 
(2012) 
S Association between 
PCAOB reports and 
perceived audit quality.  
90 responses from 
independent mailings to 
U.S. public company 
financial executives. 
PCAOB inspection 
reports decreased 
perceived audit quality. 
          Abbott et al. 
(2013) 
A Relation between the 
PCAOB inspection reports 
with GAAP deficiencies and 
the audit firms and their 
clients. 
521 triennially inspected 
non-foreign accounting 
firms; PCAOB inspection 
reports filed from 2005 to 
2007. 
PCAOB inspections 
served as signal of audit 
quality for smaller 
firms. 
          
A: archival, C: commentary, E: experimental, I: interview, R: review, S: survey. 
 
1.6 Comparison 
The first question for which the literature was analysed was whether reviews and inspections lead 
to valid results. As explained in the framework, the validity of the results is determined by the 
expertise and objectivity of the external quality controls. The former peer review system was 
mostly criticised for its perceived lack of objectivity—only one study did not make this 
observation. In contrast, multiple studies revealed that the outcome results were significantly 
affected by the characteristics of the reviewing firm, representing a loophole that audit firms used 
to strategically change their reviewer after unfavourable review outcomes. Research studies with a 
similar focus could not be identified for the current PCAOB regime. Although the PCAOB is 
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established as a formally independent authority, the objectivity of inspectors should not be taken 
for granted. For this reason, formal independence and objectivity should not be used entirely 
synonymously. The formal independence of the PCAOB regime might not prevent its inspection 
process being influenced by the specific background and former affiliation of the particular 
inspectors.  
Regarding the level of expertise, the peer review system was highly accepted and reviewers were 
seen as competent. Concerning PCAOB inspections, Big 4 firms disagree more frequently with 
the findings than smaller firms. However, as only two studies directly asked audit firms about 
their opinion on PCAOB inspectors, and neither took into consideration the firms that already 
left the auditing market, conclusions have to be made with reservations. Table 7 shows the 
synthesised results of the validity of peer reviews and PCAOB inspections.  
Table 7: Synthesised results on outcome validity 
 
Elements of validity AICPA peer reviews PCAOB inspections 
Expertise High (perception of audit profession). Mixed (limited data). 
Independence Impaired (review result affected by 
type of reviewer). 
No studies exist. 
 
The framework’s second criterion refers to the question of whether financial markets recognise 
peer reviews and inspection reports as informative. When the peer review system was voluntary, 
financial markets considered peer review reports to be informative signals of audit quality 
(compared to non-reviewed firms). However, when the system became mandatory the peer 
review system’s signalling power decreased significantly: peer review reports had only a marginal 
effect on the financial judgments of financial experts and were not considered by audit 
committees in the selection process of audit firms. Peer reviews were not seen as transparent 
instruments to signal audit quality. The accounting profession shared this perception, as they did 
not believe that their clients would take review results into consideration. Thus, it can be 
concluded that while it was possible to differentiate between peer reviewed firms and non-
reviewed firms, markets were not able to differentiate between the results of the different types 
of review.  
Empirical findings concerning the market’s awareness of PCAOB reports are less clear. Indeed, 
some authors do not identify an association between PCAOB outcomes and client losses, 
whereas others point out that negative reports increase the likelihood of losing clients 
involuntarily and that stock movements of audit firms’ clients are sensitive to the issuance of 
inspection reports. Interestingly, not much work can be found on the perception of individual 
financial experts or of the accounting profession about the PCAOB inspections. Only one study 
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indicates that PCAOB reports improve the credibility of future audit opinions. Table 8 shows the 
synthesised result of whether peer reviews and PCAOB inspections were recognised for 
decision-making purposes.  
Table 8: Synthesised results on recognition for decision-making purposes 
 
AICPA peer reviews PCAOB inspections 
Voluntary system: recognised for decision-making. 
Mixed findings. 
Mandatory system: not-recognised for decision-making. 
Finally, the framework’s third aspect focuses on the impact of peer reviews and PCAOB reports 
on audit quality. Empirical work on peer reviews has mostly used alternative assessments, such as 
outcomes of inspections conducted by state authorities, SEC enforcement actions, or compliance 
with GAAP, to reveal the impact of peer reviews on overall audit quality. The studies indicate 
that reviewed firms (compared to non-reviewed firms) conducted higher quality governmental 
audits, were less likely to receive SEC sanctions, and showed fewer violations of GAAS reporting 
standards. Empirical work on the PCAOB has primarily used client-specific measures to assess 
the contribution of the inspection to overall audit quality. The results indicate that PCAOB 
opinions can distinguish earnings quality and that audit firms with detected deficiencies are more 
likely to issue going-concern opinions. Moreover, the rate of abnormal accruals of clients of audit 
firms declines subsequent to inspections. Another indicator of the PCAOB’s contribution to 
overall audit quality is that studies show that PCAOB inspections incentivise low-quality audit 
firms to exit the audit market.  
Table 9 shows the synthesised result of the impact of the peer reviews and PCAOB inspections 
on overall audit quality.  
Table 9: Synthesised result of the impact on audit quality 
 
AICPA peer reviews PCAOB inspections 
Voluntary system: increase of audit quality.  
Increase of audit quality. 
Mandatory system: no effect on audit quality. 
 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that surveys indicate that financial actors were highly critical 
of the peer review programme’s ability to enhance audit quality; figures show that the majority 
did not believe in the system’s effect on audit practices or its ability to detect material 
misrepresentation during a review process. Under the new PCAOB framework, triennially 
inspected firms tend to neglect the effect of PCAOB inspections on audit quality, while large 
audit firms believe the PCAOB to be efficient and effective in improving overall audit quality. 
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1.7 Research gaps  
The following section points out some blind spots in the field of audit regulation research. These 
are derived from findings in regulation theory and from the comparison of research on the peer 
review system with research on the PCAOB system.  
Individual characteristics of reviewers and PCAOB inspectors 
Research has examined the validity of peer reviews in various ways. However, it is striking that 
apart from direct surveys among the profession, studies on the expertise of peer review teams or 
analyses that take a closer and detailed look at the composition of review teams do not exist. 
Hence, insights are missing about the outcome and process effects of individual reviewer’s 
characteristics and of review team compositions. In particular, research has to address the 
possible effects of auditors for which peer reviews represent only an ancillary activity to their 
primary audit-related responsibilities (Carcello et al., 2011, p. 86). This is particularly important 
because, in the U.S. and other countries, the peer review system is still the dominant mode of 
external quality control for audit firms with non-listed companies as clients. The same research 
gap is identified concerning the PCAOB inspections. Although, anecdotal evidence indicates that 
PCAOB inspectors possess a high level of auditing experience (Glover et al., 2009; Lennox & 
Pittman, 2010), not much is really known about their background, their rationales for working 
for a governmental agency, their ties and intertwining in the auditing profession, and other 
possible process- and outcome-related factors.  
Process of PCAOB inspections 
In regulatory regimes the risk of “creative-compliance” exists. This term refers to the practice of 
“complying with” rules by box-ticking, rather than taking substantive organisational steps 
(Baldwin et al., 2012). Although Fogarty (1996) previously criticised that the “peer review process 
is predicated on the rather dubious presumption that the quality of the audit can be understood 
by an examination of the audit’s working papers”, the inspection procedures under the PCAOB 
are not significantly different. They are based on an ex-post evaluation of the work conducted by 
the audit firm, and a disagreement with the audit firm’s opinion about an audit engagement is 
interpreted as evidence of audit deficiency (Peecher et al., 2013, p. 21). Thus, it is likely that the 
PCAOB inspectors’ judgments are affected by the same factors as those found in studies on peer 
reviews (Emby et al., 2002; King et al., 1994; Peecher et al., 2013), and that the efficacy of 
PCAOB inspections may be enhanced by focusing on process modifications. This is particularly 
important as the intensity of inspections (e.g. the amount of inspected audits) is not static: during 
an inspection, the inspection plan can be revised in order to target additional audits, which in 
most instances increases the number of deficiencies, and thereby worsens the formal assessment 
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of audit quality (PCAOB member Goelzer, 2005). To date, this field has only been partially 
addressed by proposing evaluations of the inspection by the inspected firm (Daugherty & Tervo, 
2010), or by arguing for a transition from outcome-oriented judgments to a more process-
oriented approach (Peecher et al., 2013). Future research has therefore to move beyond the 
classical dichotomy of reviews versus inspections, to reveal the potential of process modifications 
of external quality controls on audit quality.  
Organisational learning  
Regulatory failure needs to be separated from the organisational failures of regulated parties. As 
Baldwin et al. (2012) explain, “a late train [does] not necessarily indicate poor railway regulation”. 
In the end, it is the audit firm that determines audit quality. Although the outcome results for an 
audit firm increase with the number of visits of the regulatory authority (e.g. Colbert & Murray, 
1998; Hermanson & Houston, 2009), the organisational learning process is unknown as the 
process of adjusting audit practices due to identified deficiencies is still unclear. In other words, 
what is really learned from the inspection process and whether and how the findings change and 
shift current audit practices, remains unfathomable. Insights about the organisational learning are 
in particular important to interpret the trend of external quality control mechanisms. Trends were 
used both in research on the former peer review system (Bremser & Gramling, 1988; Colbert & 
Murray, 1998) and on the PCAOB inspections (Ragothaman, 2012), to draw general conclusions 
about the overall audit quality. However, the interpretation of a “positive” trend is associated 
with methodological difficulties as different factors might have an effect on the results without 
enhancing the level of audit quality. Alternative explanations for the positive trend might be that 
the inspection philosophy shifted over time or that the audit firms have become better prepared 
for the inspections by providing special attention to issues that are likely targets for inspection 
(i.e., high-risk issues) or by “stylising working papers to appease inspectors” (Church & Shefchik, 
2012, p. 61).18 The lack of empirical findings about the processes of inspections and about the 
organisational learning of audit firms can be partially explained by the fact that field work in 
auditing is not existent (Gendron & Bédard, 2001; Power, 2003). However, qualitative methods, 
such as participatory observations, could explore the interplay of inspectors and the audit team 
during an inspection process – and provide answers to what is really learnt from external quality 
controls. 
Research driven by data rather than importance 
Regulatory actions fail when the established regulatory regime does not produce the outcomes 
stipulated in its mandate (Baldwin et al., 2012). The accounting manipulations of Enron and 
                                                     
18 In fact, the AICPA offered trial-run peer reviews to CPA firms without review experience to prepare them for the 
actual review process (Wallace, 1991). 
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other major companies were interpreted as evidence of serious shortcomings in the self-
regulatory system of the auditing profession. Given the fact that the overall annual audit failure 
was close to none (e.g. Francis, 2004; Palmrose, 1988), it was especially the role of large audit 
firms that were in the focus of the public and political outcry. Large accounting firms exert 
significant influence on the U.S. economy: they audit more than 80 per cent of all U.S. public 
companies, accounting for approximately 99 per cent of U.S.-based issuer market capitalisation 
(Roybark, 2006, p. 145). Yet, there is a paradoxical mismatch between the importance of large 
auditing firms and research about the impact of PCAOB inspection on this particular segment of 
the auditing profession. While it is known that triennially inspected firms that have received 
deficiency reports have a higher ratio of clients to personnel and relatively small personal 
resources (Hermanson & Houston, 2008; Hermanson et al., 2007), less industry expertise 
(Gunny, Krishnan, & Zhang, 2007), and clients with low earnings quality (Gunny & Zhang, 
2013), knowledge about annually inspected firms is limited.  
To date, only Carcello et al. (2011), Church and Shefchik (2012), and Gunny and Zhang (2013) 
analyse Big 4 data. But while Carcello et al. (2011), demonstrate that PCAOB inspections 
distinguish audit quality, Gunny and Zhang (2013) do not find supporting evidence. 
Methodological problems are the lack of variation of PCAOB reports for Big 4 firms (Abbott et 
al., 2013) and the fact that, although quality control deficiencies have been found in every 
inspection of these firms, they remain beyond the scope of academia because all criticism was 
addressed in a timely manner, and therefore, remain undisclosed (Church & Shefchik, 2012). 
While there is a vast bulk of research on the effect of large auditing firms on the international 
regulatory arena (Gillis, Petty, & Suddaby, 2014; Humphrey et al., 2006; Suddaby, Cooper, & 
Greenwood, 2007), it seems that research has somehow overlooked the local roots and causes of 
the shift from self-regulation to government regulation. To date, it has only scratched the surface 
of the big question: does government regulation decrease the risk of large accounting scandals?  
Table 10: Analysed data of studies on the PCAOB system 
 
Triennially inspected audit firms  Annually inspected audit firms 
•  •  
• Hermanson et al. (2007) 
• Hermanson & Houston (2009) 
• Daugherty & Tervo (2010) 
• Daugherty et al. (2011) 
• Gramling et al. (2011)  
• Landis et al. (2011)  
• Ragothaman (2012)  
• Blankley et al. (2012)  
• Abbott et al. (2013) 
• Carcello et al. (2011)  
• Church & Shefchik (2012)  
• Gunny & Zhang (2013)  
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1.8 Conclusion 
For the last ten years the U.S. audit profession has been monitored by PCAOB inspections under 
government oversight. This paper reviews research on both the former peer-review system and 
the current PCAOB system. Prior literature is analysed and synthesised along three research axes: 
the validity of reviews and inspections, the recognition of reviews and PCAOB inspections for 
decision-making by financial markets, and the effect of reviews and inspections on audit quality.  
Research on the former peer review system is consistent with regard to several findings. First, the 
results indicate that the initial introduction of external quality controls enhanced the quality of 
services provided by audit firms. When reviewed firms were compared with non-reviewed firms, 
reviewed firms conducted higher quality governmental audits, were less likely to receive SEC 
sanctions, and showed fewer violations of GAAS reporting standards. When all firms were 
reviewed, however, financial markets began to ignore review reports. This can be explained by 
the inability of financial actors to differentiate the audit quality among peer reviewed firms 
and/or by the awareness of the system’s main shortcoming: multiple studies provide evidence for 
the lack of objectivity to which the system was exposed. 
 When analysing research on the PCAOB regime, results indicate a positive impact of PCAOB 
inspections on audit quality. At the same time, however, audit firms themselves are rather 
sceptical concerning the effect of PCAOB inspection on audit quality. This mismatch has to be 
addressed by future research, in particular through research designs that focus on the intra-
organisational learning processes of audit firms subsequent to PCAOB inspections. In addition, 
further research is necessary to elaborate whether financial markets really trust the credibility of 
public authorities. While one study demonstrated that audit firms’ market shares are insensitive 
to the content of PCAOB reports, other studies reveal the opposite. The absence of an overall 
quality rating, the fact that quality-control findings are kept confidential, and the three-year 
inspection cycle for triennially inspected firms might explain the market’s hesitation to take into 
account PCAOB inspections for decision-making purposes. These obstacles have also to be 
considered by other audit regulators, which aim at reforming their oversight structures to 
maintain or gain legitimacy in the public and the financial spheres.  
This study cannot eliminate the potential confusions that are associated with history, which is the 
main limitation of this study. For instance, confounding SOX provisions hamper research on the 
PCAOB inspections. Provisions, as management certifications change with regard to audit 
subcommittee independence (SOX, Sec. 301), or bans on the provision of certain non-audit 
services (Sec 201), might simultaneously affect audit quality and other aspects under 
consideration. For this reason, it is all the more important to shed light on areas which have been 
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overlooked in research, but are from insignificant in importance. Research must disclose the 
inspection process and analyse how audit firms see themselves as learning organisations rather 
than pure audit units. In particular, research should focus on the effect of the PCAOB 
inspections on large accounting firms, since their role in the past balance-sheet scandals was the 
driver for change from self-regulation to government oversight. It remains to be shown whether 
direct government regulation has de facto decreased the risk of large accounting scandals, 
political tsunamis, and further rounds of regulatory reforms. 
  
 
51
1.9 References 
 
Abbott, L. J., Gunny, K. A., & Zhang, T. C. (2013). When the PCAOB talks, who listens? 
Evidence from stakeholder reaction to GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection reports of 
small auditors. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 32(2), 1–31. 
Abernathy, J., Barnes, M., & Stefaniak, C. (2013). A summary of 10 years of PCAOB research: 
what have we learned? Journal of Accounting Literature, 21(1), 30–60. 
Alam, P., Hoffman, R. C., & Meier, H. (2000). Perceptions of the peer review program of the 
accounting profession: implications for management. Journal of Managerial Issues, 12(4), 
408–426. 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). (1995). Inside AICPA. Journal of 
Accountancy, 82–84. 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). (2005). Peer review in an era of 
transparency: a position paper. Retrieved November 3, 2013, from 
http://www.aicpa.org/InterestAreas/PeerReview/Resources/Transparency/Downloada
bleDocuments/TransparencyPositionPaper.pdf 
Anantharaman, D. (2012). Comparing self-regulation and statutory regulation: evidence from the 
accounting profession. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 37(2), 55–77. 
Arens, A. A., Elder, R. J., & Beasley, M. S. (2011). Auditing and assurance services. Upper Saddle 
River: Prentice Hall. 
Baldwin, R., Cave, M., & Lodge, M. (2012). Understanding regulation: theory, strategy, and practice. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Barton, J. (2005). Who cares about auditor reputation? Contemporary Accounting Research, 22(3), 
549–586. 
Bellovary, J. L., & Mayhew, B. W. (2009). Self-regulation: experimental evidence on reputation 
and peer review. working paper. 
Berton, L. (1986). Self-regulation by accountants divides industry. Wall Street Journal, June, 1. 
Berton, L. (1988). Accountants vote required program of self-regulation. Wall Street Journal, 
January, 1. 
Bishop, C. C., Hermanson, D. R., & Houston, R. W. (2013). PCAOB inspections of international 
audit firms: initial evidence. International Journal of Auditing, 17, 1–18. 
Blankley, A. I., Kerr, D. S., & Wiggins, C. E. (2012). A content analysis of CPA firms’ 
correspondence following PCAOB inspections: 2004–2010. Research in Accounting 
Regulation, 24, 74–89. 
Boster, R. S. (2007). The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board: deja vu seidman’s quasi 
government? Public Budgeting and Finance, 27(3), 130–137. 
Bremser, W. G., & Gramling, L., J. (1988). CPA firm peer reviews: do they improve quality? The 
CPA Journal, 58(5), 75–77. 
Canning, M., & O’Dwyer, B. (2013). The dynamics of a regulatory space realignment: strategic 
responses in a local context. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 38, 169–196. 
Caramanis, C., Dedoulis, E., & Leventis, S. (2015). Transplanting Anglo-American accounting 
oversight boards to a diverse institutional context. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 42, 
12–31. 
Carcello, J., Hollingsworth, C., & Mastrolia, S. (2011). The effect of PCAOB inspections of Big 4 
audit quality. Research in Accounting Regulation, 23, 85–96. 
Casterella, J. R., Jensen, K. L., & Knechel, W. R. (2009). Is self-regulated peer review effective at 
signaling audit quality? The Accounting Review, 84(3), 713–735. 
Church, B. K., & Shefchik, L. B. (2012). PCAOB inspections and large accounting firms. 
Accounting Horizons, 26(1), 43–63. 
Colbert, G., & Murray, D. (1998). The association between auditor quality and auditor size: an 
analysis of small CPA firms. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 13(2), 135–150. 
Daugherty, B., Dickins, D., & Tervo, W. A. (2011). Negative PCAOB inspections of triennially 
inspected auditors and involuntary and voluntary client losses. International Journal of 
Auditing, 15(3), 231–246. 
Daugherty, B., & Tervo, W. (2010). PCAOB inspections of smaller CPA firms: the perspective of 
inspected firms. Accounting Horizons, 24(2), 189–219. 
  
 
52
DeAngelo, L. E. (1981). Auditor size and audit quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 3(3), 
183–199. 
DeFond, M. L. (2010). How should the auditors be audited? Comparing the PCAOB inspections 
with the AICPA peer reviews. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 49(1-2), 104–108. 
DeFond, M. L., & Lennox, C. S. (2011). The effect of SOX on small auditor exits and audit 
quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 52(1), 21–40. 
Deis, D., R., & Giroux, G., A. (1992). Determinants of audit quality in the public sector. The 
Accounting Review, Vol. 67(No. 3), 464–479. 
Donabedian, B. (1993). Accounting self-regulation and the enforcement of professional codes. 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 12(2), 87–112. 
Ehlen, C. R., & Welker, R. B. (1996). Procedural fairness in the peer and quality review programs. 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 15(1), 38–52. 
Elsea, J. E., & Stewart, J. R. (1995). Perceptions of peer and quality review. The CPA Journal, 
65(6), 58. 
Emby, C., Gelardi, A. M., & Lowe, J. D. (2002). A research note on the influence of outcome 
knowledge on audit partners’ judgments. Behavioral Research in Accounting, 14, 87–103. 
Federal Committee. (1976a). Federal regulation and regulatory reform (Report by the Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce) 
(pp. 1–749). Washington D.C.: House of Representatives. 
Federal Committee. (1976b). The accounting establishment (Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting 
and Management of the Committee on Government Operations) (pp. 1–1760). 
Washington D.C.: United States Senate. 
Felix, W. L., & Prawitt, D. F. (1993). Self-regulation: an assessment by SECPS members. Journal 
of Accountancy, 176(1), 20–21. 
File, R. G., Ward, B. H., & Gray, C. A. (1992). Peer review as a market signal: effective self-
regulation? Research in Accounting Regulation, 6, 179–193. 
Fogarty, T. J. (1996). The imagery and reality of peer review in the US: insights from institutional 
theory. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 21(2-3), 243–267. 
Francis, J. R. (2004). What do we know about audit quality? The British Accounting Review, 36(4), 
345–368. 
Francis, J. R., Andrews, W., & Simon, D. (1990). Voluntary peer reviews, audit quality, and 
proposals for mandatory peer reviews. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 5(3), 369–
378. 
Gendron, Y., & Bédard, J. (2001). Academic auditing research: an exploratory investigation into 
its usefulness. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 12(3), 339–368. 
Gillis, P., Petty, R., & Suddaby, R. (2014). The transnational regulation of accounting: insights, 
gaps and an agenda for future research. Accounting, Auditing &amp; Accountability Journal, 
27(6), 894–902. 
Giroux, G., A., Deis, D. R., & Bryan, B. (1995). The effect of peer review on audit economies. 
Research in Accounting Regulation, 9, 63–82. 
Glover, S. M., Prawitt, D. F., & Taylor, M. H. (2009). Audit standard setting and inspection for 
U.S. public companies: a critical assessment and recommendations for fundamental 
change. Accounting Horizons, 23(2), 221–237. 
Goelzer, D. L. (2005). PCAOB update: a year-three progress report and 2006 challenges. Presented at the 
Colorado Society of CPAs 2005 SEC Conference, December 2005, Denver. 
Gramling, A. A., Krishnan, J., & Zhang, Y. (2011). Are PCAOB-identified audit deficiencies 
associated with a change in reporting decisions of triennially inspected audit firms? 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 30(3), 59–79. 
Grant, J., Bricker, R., & Shiptsova, R. (1996). Audit quality and professional self-regulation: a 
social dilemma perspective and laboratory investigation. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & 
Theory, 15(1). 
Grumet, L. (2005). Peer review: dealing with the reality of perceptions. The CPA Journal. 
Gunny, K., Krishnan, G. V., & Zhang, T. C. (2007). Is audit quality associated with auditor tenure, 
industry expertise, and fees? Evidence from PCAOB opinions. Working paper. Retrieved from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1015089 
  
 
53
Gunny, K., & Zhang, T. (2006). The association between earnings quality and regulatory report 
opinions in the accounting industry - AICPA peer review and PCAOB inspections. 
Presented at the American Accounting Association Annual Meeting 2006, Washington 
D.C. 
Gunny, K., & Zhang, T. C. (2013). PCAOB inspection reports and audit quality. Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, 32, 136–160. 
Hanson, J., D. (2012). Reflections on the state of the audit profession. Presented at the Mid-Year Meeting 
of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association, Savannah, GA. 
Hazgui, M., & Gendron, Y. (2015). Blurred roles and elusive boundaries: on the contemporary 
forms of oversight surrounding professional work. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, forthcoming. 
Hermanson, D. R., & Houston, R. W. (2008). Quality control defects revealed in smaller firms’ 
PCAOB inspection reports. The CPA Journal, 78(12), 36–40. 
Hermanson, D. R., & Houston, R. W. (2009). Evidence from the PCAOB’s second inspections 
of small firms. CPA Journal, 79(2), 58–60. 
Hermanson, D. R., Houston, R. W., & Rice, J. C. (2007). PCAOB inspections of smaller CPA 
firms: initial evidence from inspection reports. Accounting Horizons, 21(2), 137–152. 
Hilary, G., & Lennox, C. S. (2005). The credibility of self-regulation: evidence from the 
accounting profession’s peer review program. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 40(1), 
211–229. 
Hodowanitz, J., & Solieri, S. A. (2005). Guarding the guardians. Strategic Finance, 87(2), 47–53. 
Huff, B. N., & Kelley, T. P. (1989). Quality review and you. The Journal of Accountancy, February, 
34–40. 
Humphrey, C., Moizer, P., & Turley, S. (2006). Independence and competence? A critical 
questioning of auditing. Advances in Public Interest Accounting, 12, 149–167. 
King, J., Welker, R., & Keller, G. (1994). The effects of independence allegation on peer review 
evaluation of audit procedures. Behavioral Research in Accounting, 6, 72–91. 
Kinney, W. R. (2005). Twenty‐five years of audit deregulation and re‐regulation: what does it 
mean for 2005 and beyond? Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 24(s-1), 89–109. 
Knechel, W. R., Krishnan, G. V., Pevzner, M., & Stefchik, L. (2013). Audit quality: insights from 
the academic literature. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 32(Supplement 1), 385–
421. 
Krishnan, J., & Schauer, P. C. (2000). The differentiation of quality among auditors: evidence 
from the not‐for‐profit sector. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 19(2), 9–25. 
Larson, R. (1987). For the membrs by the members. Journal of Accountancy, October, 116–122. 
Lennox, C., & Pittman, J. (2010). Auditing the auditors: evidence on the recent reforms to the 
external monitoring of audit firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 49, 84–103. 
Loscalzo, M. A. (1979). What is peer review all about? The Journal of Accountancy, October, 78–82. 
Malsch, B., & Gendron, Y. (2011). Reining in auditors: on the dynamics of power surrounding an 
“innovation” in the regulatory space. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 36, 456–476. 
Mason, E. (2005). Peer review: reality or fiction? Accounting Today, April, 6–9. 
Mautz, R. (1984). Self-regulation: criticism and a response. Journal of Accountancy, 56–66. 
McCabe, R. K., Luzi, A. D., & Brennan, T. (1993). Managing partners’ perceptions of peer 
review. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 12(2), 108–115. 
Mulford, C. W., & Comiskey, E. E. (2011). Creative accounting and accounting scandals in the 
USA. In M. Jones J. (Ed.), Creative accounting, fraud and international accounting scandals (pp. 
407–424). Chichester: Wiley. 
Newman, B. H., & Oliverio, M. E. (2010). PCAOB triennial inspections of small firms - 
perceptions of no-deficiency reports. The CPA Journal, 62–67. 
Offermanns, M., & Peek, E. (2011). Investor reactions to PCAOB inspection reports. Retrieved 
October 20, 2013, from http://ssrn.com/abstract=1807994 
O’Keefe, T. B., King, R. D., & Gaver, K. M. (1994). Audit fees, industry specialization, and 
compliance with GAAS reporting standards. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 13(2), 
41–55. 
Ottow, A. (2015). Market and competition authorities: good agency principles. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
  
 
54
Palmrose, Z.-V. (1988). 1987 competitive manuscript co-winner: an analysis of auditor litigation 
and audit service quality. The Accounting Review, 63(1), 55–73. 
Palmrose, Z.-V. (2006). Maintaining the value and viability of auditors as gatekeepers under SOX: 
an auditing master proposal. In Y. Fuchita & R. E. Litan (Eds.), Financial gatekeepers - can 
they protect investors? (pp. 103–135). Baltimore: Brookings Institution Press. 
Palmrose, Z.-V. (2013). PCAOB audit regulation a decade after SOX: where it stands and what 
the future holds. Accounting Horizons, 27(4), 775–798. 
Payne, J. L. (2003). An experimental examination of the peer review process. Research in Accounting 
Regulation, 16, 209–225. 
Peecher, M. E., Solomon, I., & Trotman, K. (2013). An accountability framework for financial 
statement auditors and related research questions. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 38, 
596–620. 
Power, M. K. (2003). Auditing and the production of legitimacy. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 28(4), 379–394. 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. (2011). PCAOB Annual Report 2011 (Annual 
Report). 
Ragothaman, S. (2012). Watching the watchdogs: an examination of the PCAOB quality control 
inspection reports on triennially inspected audit firms and the AICPA peer review 
reports. Presented at the 2012 Deloitte Foundation University of Kansas Auditing 
Symposium. 
Read, W. J., Rama, D. V., & Raghunandan, K. (2004). Local and regional audit firms and the 
market for SEC audits. Accounting Horizons, 18(4), 241–254. 
Robertson, J. C., & Houston, R. W. (2010). Investors’ expectations of the improvement in the 
credibility of audit opinions following PCAOB inspection reports with identified 
deficiencies. Accounting & the Public Interest, 10, 36–56. 
Robertson, J. C., Stefaniak, C. M., & Houston, R. W. (2014). Do PCAOB inspection reports 
influence corporate executives’ perceptions of audit quality and the likelihood of 
switching auditors? Accounting and the Public Interest, 14(1), 48–71. 
Rollins, T. P., & Bremser, W. G. (1997). The SEC’s enforcement actions against auditors: An 
auditor reputation and institutional theory perspective. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 8, 
191–206. 
Romano, R. (2004). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the making of quack corporate governance. The 
Yale Law Journal, 114(7), 1521–1611. 
Roybark, H. (2006). An analysis of audit deficiencies based on PCAOB inspection reports issued 
during 2005. Journal of Accounting, Ethics and Public Policy, 6(2), 125–154. 
Russell, J., & Armitage, J. (2006). Peer review effectiveness: an analysis of potential loopholes 
within the USA peer review program. Managerial Auditing Journal, 21(1), 46–62. 
Schneider, A., & Ramsay, R. J. (2000). Assessing the value added by peer and quality reviews of 
CPA firms. Research in Accounting Regulation, 14, 23–38. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). (1989). The Treadway Commission report: two years later 
(pp. 1–36). Washington. 
Shafer, W. E., Morris, R. E., & Ketchand, A. A. (1999). The effects of formal sanctions on 
auditor independence. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 18(Supplement), 85–101. 
Simnett, R., & Smith, A. (2005). Public oversight: an international approach to auditing. In T. 
Campbell & K. Houghton (Eds.), Ethics and auditing (pp. 45–62). Canberra: ANU E-
Press. 
Sperry, J. B., Spede, E. C., & Hicks, D. W. (1987). The evolution and current status of peer 
review. Journal of Accountancy, May, 381–382. 
Suddaby, R., Cooper, D. J., & Greenwood, R. (2007). Transnational regulation of professional 
services: Governance dynamics of field level organizational change. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 32(4-5), 333–362. 
Sutton, S. G., & Lampe, J. C. (1991). A framework for evaluating process quality for audit 
engagements. Accounting and Business Research, 21(83), 275–288. 
Treadway Commission. (1987). Report of the national commission on fraudulent financial report. 
Wainberg, J., Kida, T., Piercey, D. M., & Smith, J. F. (2011). Empirical evidence of the effectiveness of 
recent changes to PCAOB inspection reports. Working paper. 
  
 
55
Wallace, W. A. (1991). Peer review filings and their implications in evaluating self-regulation. 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 10(1), 53–68. 
Wallace, W. A., & Cravens, K. S. (1994). An exploratory content analysis of terminology in public 
accounting firms’ responses to AICPA peer reviews. Research in Accounting Regulation, 8, 
3–32. 
Wegman, J. (2008). Government regulation of accountants: the PCAOB enforcement process. 
Journal of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues, Vol. 11(1), 75–94. 
Woodlock, P., & Claypool, G. (2001). Your audit committee: how to cope with the end of the 
“rubber stamp” era. Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance, 12(4), 27–39. 
Zeff, S. A. (2003). How the U.S. accounting profession got where it is today: part 1. Accounting 
Horizons, 17(3), 189–205. 
 
  
  
 
56
 
  
  
 
57
“Other countries have established or are considering establishing PCAOB-like inspection bodies.  
The days of unfettered self-regulation are coming to an end”  
(PCAOB founding member Daniel Goelzer, 2005) 
 
Chapter 2 
(In)dependent audit oversight: an interdisciplinary approach to 
comparing audit regulation. 
 
Abstract 
The independence of audit oversight systems is the most essential prerequisite for restoring 
public confidence in audits after the recent accounting scandals and financial crisis. This study 
provides insights into the question as to how independent the “independent” audit oversight 
boards are. Their independence is measured both in terms of their organisational composition 
(e.g. appointment procedures of the board members) and regulatory competences (e.g. the way 
audit firms are inspected). Hence, this study takes a first step towards providing a quantifiable 
measure of the formal independence of audit oversight authorities. The results are visualised by a 
Partial Order Scalogram Analysis with Coordinates (POSAC), which allows conclusions about 
the similarities of various countries and their relative levels of independence. Although all 
countries encounter similar pressure to establish public (i.e. profession-independent) oversight 
systems, this study identifies how differently “independence” has been translated in regulatory 
outcomes. Whereas all countries claim to possess formal public oversight systems, there is a 
visible gap between countries with comparatively independent oversight systems, and the states 
with accounting bodies that still maintain far-reaching regulatory competences.19  
Keywords: audit regulation, audit oversight, regulator independence, cross-country 
comparison 
 
                                                     
19 This chapter benefited from the helpful comments of Robert Day, Annette Köhler, Ann Vanstraelen, Emmanouil 
Dedoulis, Marc Tenbücken, Tim Hasso, Sebastian Botzem, and two anonyms reviewers from the Centre for Analysis 
of Risk and Regulation (CARR) of the London School of Economics and Political Science. I also acknowledge the 
comments from participants at the 2015 Annual Conference of the British Accounting and Finance Association 
(Manchester) and the 2014 Conference on Interdisciplinary Business and Economics Research (Hong Kong). All 
errors remain the sole responsibility of the author. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The changing relationships between the audit profession and the state are at the heart of national 
audit regulation. The establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) in the U.S. in the aftermath of the fall of Enron has marked a turning point for the 
regulation of the accounting profession: it formally terminated the long-standing tradition of 
professional self-regulation and replaced it with public oversight. Profession-independent 
examination of auditing practice was seen as the essential tool to restore public confidence in 
financial auditing and secure its legitimacy. Triggered from the regulatory changes in the U.S., 
audit oversight structures soon mushroomed around the globe and challenged the 
institutionalised net of interrelations between the profession and the state (Canning & O’Dwyer, 
2013; Caramanis, Dedoulis, & Leventis, 2015; Hazgui & Gendron, 2015; Malsch & Gendron, 
2011). However, empirical cross-country comparisons about the interrelation between audit 
oversight systems and the accounting profession have not yet been provided.20  
Traditional research on audit regulation is characterised by comparative studies incorporating a 
rather small and highly selective number of large countries (R. C. Baker, Quick, & Mikol, 2001; 
Eldaly, 2012; Evans & Nobes, 1998; Puxty, Willmott, & Lowe, 1987), or by qualitative case 
studies focusing on single countries (Blavoukos, Caramanis, & Dedoulis, 2013; Canning & 
O’Dwyer, 2013; Jonnergard, 2012; Malsch & Gendron, 2011; Öhman & Wallerstedt, 2012; 
Robson, Willmott, Cooper, & Puxty, 1994). A systematic and encompassing comparison of the 
intertwining of oversight entities and the accounting profession is still missing. Especially, there 
is a lack of comparative data on the configuration of oversight systems and the diverse 
understanding and interpretation of “independent oversight” across different jurisdictions. As a 
result, there is a paradoxical gap between the high relevance attributed to independent regulation 
and the empirical findings on the way in which this new regulatory paradigm has been translated 
into regulatory outcomes.  
This study fills the research gap by offering a methodological operationalisation for measuring 
the level of independence of audit oversight structures by using an analytical framework for the 
first time. In other words, this study provides first insights about the independent nature of the 
audit oversight systems of the accounting profession. By comparing the independence of the 
audit oversight systems of all European member states and the U.S., this paper at the same time 
responds to calls for more cross-country audit research to advance the knowledge about various 
forms of public oversight systems (Humphrey & Moizer, 2008, p. 270; Maijoor & Vanstraelen, 
2012; Schilder, 1996).  
                                                     
20 This stands in sharp contrast to other sub-disciplines of international accounting research. For instance, research on 
the international harmonisation of financial accounting standards has increased significantly within the last two decades 
(Baker and Barbu, 2007; PratherKinsey & Rueschhoff, 2004). 
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Assessing the institutional independence is important as it helps to shed light on the governance 
mechanisms of these pivotal financial regulatory entities. It is not argued that regulatory 
behaviour or action can be deduced entirely from the formal institutional design. Nevertheless, it 
provides a point of reference when referring to the “independent regulator”; an anchor, needed 
for current debates on further regulatory reforms and audit research on the relationship between 
the regulator’s action and its formal institutional design. The development of the framework is 
particularly needed as the meanings of rather broad regulatory categories (e.g. “agencies” and 
“authorities”) vary across countries, which frequently undermines the validity of cross-country 
comparisons (Thatcher, 2002c, p. 956). The methodological challenge of this study lies in the 
operationalisation and the measurement of the concept of audit oversight independence. 
Independence is measured in terms of the organisational compositions and regulatory 
competences of the audit oversight authorities. The results are analysed and visualised by a Partial 
Order Scalogram Analysis with Coordinates (POSAC), which allows conclusions about the 
similarities of various countries and their relative levels of independence. The basic idea behind 
this approach is that every analytical object can be decomposed into a certain number of distinct 
dimensions. Both measurements are then equally combined into one value of material 
independence, which is used to rank the analysed oversight authorities.  
The U.S. PCAOB is added to the European sample given its pivotal role in shaping audit 
regulation on the global landscape. Its establishment triggered various rounds of regulatory 
reforms in the European Union, starting in 2006, when an EU Directive (2006/43/EC) for the 
first time required European member states to implement an independent oversight system.21 
Moreover, as the PCAOB’s power reaches beyond the U.S. boundaries, the subsequent 
development of the European oversight regulation, both on the national and the European level, 
was strongly linked to the PCAOB’s pressures to establish professionally independent – 
“PCAOB-like” – oversight authorities. Sections 102(a) and 106 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
PCAOB Rule 2100 require non-U.S. audit firms to be registered with the PCAOB and thereby 
subject to PCAOB inspections. From 2009, the PCAOB inspected non-U.S. audit firms in their 
respective home countries. This caused other countries to establish audit oversight authorities as 
the PCAOB made clear that only the establishment of “equivalent” bodies would avoid 
extraterritorial PCAOB inspections (see, for example, the statements of PCAOB members 
Goelzer, 2004, 2005, 2007; Olson, 2006; Ross, 2004). Complete independence from the 
accounting profession was seen by the PCAOB as “essential criteria” for determining whether 
the Board could rely on a non-U.S. oversight system to conduct inspections of PCAOB-
registered non-U.S. audit firms (PCAOB, 2007; PCAOB member Ross, 2004). 
                                                     
21 European regulation can occur through several ways: if it is in the form of a Directive, member states must 
transpose the regulation into national law, but are free to choose the means of attaining the objectives set. Appendix 1 
offers a detailed presentation of the history of audit regulation in the European Union. 
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Comparative analysis requires comparable data. To guarantee the study’s validity, data about the 
oversight authorities was collected in two ways. First, an email questionnaire was sent to all 28 
European oversight authorities in November 2013. The questionnaire focused on the legal 
provisions of the independence dimensions used for this study. By March 2014, answers were 
received from 22 oversight authorities.22 Second, all national provisions on the compositions and 
responsibilities of the audit oversight systems were collected and analysed (Appendix 2: Legal 
sources).23 Other sources of information were data from the website of the International Forum 
of Independent Audit Regulators (IFIAR) (www.ifiar.org), along with the official websites of the 
oversight boards and their annual reports. The list of regulators and their basic institutional 
design and funding structure is presented in the Appendix 3. As it was neither possible to get in 
contact with the relevant authorities nor possible to identify and to obtain the relevant regulatory 
provisions, the oversight board of Cyprus could not be included in the analysis. To guarantee 
that the results represent the current oversight structures, the findings of the various sources 
were compared with each other and then directly translated to the coding scheme.24 In case 
answers from the questionnaire needed further clarification or were unclear to the author, the 
responding authorities were approached via email and phone in a second round in order to 
guarantee an appropriate translation to the coding scheme. The validity of the final results was 
cross-checked by other auditing scholars and by various oversight authorities to which the results 
have been provided (e.g. France, Germany, Romania).  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the operationalisation of 
the “independent” audit oversight, on which the coding system used in this paper is based, and 
introduces the method for analysis. The third section illustrates and compares the independence 
values of all oversight systems. Explaining the ranking for each country would go beyond the 
scope of the paper. Nevertheless, the reasons and rationales behind the ranking of various 
extreme cases are presented. Finally, conclusions and suggestions for future research are given.  
 
 
 
                                                     
22 The following countries did not respond to the research request: Spain, Slovenia, Portugal, Italy, Estonia and 
Cyprus.  
23 In case, no English version of the legal text existed, the relevant regulations were identified and translated with the 
help of audit researchers from the particular country, who were contacted by the author.  
24 Two research assistants were involved in the data collection. The coding process (i.e. the translation of the collected 
materials into the coding scheme, however, was only made by the author.  
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2.2  Methodology 
2.2.1 Notion of independence 
Independence is considered to be a vital element of regulatory supervision. Independence from 
regulatees is essential in order to create a level playing field and to ensure market confidence in 
the impartiality of regulatory decision-making (Ottow, 2015, p. 11). Nevertheless, 
“independence” is a rather blurred concept as multiple definitions exist (Koen Verhoest, Peters, 
Bouckaert, & Verschuere, 2004). Following Majone (1997), independence can be conceptualised 
as an entity’s autonomy in decision-making (Majone, 1997). Autonomy, in turn, is the ability to 
translate one’s own preferences into authoritative actions without external constraints (Busuioc, 
2009; Maggetti, 2007; Nordlinger, 1987). Given this paper’s research focus, independence is 
therefore defined as the autonomy of the oversight entity to self-determine its preferences and to 
make use of its regulatory competences, without constraints from the accounting profession, 
during the activity of regulation.25  
Moreover, it is important to distinguish between formal independence and de-facto 
independence. Formal independence describes the status of an agency according to the legal acts 
that establish its authority. De-facto (e.g. actual) independence refers to the degree to which the 
oversight authority operates independently from the audit profession in practice (Hanretty & 
Koop, 2012, 2013; Maggetti, 2007; Tenbücken & Schneider, 2004). Measuring and comparing de-
facto independence among all European member states would require an extremely complex 
research design. Therefore, this study assesses the formal independence of the audit oversight 
systems. Formal independence can be considered as the key factor when investigating delegation 
to regulatory agencies as it corresponds to the intentions of the decision-makers – policy makers 
and regulators – with regard to providing credibility to regulatory policies (Maggetti, 2007).26 By 
focusing on the dimension of material independence, the country’s politico-administrative 
tradition or other non-legal determinants (i.e. policy style or administrative culture) of actual 
independence are outside the scope of this paper. Acknowledging the possible interferences of 
other factors does not, however, mean that formal independence is immaterial. On the contrary, 
various scholars trace actual independence back to formal independence (Furlong, 1998; 
Hanretty & Koop, 2013; Hayo & Voigt, 2007; K. Verhoest, Roness, Verschuere, Rubecksen, & 
MacCarthaigh, 2010).27  
                                                     
25 It has to be pointed out that audit regulators might also be dependent on political decision-makers. Blavoukos et al. 
(2013), for instance, show how the mode of governance of the Greek independent oversight board is highly politicized 
(Blavoukos et al., 2013; also Caramanis, Dedoulis, & Leventis, 2015).  
26 It is important to remember that the study’s focus should not be mixed up with debates on auditor-client 
independence (see e.g. Jeppesen, 1998; Suddaby, Cooper, & Greenwood, 2007). 
27 For a critical account about the translation from formal autonomy into real autonomy of regulatory agencies, see 
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2.2.2 Variables of independence 
This paper’s index of independence – on which the oversight systems are compared – is based 
on the construction of two profiles for each oversight system. While the Organisational Profile takes 
into account the organisational structures, the Functional Profile relates to the regulatory 
competences of the oversight authorities.28 With the results of these profiles, it is then possible to 
create one index of independence that considers both the organisational and the functional 
independence equally. For each country the arithmetic mean of the organisational and functional 
profile is calculated in order to set up a ranking regarding the degree of material independence of 
the oversight systems.29 Each profile is based on several variables and each variable is associated 
with several indicators, which are numerically coded on a scale of 0 (lowest level of 
independence) to 3 (highest level of independence).30 It could reasonably be argued that the 
variables of the profiles could be weighted differently, for instance, by performing a qualitative 
assessment of their relative importance a priori. At this point in the study, each variable has been 
attributed with the same weight, thus, implicitly, the same relevance.31 
The identification of the variables (i.e. the operationalisation of independence) is based on two 
pillars. First, it takes into account prior studies on independence of regulatory entities. Public 
policy primarily investigates the independence of regulatory agencies from political interferences. 
A measurement tool for independence has been developed for special cases, such as banks 
(Cukierman & Webb, 1995; Cukierman, Webb, & Nevapti, 1992), the telecommunications 
market (Edwards & Waverman, 2006; Tenbücken & Schneider, 2004) and courts (Hayo & Voigt, 
2007; Smithey & Ishiyama, 2000). Other scholars have analysed the level of independence of 
regulatory agencies of various sectors within one country (Elgie & McMenamin, 2005) or among 
several countries (Gilardi, 2002, 2005; Hanretty & Koop, 2013). These studies all measure 
independence along multiple indicators (Table 11).  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Busuioc (2009) and Yesilkagit (2004).  
28 In some countries, several other entities are in charge of audit oversight. For instance, the Finish audit oversight 
system is a two-tier system with the Auditing Board of the State, which is a government authority, and the Auditing 
Board of the Central Chamber of Commerce. Here the latter was taken as an analysis subject for organisational 
independence as it was specified in the questionnaire as the primarily responsible body for oversight matters.  
29 “Material” independence is thereby defined as true independence rather than rhetoric independence.  
30 This scale was used as the majority of variables had three indicators. In the case of four indicators, the scale was 
further differentiated (0.75 - 1.50 - 2.25 - 3.00). 
31 Gilardi points out that combining and weighing variables is unavoidably arbitrary. To cut this Gordian knot, he 
therefore attributes the same weight to each variable (Gilardi, 2002; also Tenbücken & Schneider, 2004). 
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Table 11: Indices of statutory Independence 
 
Authors & date Study focus Dimensions of independence  
(number of indicators) 
   
Cukierman et al. 
(1992)  
Independence of banks from 
government 
 Chief executive officer (4) 
 Regulatory competences vis-à-vis the government (3) 
 Central bank objectives (1) 
 Limitations on lending to the government (8) 
      
Smithey and 
Ishiyama (2000) 
 
Independence of courts from 
politicians 
 One dimension with six indicators: 
• Number of actors involved in the appointment  
• Term length  
• Dismissal provisions  
• Organisational autonomy  
• Presence of a priori review 
• Decisions irreversible or not 
      
Gilardi (2002) 
Independence of various agencies 
from politicians 
 Agency head status (6) 
 Management board members’ status (6) 
 Relationship with government and parliament (4) 
 Financial and organisational autonomy (4) 
 Regulatory competences (1) 
      
Schneider and 
Tenbücken (2004) 
Independence of 
telecommunication regulators 
from governments 
 Organisational features (11) 
 Regulatory competences (12) 
      
Elgie and 
McMenamin (2005) 
Independence of French agencies 
from politicians 
 Agency head (4) 
 Agency board member (4) 
 Regulatory competences (5) 
      
Edwards and 
Waverman (2006) 
Independence of 
telecommunication regulators 
from governments 
 Powers of the agency (6) 
 Characteristics of the agency (6) 
 Member appointments and terms of office (3) 
 Resources of the agency (2) 
 Experience of the agency (1) 
      
Wonka and 
Rittberger (2010) 
 
Independence of EU agencies 
from the European Commission, 
the European Parliament, and the 
European Council 
 Formal mandate of the agency (1) 
 Appointment of the head (8) 
 Appointment of the members (7) 
 Internal decision-making (11) 
   
 
To link public policy research to the specific field of audit regulation, the definition of the 
International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators (IFIAR) and the European Commission 
about the core principles of an “independent” audit oversight system has been taken into 
account as a second pillar for the identification for the relevant independence variables. The 
IFIAR was established in 2006 and is the central global platform of the audit regulatory 
framework, bringing together independent audit regulators from a total of 50 jurisdictions. 
According to its charter, the organisation seeks to promote effective independent audit oversight 
globally by developing and offering “core principles for independent audit regulators”. These 
principles are aimed at “fostering high quality audits and promoting public trust in the financial 
reporting process” (IFIAR 2014) and describe the responsibilities and powers of audit regulators, 
and ways of operating independently and objectively. The principles are meant to provide 
guidance to regulators’ governments, to establish an “effective” independent audit oversight 
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system. The 11 core principles are classified into three groups. While the first group includes 
principles on the structure of audit oversight, the second group focuses on the operations of 
audit regulators. The third group analyses the inspection process.32  
By matching public policy research and the definition of audit oversight independence of the 
IFIAR and the European Union, the study’s measurement validity can be secured.33 The 
combination results in ten variables on which the measurement of the Organisational Profile is 
based, and five variables on which the Functional Profile of each oversight system is based 
(Table 2). 
Organisational Profiles 
The analysis of the Organisational Profiles of the public oversight systems is based on a total of 
ten variables. Seven out of the ten variables are explicitly or implicitly stated in the IFIAR 
principles on independent audit oversight. Three have been additionally added based on prior 
literature on independence.34 The variables measure the essential organisational features of the 
oversight boards and represent control relations between the accounting profession and the 
oversight board, such as the procedures foreseen for the appointment of the oversight board 
members and the oversight head, the existence or not of special cooling-off provisions, the 
employment status of the board members, and provisions on the terms of office. The latter is 
based on literature which argues that non-renewable and fixed-term mandates promote 
independence by eliminating the possibility that members exercise regulatory power strategically 
(Edwards & Waverman, 2006; Tenbücken & Schneider, 2004). They also measure the extent of 
influence of professional bodies on the nomination procedure and whether practitioners are 
involved in the governance of the board. Finally, the audit oversight system is analysed to 
determine whether it is organised as a single-sector or a multi-sector jurisdiction. According to 
the classic argument of capture theory, regulatees may gain influence over their regulator (Coen, 
2005; Stigler, 1971). Scholars suggest that a multi-sector agency provides better protection from 
                                                     
32 Eldaly (2012) provides a very useful analysis of the 11 core principles and their key features of the IFIAR (Eldaly, 
2012, pp. 117–124).  
33 Measurement validity is concerned with the question as to whether a variable measures what it is supposed to 
measure (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994). As independence is a broad and widely used concept, it is important to keep 
in mind that the quality of measurement technique should be evaluated based on its relation between reality and its 
“systematised concept” (i.e. the construct defined for the purpose of the specific study). This means that the more 
complex and contested the background concept, in this case “independence”, the more important it is to distinguish 
issues of measurement from fundamental conceptual disputes. Therefore, the quality of this paper`s operationalisation 
should not be assessed against any possible understanding of “independence”, but rather be evaluated against the 
concept of the specific research question addressed by this study. This understanding is borrowed from Adcock and 
Collier (2001) who argue that “rather than making sweeping claims about what the background concept ‘really’ means, 
scholars should present specific arguments, linked to the goals and context of their research, that justify their particular 
choices” (Adcock & Collier, 2001, p. 532). 
34 Literature does not offer a fixed number of variables for the reliability of the scale. However, the reliability is 
improved by the increasing the number of variables that can be theoretically defended as being representative of the 
concept (Merschrod, 1980). With regard to the subsequent POSAC analysis, optimal solutions are obtained with five to 
ten variables (Shye, 2009, p. 299). This is in line with the number of variables chosen in this study.  
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industry capture as interest groups compete against each other and thus reduce their 
organisational strength (Edwards & Waverman, 2006; Maggetti, 2007; Tenbücken & Schneider, 
2004). Based on this argumentation, audit oversight systems embedded in a multi-sector regulator 
are coded as more independent. The variables “dismissal of board members” and “dismissal of 
authority head” have been omitted in the final analysis due to a lack of variance. The coding 
values for the Organisational Profiles of each oversight system are stated in Appendix 4.  
Functional Profiles 
The Functional profiles measure the extent to which the audit oversight regulators depend on the 
audit profession for conducting the vital elements of the oversight system. Due to the high 
technical understanding that is needed in auditing, regulators have to balance between the need 
to cooperate with the audit profession and the necessary detachment, which is needed for an 
effective oversight system. Too much cooperation may result in an oversight authority being 
captured by the audit profession seeking to influence its decision, and in rules being applied too 
leniently or that the regulator loses its objectivity (i.e. a risk of capture) (Baldwin, Cave, & Lodge, 
2012; Ottow, 2015). In other words, the interrelation between regulators and regulatees is 
characterised by the continual struggle to “balance between trust and distrust” (Ottow, 2015, p. 
6). The analysis of functional profiles of the public oversight systems is based on a total of five 
variables. The first variable focuses on the registration of audit firms. The second and third 
variables relate to the mode of external quality assurance, which particularly affects the degree to 
which oversight systems achieve their goal of protecting the interests of investors and the public. 
This relates to common criticism that professions are unwilling or unable to discipline their 
members (Bedard, 2001; Suddaby, Cooper, & Greenwood, 2007). The fourth variable relates to 
the authority for disciplinary measures in case errors or material weaknesses were identified in the 
inspections and the publication of the report, which is the fifth variable (Table 3). The level of 
independence of the Functional Profiles is in particular determined whether the oversight 
authorities delegated tasks to national accountancy associations or national chambers of auditors. 
In these cases, the respective oversight authority is not directly involved in the day-to-day 
regulatory process, but strongly depends on the support of the accounting profession. These 
variables relate to core principles of professional self-regulation (Powell, 1985; Suddaby et al., 
2007). In other words, the higher the level of functional independence of the particular oversight 
authorities, the more impaired is the national self-regulatory system (see e.g. R. L. Baker, Bealing 
Jr, Nelson, & Staley, 2006). The coding values for the Functional Profiles of each oversight 
system are stated in Appendix 5.35  
                                                     
35 As this is the first study on audit oversight boards, the column “prior studies” refers to prior studies that in general 
incorporated the competencies of regulators. These competencies differ in regard to the specific regulator. 
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2.2.3 Analysis and visualisation of independence 
The results are analysed and visualised with a Partial Order Scalogram Analysis with Coordinates 
(POSAC).36 POSAC is a specific form of multidimensional scalogram analysis that reduces the 
data of the objects from an N-dimensional space to a two dimensional space. As POSAC is a 
dimension reduction method, it can be compared with a Principal Component Analysis. 
However, while the latter tries to preserve distances, POSAC tries to preserve ordering (Bhat, 
2007). Thus, the underlying assumption of POSAC is that the geometric representation of order 
relations among objects, rather than the mathematical expression of items’ loadings on factors, 
may highlight patterns in the data that are not so apparent in factor analytic solutions. POSAC 
lists all profiles of the data set and represents these in a two-dimensional space by means of 
geometric distances on the basis of their structural similarity. 
A partial order analysis begins with a number of criteria for differentiating an observed 
population basis; this is the so-called “facet theory”. Facet theory was originally used in the field 
of organisational research and psychology (Guttmann & Greenbaum, 1998, p. 13). Recently, the 
method has gained attention in the field of comparative politics as it has been identified as a 
powerful method of structural and comparative analysis (DeRosa, D’Ambrosio, & Cohen, 2005; 
Schneider, 2001; Schneider, Fink, & Tenbücken, 2005; Taylor, 2002; Tenbücken & Schneider, 
2004; Voigt, Welz, & Brüggemann, 2004).  
Facet theory emerged out of Louis Guttmann’s conviction that research first has to conceptualise 
and define that which is being studied (Guttmann & Greenbaum, 1998). The basic idea behind 
facet theory is that every analytical object can be decomposed into a certain number of 
dimensions (facets) and each dimension can be decomposed into ordered values (Tenbücken & 
Schneider, 2004). A combination of different facets is a “structuple”; in this case, the profile of 
one oversight system. Each oversight system can thus be defined by its specific ‘structuple’ 
(profile) based on scores for each variable. In other words, an audit oversight profile is a row of 
the data matrix, which, in the current coding scheme, can range from {1111111111} through to 
{3333333333} (ten dimensions of organizational profile which can take values from 1 to 3), with 
all combinations among these two extremes empirically possible.37 The method`s advantage is 
that it enables us to distinguish between objects that have different values on different facets and 
thus show different institutional configurations. This allows the comparison of various objects 
and enables us to structure a previously disorganised universe. From this perspective, an 
                                                     
36 For the analysis, the software SYSTAT, Version 12 was used.  
37 Tenbücken and Thiem (2004) show an introductory example of facet theory: Here, the analytical object person 
(public oversight systems in this study) is decomposed into personal characteristics (facets), such as age, height, 
physical strength or intelligence. Depending on their characteristic, the values 1, 2 and 3 are attributed to each facet. 
Hence, an object with a medium age (2), which is very tall (3), possesses medium physical strength (2) and only little 
intelligence (1) would end up the structuple (profile) {2321}.  
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oversight system is defined as a specific combination of organisational and institutional elements. 
POSAC adopts these principles and represents the resulting variation among profiles as points in 
the geometric space. With the scalogram analysis, all structuples (all profiles of the oversight 
systems) are then ordered and depicted as points in a two-dimensional space through a regioning 
process in which profiles with the same score on a struct are positioned closer together than 
profiles with different scores on that struct (Taylor, 2002; Tenbücken & Thiem, 2004). This 
means that similar profiles are close and dissimilar profiles are distant from each other.  
Moreover, the two-dimensional space illustrates the degree of independence of the various 
systems. Profiles with the highest rank occupy the upper right-hand corner, those with the lowest 
rank, the left-hand corner (Guttmann & Greenbaum, 1998). Based on the coding system, this 
means that the profiles with the lowest degree of independence are in the lower left-hand corner, 
while the profile with the highest degree of independence is located in the upper right-hand 
corner. In this way it is possible to measure the European oversight boards in a quantitative and 
comparative way.  
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Organisational Independence  
Comparing all 28 profiles along a multidimensional scale, the analysis generates the topography 
illustrated in Figure 1. The values of Organisational Independence of each oversight system are 
presented in Appendix 6.  
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Figure 1: Organisational Profile (Stress Level: 0,1) 
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the POSAC for the organisational profiles of the audit oversight systems. In this 
case, the POSAC orders the oversight systems along ten dimensions, reduces the data and 
depicts them in a two-dimensional space. The result of the reduction of the ten dimensions to 
only two is DIM (1) and DIM (2). Thus, DIM (1) and DIM (2) are purely constructed 
dimensions which do not represent one particular dimension. They can be compared with the 
factors in a factor analysis that show a high factor loading. However, due to the reduction of ten 
dimensions to two, there is some error. The stress factor indicates that the percentage of the 
dimensions is not correctly represented after the reduction. A stress factor of <0.2 is considered 
to be acceptable for the POSAC. Countries that lie closer to the lower left-hand corner have 
audit oversight systems with a low level of independence, whereas those systems closer to the 
upper right-hand corner possess a high level of independence. The Euclidean distance between 
each pair of oversight boards shows the systems’ similarity based on the ten dimensions. 
Moreover, all of the countries that have the same distance to the diagonal have the same level of 
independence.  
 
The analysis of the various interrelations between the accounting profession and the regulatory 
authority reveals a mixed picture of how independence was interpreted: although all of the 
European audit oversight bodies are formally independent from the accounting profession, there 
is not one single model to which all countries adhere. Countries lying closer to the upper right-
hand corner show high levels of independence. Hence, Latvia, Luxembourg, Italy, and Hungary 
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are identified as possessing the most independent oversight systems in terms of organisational 
independence from the accounting profession and are gathered in the first group. The close 
positioning of the oversight systems of Luxembourg and Italy indicate similar institutional 
structures: they organise their audit oversight systems in the form of traditional regulatory 
agencies. Two indicators express the high organisational values of these countries in particular. 
First, one way of ensuring independence from the regulated industry is to maximise relational 
distance from the industry by excluding former employees of the accounting profession from 
being appointed as regulators, which is the case in these countries. Second, Italy and 
Luxembourg have multi-sector rather than single-sector agencies. As can be concluded from 
regulation literature, multi-sector agencies offer greater independence than single-sector agencies. 
They are more able to provide protection from industry capture, as interest groups have 
opposing effects and the agency has facilitated access to pooled resources, improving its 
information-processing abilities (Edwards & Waverman, 2006). Hungary and Latvia have set up 
the oversight boards within the government, as a permanent internal structure of the Ministry of 
Finance (Latvia) and the Ministry for National Economy (Hungary). Hence, members of the 
oversight board are civil servants and employed directly by the ministries. 
 
Interestingly, Sweden shows that the organisation of the audit oversight system as a government 
authority does not necessarily result in high independence values. By 1973, in Sweden the 
supervision and licensing of auditors was transferred from the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce (private institution) to the State. It became one of the pioneers of quality controls 
when the Supervisory Board for Public Accountants (Revisorsnämnden) was established in 1995. 
Today, the Supervisory Board is a governmental authority under the Ministry of Justice and is 
governed by its director, who is appointed by the government. However, a closer look reveals 
that within its organisation the Supervisory Board has a separate decision-making body, the 
Oversight Board, which has decision authority in the field of disciplinary actions against 
individual auditors and audit firms. Additionally, the relatively low independence value is based 
on the lack of cooling-off requirements for the members of the Board and the involvement of 
practising auditors. This is in line with Jonnergard (2012), who draws attention to the country’s 
opaque regulatory system, characterised by a strong regulatory intertwining between the state and 
the profession.38 
 
Denmark presents a similar case. The official audit oversight authority is the Danish Business 
Authority (DBA), which is a regulatory agency under the Ministry of Business and Growth. 
However, the main responsible actor for quality assurance is the Danish Supervisory Authority 
                                                     
38 One example is the procedure in the event that the Supervisory Board reveals deficits when examining quality 
reports: Instead of taking action, it refers the matter back to the professional association for re-consideration 
(Jonnergard, 2012, p. 67).  
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on Auditing (DSAA). Although, the DSAA is an organisational entity within the DBA, its board 
consists of honorary members. The low independence value can furthermore be explained by the 
absence of cooling-off provisions and by the high number of accountants on the board: four out 
of nine members have to be approved auditors. 
 
The low independence value of the PCAOB is another striking finding. This is primarily due to 
the specific SOX provisions regarding the composition of the Board. First, two out of five 
members involved in the governance of the Board have to be certified public accountants. 
Second, only the chairman has to meet the cooling-off provisions stated in the SOX. In 
particular, the SOX restriction of the number of Certified Public Accountants on the Board to 
two members is perceived as an appropriate safeguard to avoid the Board being dominated by 
the regulated parties (e.g. Palmrose, 2013, p. 778). Nevertheless this ratio is among the highest in 
terms of the involvement of accounting professionals, compared to the European provisions. 
Given that the Board is central to the way the PCAOB implements SOX provisions, one could, 
at least partially, question the role of the PCAOB as the globally accepted benchmark of an 
entirely independent regulator.  
 
The British Financial Reporting Council (FRC) became responsible for audit regulation in 2004. 
Although the U.K. did not experience Enron-like accounting scandals, the FRC Board was a 
direct response to the developments in the U.S. (Eldaly, 2012), which is evidenced in relatively 
similar organisational structures, evidenced in the close positioning of the U.K. and the PCAOB 
in the topography illustrated in Figure 1. In contrast to other oversight authorities, here, only a 
majority of the overall 16 members of the Board must not be individuals who in the five years 
prior to appointment have been practising auditors. The average ranking in terms of 
organisational independence is mainly due to the fact that the profession funds half of the 
auditing and accounting costs of the FRC. This is in line with Eldaly (2012) who identified the 
dependence of the FRC's funding system on professional bodies as independence risk (Eldaly, 
2012, p. 130).39  
 
Finland and Ireland are the countries with the lowest values. By the mid-1990s, in Ireland the 
regulatory reforms altered the institutional arrangements of the country’s self-regulatory system 
and established the Irish Auditing and Accounting Supervisory Authority (IAASA), described as 
“a unique event in the context of the main Irish professions” (Canning & O’Dwyer, 2013, p. 
179). While at the time of establishment the institutional arrangements were more extensive than 
                                                     
39 The FRC frequently demanded to enhance its independence from those it regulates by arguing that “the 
independence of the FRC as oversight regulator for the audit profession is still governed by agreements with the 
profession that sometimes inappropriately limit its independence” (FRC, 2012, p. 11). 
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those of the majority of European countries40, the system has not kept pace with international 
and European regulatory developments (Canning & O’Dwyer, 2014, p. 25). As long ago as 1924, 
Finland decided that the supervision of the profession should be carried out by the Central 
Chamber of Commerce (Niemi & Sundgren, 2008, p. 80,96). Although critical voices have called 
for the removal of the oversight from the national Chamber to a pure governmental body, the 
Chamber has remained the primary responsible entity to this day.  
2.3.2 Functional Independence 
Comparing all 28 profiles along the multidimensional scale, the analysis shows the topography 
illustrated in Figure 2. The values of Functional Independence of each oversight system are 
presented in Appendix 7.  
Figure 2: Functional Profiles (Stress Level: 0,1) 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the POSAC for the functional profiles of the audit oversight systems. It shows 
less variation than the figure of the organisational profiles, thus indicating that the European 
audit oversight systems differ less significantly in terms of regulatory competences. Moreover, it 
reveals a fundamental difference between organisational and functional independence. While no 
single oversight system reaches the highest possible value concerning institutional independence, 
there are various countries with extremely high functional independence values (e.g. the FRC, the 
                                                     
40 Canning and O'Dwyer (2013, p. 179) point out that one explicit aim of the regulatory reform was to establish an 
oversight board that is more independent and possesses greater regulatory competences than its U.K. counterpart.  
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Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB) in Italy, the Commission de 
Surveillance du Secteur Financier (CSSF) in Luxembourg and the Authority for the Financial 
Markets (AFM) in the Netherlands).  
The two extreme outliers here are Belgium and again Ireland. In both countries, the primary 
responsibility for all quality assurance of statutory auditors resides with the accountancy bodies 
that organise the inspections and issue penalties in the case of deficiency reports. As in Ireland, 
Belgium integrated external entities, such as the High Council for Economic Professions and 
other disciplinary bodies, into its oversight system before European law required the 
establishment of independent regulation. Observers therefore argued that the “Belgian 
profession was at the leading edge” with respect to external quality assurance (Vanstraelen & 
Willekens, 2008, p. 36). However, the design of the system was made under influence of the 
profession (Vanstraelen & Willekens, 2008), which is evidenced in the analysis in terms of a very 
low degree of functional independence of the Belgian regulator. At this point, it is worth 
remembering that the analysis focus of this paper is on the external quality controls of audit firms 
with public interests clients. While some countries, such as the US, the UK, and Denmark 
distinguish considerably between audit firms with and without issuer clients, this regulatory gap 
does not exist in other countries. The low level of functional independence of the Belgian system 
might also explain why only one per cent of audit mandates relate to listed companies 
(Vanstraelen & Willekens, 2008, p. 19). 
The Dutch system represents the counterexample, as the regulatory development took a very 
different course. Until 2006, no independent external oversight existed in the Dutch regulatory 
environment (Meuwissen & Wallage, 2008, p. 176). When, in 2006, the Authority for the 
Financial Markets (AFM) was declared as oversight body, the Dutch oversight system was 
transformed and—as in the U.S.—regulatory power was transferred from the professional bodies 
to a purely regulatory agency.  
2.3.3 Material Independence 
With these results, it is possible to create one index of independence that considers both 
organizational and functional independence equally. For each country, the arithmetic mean is 
calculated from the POSAC values of the Organizational and Functional profiles in order to set 
up a rank order regarding the degree of material independence of the oversight systems. The 
values of material independence of each audit oversight system are set out in Appendix 8.  
For a graphical representation, the combined values are used to determine the positions of the 
systems on the y- and the x-axis of the diagram. The y-axis shows the combined values for the 
POSAC concerning the competences of the systems, the x-axis reveals the combined values for 
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the organisational structure. In this diagram, the oversight systems with the highest level of 
independence are located in the upper right-hand corner. The high variation—on both the y- and 
the x-axis—indicates that the oversight systems still differ significantly in terms of material 
independence.  
Figure 3: Material Independence of Audit Oversight Systems 
 
 
The great variance between the different degrees of independence among the countries becomes 
evident in the diagram. Countries with high independence values set up their oversight systems as 
administrative agencies (Hungary, Sweden) or as regulatory agencies (Luxembourg, Italy, the 
Netherlands).  
The latter approach was put into practice by either adding audit oversight as an additional task to 
an already existing financial market supervisory authority, or by establishing a new authority—
which was the case of the PCAOB in the U.S. The essential feature of regulatory agencies is that 
the prime and final responsibilities are combined as they are responsible for all immediate 
operating tasks of public oversight. Hence, these agencies combine legislative, executive, and 
judicial functions, i.e. they define rules, supervise them, and introduce sanctions if necessary. In 
addition, these agencies have their own powers and responsibilities given under public law, are 
organisationally separated from ministries, and are neither directly elected nor managed by 
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elected officials. Therefore they fulfil the criteria as an “independent regulatory agency” 
(Thatcher, 2002a, 2002b).41 
Apart from Hungary and Sweden, the audit oversight systems in Denmark, Latvia, and Malta are 
also organised in the form of a regulatory authority equipped with its own resources and staff. 
These entities are organised as “governmental authorities” under the Ministry of Justice 
(Sweden), Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs (Denmark), and the Ministry for National 
Economy (Hungary), or belong to the internal structure of a ministry, as is the case in Latvia. 
Hence, this approach involves highly politicised bodies. However, as can be seen in Denmark, 
this does not necessarily result in regulatory structures without interference of the profession.  
Low material independence values can be found in particular for oversight systems that are either 
institutionalised as a monitored peer-review system or are situated within a chamber system (as is 
the case, for example, in Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Lithuania, and 
Poland). 
A professional chamber is a corporation under public law that exercises some degree of 
regulatory authority over the accounting profession. In most of the countries these chambers are 
institutionalised in addition to other forms of government regulation, and the membership of 
statutory auditors is compulsory. At the same time, however, these chambers also function as 
traditional interest groups.42 In these countries, a multiple-principles problem (Mattli & Büthe, 
2005) arises, since the chambers, on the one hand, represent the interests of their members and, 
on the other hand, work as regulators on behalf of public interest. In these cases, audit oversight 
is conducted through a relatively weak council, commission, or committee, which holds the 
ultimate responsibility and which has the right to access any information on oversight matters 
and to participate in any oversight activity. In such a situation, the agent’s behaviour diverges 
from the public preference and moves closer to the private principal, the more the agent depends 
upon the private principal for the provision of expertise and technical support. The close 
interrelation with, and dependence on, the accounting profession therefore might jeopardise the 
regulators’ service for public interest.  
                                                     
41 Independent regulatory agencies can be observed in many economic fields. Interestingly, they are generally seen as 
result of a process of “reregulation”, which refers to a process in which European governments have been forced to 
change their traditional modes of governance due to increasing international competition and financial integration 
within the European Union. Political actors have started to delegate powers away from government departments to 
independent regulatory agencies (Majone, 1997, p. 199; Thatcher, 2002a; Vogel, 2003). This development has been 
observed in various markets, such as telecommunication, energy, and the media (Gilardi, 2002; Tenbücken & 
Schneider, 2004). Hence, from the reregulation angle, regulatory agencies are the material features of a development 
away from direct government regulation towards a more pluralist and liberal understanding of regulation.  
42 The German Chamber of Public Accountants, for instance, unambiguously mentions the “upholding of the interests 
and positions of the profession vis-à-vis the public and policymakers as one of its key duties” 
(Wirtschaftsprüferkammer (WPK), 2014). 
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2.4 Conclusion and future research 
Within the last decade, the regulation of statutory audit firms has changed significantly. By 
analysing the statutory provisions that describe the composition and the competences of audit 
oversight boards, this paper contributes empirically and methodologically to the on-going debate 
on audit regulation. 
The methodological aim was to develop a framework to measure the degree of independence of 
the PCAOB and recently established oversight bodies in the European Union. To this end, this 
paper offers a detailed operationalisation of audit oversight independence, leading eventually to a 
single index of material independence. The impact of formal independence on regulatory 
effectiveness (Krapohl, 2004) and on behavioural independence (Gehring & Krapohl, 2007) 
should not be overestimated. Nevertheless, the empirical and methodological contribution of this 
study is a first and necessary step for further comparative audit oversight research, as legal 
represent the “starting point” (Busuioc, 2009, p. 603) for further comparative audit oversight 
research that aims at investigating how these formal rules have been evolved in regulatory 
practice. The results of this study can therefore be used for future research about the 
effectiveness of audit regulation. Carson et al. (2013), for example, found that the use of 
government inspectors did not affect audit quality compared to the use of peer reviewers. As 
they do not consider the overall oversight structure in which inspectors operate, the results of 
this study should therefore be used as a basis for elaborating on the relationship between audit 
regulation and audit quality in more detail.  
The empirical aim of this study was to shed light on the independence from the accounting 
profession of the various audit oversight authorities. In 2009, PCAOB Chairman Mark Olson 
explained that “approximately 27 countries have established independent audit oversight bodies 
that are responsible for audit firms operating in their jurisdictions” (Olson, 2009). Although all 
countries encounter similar pressures to establish public oversight systems, this study has 
revealed that “independence” has been translated into rather different regulatory outcomes. 
Whereas all countries claim to possess formal independent oversight systems, there is a visible 
gap between countries with comparatively strong independent oversight authorities, such as Italy 
and Luxembourg, and countries in which accounting bodies still maintain far-reaching regulatory 
influence, such as Ireland and Belgium. Hence, despite the fact that regulatory convergence has 
intensified with time, the in-depth analysis of the oversight structures reveals significant 
differences in terms of their institutional design and composition, as European member states 
have established oversight systems with various organisational structures and have often 
delegated very different regulatory competences to them. Through the strong interrelation 
between oversight entities and the accounting profession found in various countries, regulators 
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and accountants form what Meidinger (1987, p. 365) defined as a “regulatory community”, in 
which members “frequently influence each other, act with reference to each other, and desire 
each other’s respect”. Through this, a specific mode of regulatory capture, labelled as “social 
capture” (Davidoff Solomon, 2010) or “cultural capture” (Kwak, 2014), could arise. The concept 
goes beyond traditional material self-interest explanations, as the regulated industry is able to 
shape policy outcomes through mechanisms other than material incentives or rational debate. As 
a result, regulators “may believe they are doing their best, but their worldview is affected by the 
people they interact with” (Davidoff Solomon, 2010).  
By representing initial insights about the current mode of audit regulation, this study is a 
necessary starting point in comparative audit oversight research. At the same time, it indicates 
future research questions to address. One limitation of this study is that it does not differentiate 
between different segments of the accounting profession. Others have highlighted how large and 
globally operating accounting firms have started to disconnect themselves from the majority of 
local audit firms by following their own strategic and regulatory agenda (Cooper & Robson, 
2006; Covaleski, Dirsmith, & Rittenberg, 2003; Suddaby et al., 2007). As anecdotal evidence from 
data used in this study indicates, particular representatives of large accounting firms are involved 
in oversight affairs—in the governance of the oversight authority and in the organisation and 
implementation of audit inspections. Future research has therefore to focus on whether the 
participation of different segments of the profession in regulatory affairs is representative or 
unrepresentative, and the ensuing possible side effects.  
Further research should address the causes and consequences of significant variation of audit 
oversight structures. This is particularly important for the cases that deviate extremely, which 
have been identified in this study. The analysis shows that some of the countries that 
implemented their oversight systems before the PCAOB came into existence, such as Ireland, 
Belgium, and Denmark, still possess public institutions that are close to the profession and have 
not left their chosen regulatory path. Further research could therefore elaborate on how relevant 
actors were able to secure this earlier mode of regulation and how these sectoral and national 
patters intervene with European regulatory harmonisation efforts (Yesilkagit & Christensen, 
2010). More in-depth analytical case studies are required to identify the factors and motives 
shaping audit oversight arrangements. This is particularly important for those countries in which 
a strong interrelation between the oversight authorities and the accounting profession has been 
identified. Future research has to identify the ways and mechanisms that have enabled this 
specific understanding of regulation to remain accepted by the regulatory community of statutory 
audit oversight, while being widely contested by the public and policy makers. 
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2.5 Appendices  
  
Appendix 1: History of audit oversight regulation in the European Union 
  
The first provisions on European audit regulation were introduced with the Fourth Directive 
(78/660/EEC) in 1978. The Directive required companies to have their annual accounts 
“audited by one or more persons authorised by national law to audit accounts” (European 
Council, 1978 Article 5.1 (a)). In 1983, the Seventh Directive (83/349/EEC) extended the audit 
requirement to consolidated accounts. One year later, the Eighth Directive (84/253/EEC) dealt 
specifically with the educational and training prerequisites necessary to become a statutory 
auditor. Although these three Directives caused most of the member states to modify their 
regulations in order to comply with the legislative requirements, regulatory harmonisation in 
general remained at a low level (R. C. Baker et al., 2001, p. 764). As the European framework 
remained silent about audit oversight requirements, powerful independent oversight entities did 
not exist. In the few countries with external quality controls, the system was organised within the 
profession as a peer review system.  
In the 1990s, regulation regained speed and especially the European regulatory framework for 
financial reporting and auditing “changed dramatically” (Maijoor & Vanstraelen, 2012, p. 118). 
Questions about the regulation of the regulators started to arise when the critical role of auditors 
in various corporate scandals reinforced the demand for a common and tighter regulatory 
framework (Humphrey & Moizer, 2008, p. 20). In 1996, the European Commission issued a 
Green Paper titled “The Role, the Position and the Liability of the Statutory Auditor within the 
European Union”, in which the nonexistence of external quality assurance mechanism in various 
countries was perceived as “a handicap for the Single Market and in the international context” 
(European Commission, 1996)43. One year later, in 1997, the financial crisis in Southeast Asian 
economies eventually highlighted the importance of ensuring the reliability of audited financial 
reports, and the accounting profession came under pressure to prove that it was capable of 
meeting the greater demands of the world’s capital markets. As a direct response, the European 
Commission founded the “Committee on Auditing” in 1998, to develop a common view on 
auditing matters including the discussion about the implementation of quality assurance systems 
in each member state (European Commission, 1998). The Committee consisted of government 
experts and representatives from the accounting profession. However, it was especially the 
accounting profession that delivered much of the input for the Committee’s deliberations (Van 
Hulle, 2004), and representatives left no doubts that the external quality assurance should be 
organised in the form of peer reviews. Frank Harding, the former President of the International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC), for instance, acknowledged that the accounting profession 
                                                     
43 A green paper is a tentative government report and consultation document of policy proposals for stimulating 
discussions on given topics at the European level without any commitment to action. 
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“is being challenged” to demonstrate that it is competent to fulfil its traditional self-regulatory 
role in the public interest, but he made clear that “experience has demonstrated that […] 
regulation of the profession works best where it is delegated by government to the profession 
itself” (Harding, 2000, p. 596). 
The outcome of the Committee’s debates was the Recommendation on “Quality Assurance for 
the Statutory Auditor in the EU”, issued in November 2000, in which external quality controls 
were framed as “fundamental for ensuring good audit quality” (European Commission, 2000).44 
Nevertheless, the Commission made it clear that “Quality assurance is the profession’s principal 
means of assuring the public” (European Commission, 2000, p. 3). It stated: 
“Both peer review and monitoring are acceptable methodologies for quality assurance 
[…]. Monitoring and peer review are considered as methodologies of equal stature” 
(European Commission, 2000, p. 3). 
Moreover, public oversight boards were attributed a rather passive role: their main tasks were to 
“ensure” and to “plan” the quality assurance mechanisms and to “evaluate” the review results, 
rather than to function as an authority with the possibility of making direct inspections or taking 
disciplinary measures. In general, the Recommendation’s character was shaped through the belief 
in the principle of subsidiarity. The different regulatory histories of the countires, the particular 
requirements of their financial markets, and their general cost considerations would make 
different regulatory frameworks not only unavoidable but also favourable. Only two years later, 
however, the regulatory paradigm shift in the U.S. marked the starting point of a period of 
various regulatory reforms in the European Union, as the nonbinding nature of the 
Recommendation from 2000 would not avoid extraterritorial U.S. inspections in Europe (Eberle 
& Lauter, 2011; Humphrey et al., 2011). Answers to this problem had to be found at the 
European level: in the 1990s, financial matters were still solved under bilateral agreements 
between the U.S. and European member states, and it was increasingly the European 
Commission that took the leading role in debates on financial matters. In particular, the EU–U.S. 
Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue discussed regulatory issues of mutual interest, such as the 
application of the SOX regulation to foreign companies (Ilmonen, 2012, p. 149; Posner & Véron, 
2010, p. 402). The developing Parmalat fiasco and other European financial scandals were 
perceived as contemporary proof that the European regulatory framework (mainly based on the 
8th Directive from 1984) no longer met the requirements of the global financial markets. But 
while the SOX was discussed and passed in only a few months in the U.S., regulatory changes in 
Europe took place rather slowly.  
                                                     
44 A Recommendation is expected to be applied by member states, but it does not have as much weight as a directive. 
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It took until 2006 for the European Commission to formally replace the former 8th Directive 
with the Statutory Audit Directive (European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union, 2006). The Directive obliged member states to implement a public oversight system 
independently from the accounting profession and made it mandatory for statutory audit firms to 
be subject to an external quality assurance review. However, although the Directive defined the 
“independent” public oversight board as the ultimate authority, it allowed professional bodies to 
remain directly responsible for the registration, external quality controls, and disciplinary 
measures of statutory audit firms. This legislative leeway was used by most of the member states 
and the majority installed a committee or a commission to “oversee” the accounting profession, 
rather than to place these tasks into a regulatory agency. To foster harmonisation among 
European member states without using its regulatory power, the Commission established the 
Audit Regulatory Committee (AuRC) and the European Group of Auditors’ Oversight Bodies 
(EGAOB).45 
Following the adoption of the Directive, the debate on the regulation of auditors continued, 
dominated in particular by the transatlantic relationship between the PCAOB and the European 
member states, and the lack of convergence among the European systems. In March 2007, 
Internal Market and Services Commissioner Charlie McCreevy and PCAOB Chairman Mark 
Olson agreed to launch roadmap discussions to “move towards inspections of audit firms carried 
out by an independent and rigorous home-country public oversight authority” by 2009, which 
would enable a system of mutual recognition between the U.S. and European audit regulators 
(European Commission, 2007). Therefore, it became necessary for the European oversight 
systems to move closer to the PCAOB structures, especially by cutting the systems’ dependencies 
on the accounting profession (see for example the speeches of Goelzer, 2004; Ross, 2004). The 
pressure for action was increased at the end of 2007, when the PCAOB drafted a policy 
statement that defined complete independence as the “essential criteria” for determining whether 
the Board could rely on a non-U.S. oversight system to conduct inspections of PCAOB-
registered non-U.S. audit firms (PCAOB, 2007; Ross, 2004).  
In 2008 the increasing pressure through the PCAOB caused the European Commission to issue 
the Recommendation: “On external quality assurance for statutory auditors and audit firms 
auditing public interest entities”. According to the legal text, inspections of audit firms with 
issuer clients should no longer be conducted by practising auditors and the organisation of the 
oversight bodies should cut its affiliations with the profession. At the same time, however, the 
Recommendation reiterated elements of the traditional EU model by allowing for the delegation 
of tasks to professional bodies and for the participation of practitioners in reviews as “experts” 
                                                     
45 The AuRC was established in accordance with the “comitology” procedure. The committees are forums for 
discussion, consisting of representatives from member states and are chaired by the Commission. They enable the 
Commission to establish dialogue with national administrations before adopting and implementing measures.  
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(Eberle & Lauter, 2011). Thus, the recommendation remained a compromise between the calls of 
the profession and member states for flexible and diverse oversight structures, and the 
Commission’s aspiration to set up entirely independent oversight systems.  
Surprisingly, the financial crisis of 2008 then interrupted rather than accelerated the discussion on 
audit regulation in Europe. The crisis did not seem to have much effect on the reputation of the 
audit profession. European auditors did not find themselves in the immediate firing line, with the 
blame mainly being placed on credit rating agencies, bankers, and financial regulators (Humphrey 
et al., 2011, p. 436). This changed when McCreevy, commissioner for internal market and 
services, who himself was a chartered accountant and known for his liberal market views, was 
preceded by Michael Barnier in 2010. Barnier, a former foreign minister of France without an 
accounting background, caused concern among the profession as to whether he would be as 
supportive of the profession as McCreevy had been (Humphrey et al., 2011). In fact, shortly after 
his appointment, Barnier announced the publication of a Green Paper, focusing on the role of 
audit firms:  
“I am convinced that it is the right time to launch a real debate at European level on the 
subject of audit. This conviction is reinforced by the questions recently raised in the 
context of the audit of the accounts of the American bank Lehman Brothers” (European 
Commission, 2010). 
The Green Paper was launched in 2010 and was one part of the Commission’s holistic strategy to 
stabilise the financial markets. The paper contained a wide variety of possible provisions for the 
further development of public audit oversight. For instance, the paper proposed the 
transformation of the EGAOB into a so-called “Lamfalussy Level 3 Committee” or the 
establishment of a new European Supervisory Authority, to reach convergence in the application 
of rules and ensure a common approach to inspections of audit firms among European member 
states.46 Finally, after intensive debates, the European Commission, the European Parliament, 
and the Council reached an agreement and adopted the “Directive on statutory audits of annual 
accounts and consolidated accounts” (2014/56/EU, 2014a) and the “Regulation on specific 
requirements regarding statutory audit of public-interest entities” (537/2014, 2014b) in April 
2014. The latter contains additional requirements that relate exclusively to the statutory audits of 
Public-Interest Entities (PIEs) in addition to the ones stated in the Directive.47  
Under the new regulatory umbrella, all statutory audit firms have to be subject to oversight by 
formally independent entities. They have to be governed by non-practitioners who possess 
                                                     
46 This kind of committee already exists in the areas of securities (Committee of European Securities Regulators, 
CESR), insurance (Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors, CEIOPS), and banking 
(Committee of European Banking, CEBS). 
47 The Directive needs to be transposed by the member states into their national legislation by June 2016. Although the 
Regulation formally entered into force immediately (i.e. in June 2014), most provisions will be applicable with the 
implementation of the Directive.  
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thorough expertise and knowledge in the relevant areas. Unlike in earlier debates, a sharp 
distinction was made between the regulation of audit firms of listed companies and of audit firms 
of unlisted companies. For audits without issuer clients, the Directive left European member 
states the option to delegate the organisation and execution of quality reviews, investigations, and 
sanctions to professional bodies or other authorities (Directive 2014/56/EU, Article 32 (4b)).48  
This regulatory leeway was closed for the audit firms of PIEs regarding external quality controls, 
which cannot be delegated to professional bodies. Through this, Brussels differentiates for the 
first time the regulatory requirements between audit firms with and without issuer clients. Tasks 
related to sanctions and measures can still be delegated, but only to bodies independent from the 
profession (Regulation 537/2014, Article 24). The Regulation refers to quality assurance reviews 
as “inspections”, whereby an “inspector” is defined as someone who is contracted by the 
competent authority without being a practising statutory auditor and without being associated 
with a statutory audit firm. The Regulation further specifies that all persons involved in the 
governance must not be affiliated with an audit firm during their involvement, nor have been so 
in the three previous years. However, an option was maintained, from the Directive of 2006, 
which allows the national authorities to contract experts and accounting practitioners for certain 
oversight tasks, including assurance review, investigations, and disciplinary matters (Directive, 
Article 32 (3); Regulation, Article 26 (5)).  
 
  
                                                     
48 To be precise, the 2014 Directive, in contrast to 2006 Directive, explicitly allows the member states to “delegate or 
allow the competent authority to delegate any of its tasks to other authorities or bodies designated or otherwise 
authorised by law to carry out such tasks” (Article 32), whilst the directive from 2006 did not have any provisions on 
this. The Directive requires a cooling-off period of three years between reviewers and reviewed firm, and introduces a 
risk-based approach to determine the frequency of reviews, which still have to be conducted at least every six years 
(Directive 2014/56/EU 2014a). 
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Appendix 2: Legal sources 
 
Austria 
 Abschlussprüfungs-Qualitätssicherungsgesetz (A-QSG) 
 Abschlussprüfungs-Qualitätssicherungsrichtlinie (A-QRL) 
Belgium 
 Royal Decree of 21 April 2007 transposing provisions of Directive 2006/43/EC 
 Royal Decree of 25 April 2007 amending Belgium’s Company Law with a view to the transposition of provisions of 
Directive 2006/43/EC 
 Law of 8 June 2008 
Bulgaria 
 Independent Financial Audit Act 
 Regulation for the Activity of the Commission for Public Oversight of Statutory Auditors 
Croatia 
 Audit Act Amendments (enacted by the Croatian parliament at its session of 21 November 2008) 
Czech Republic 
 Collection of Laws No. 93/2009 ACT, dated 26 March 2009, on auditors, and amending certain other legislation (the 
Auditors’ Act) 
Denmark 
 Section 32 of the Danish Act on Approved Auditors and Audit Firms 
Estonia 
 Auditors Activities Act (passed 27 January 2010) 
Finland 
 Auditing Act (459/2007) 
 Chamber of Commerce Act (878/2002) 
France 
 Code de commerce 
 Code de déontologie 
 Ordonnance du 8 décembre 2008 transposant la huitième directive européenne relative aux commissaires aux 
comptes 
Germany 
 Wirtschaftsprüferordnung (zuletzt geändert 31.08.2013) 
 Geschäftsordnung der APAK (Fassung vom 9.11.2009) 
 Abschlussprüferaufsichtsgesetz (APAG) 
 Berufsaufsichtsreformgesetz (BARefG) 
Greece 
 Law 3148/2003 
 Law 3693/2008 
Hungary 
 Act LXXV of 2007 on the Chamber of Hungarian Auditors, the Activities of Auditors, and on the Public Oversight 
of Auditors 
Ireland 
 Companies (Auditing And Accounting) Act 2003 
Italy 
 Legislative Decree no. 58 of 24 February 1998: Consolidated Law on Financial Intermediation, pursuant to Articles 8 
and 21 of Law 52 of 6 February 1996 (as amended by Italian Legislative Decrees No. 44 and No. 53 of 4 March 2014) 
 Legislative Decree No. 39 of 27 January 2010: implementation of Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of 
annual accounts and consolidated accounts, amending Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC and repealing 
Directive 84/253/EEC1 
 Consob Regulation no. 11971 of 14 May 1999: implementing the provisions on issuers of Legislative Decree 58 of 24 
February 1998 (as amended by Consob resolution No. 18671 of 8 October 2013) 
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Latvia 
 Law on Sworn Auditors 
 Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers No 525 of June 8, 2004 on procedures by which applications and other 
documents for the taking of Sworn Auditor Qualification Examination and for Receipt of Commercial Company of 
Sworn Auditors’ Licence shall be submitted 
 Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers No 547 of December 27, 2001 on the minimum liability amount of civil liability 
insurance for a sworn auditor—a self-employed person or an individual merchant—and for a commercial company of 
sworn auditors 
 Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers No 536 of June 17, 2009 on regulations regarding an inspection of compliance 
with the quality control requirements of audit services 
Regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers No 537 of June 17, 2009 on regulations regarding the sample form of the 
registration application for a third country auditor or third country commercial company of auditors, and the sample 
form for an opinion regarding the compliance of a third country auditor or third country commercial company of 
auditors to registration conditions, and procedures for preparation and sending of an opinion 
Lithuania 
 Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Audit 
Luxembourg 
 Loi du 18 décembre 2009 relative à la profession de l’audit 
 Règlement grand-ducal du 18 décembre 2009 déterminant les conditions de reconnaissance de prestataires d’autres 
Etats membres prévues à l’article 7 de la loi du 18 décembre 2009 relative à la profession de l’audit 
 Règlement grand-ducal du 15 février 2010 portant organization de la formation continue des réviseurs d’entreprises et 
réviseurs d’entreprises agréés 
 Règlement grand-ducal du 9 juillet 2013 déterminant les conditions de qualification professionnelle des réviseurs 
d’entreprises en exécution de la loi du 18 décembre 2009 relative à la profession de l’audit 
 Règlement grand-ducal du 28 octobre 2013 relatif aux taxes à percevoir par la Commission de surveillance du secteur 
financier 
Malta 
 Accountancy Profession Act, CAP281 
 Accountancy Profession Regulations, 2010 
 Accountancy Profession (Provision of Accountancy Services on a Temporary and Occasional Basis) Regulations, 2010 
 Accountancy Profession (Accounting and Auditing Standards) Regulations, 2009 
 Directive 4, Quality Assurance, 2009 
 Companies Act, CAP386 
Netherlands 
 Audit Firms Supervision Act  
 Decree on the supervision of audit firms 
Portugal 
 Regulamento do CNSA relativo à supervisão do Controlo de qualidade da Ordem dos Revisores Oficiais de Contas 
 Decreto-Lei 225/2008, de 20 de Novembro Criação do Conselho Nacional de Supervisão de Auditoria 
 Decreto-Lei 224/2008, de 20 de Novembro Alteração ao Estatuto da Ordem dos Revisores Oficiais de Contas 
 Regulamento da CMVM n.º 6/2000 
Poland 
 Act of 07 May 2009 on statutory auditors and their self-government, entities authorised to audit financial statements 
and public oversight 
Romania 
 Government emergency ordinance regarding the statutory audit of annual financial statements and consolidated 
financial statements 
Slovakia 
 Act No. 540/2007  
 Act No. 504/2009 
 Act No. 136/2010 
Slovenia 
 Auditing Act (Official Gazette RS No. 65/08, ZRev-2) 
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Spain 
 Royal Decree 302/1989, of 17 March 
 Royal Decree 1517/2011, of 31 October 
 Royal Legislative Decree 1/2011, of 1 July 
Sweden 
 Revisorslagen (2001:883) 
 Revisorsförordningen (1995:665)  
 Revisorsnämndens föreskrifter  
United Kingdom 
 Companies Act 2006 
United States 
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 
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Appendix 3: National oversight authorities and funding structure  
 
Country Name of authority Funding structure Budget  
Austria Austrian Auditors Supervisory Authority  State budget Not public 
Belgium High Council for Economic Professions Fees from audit profession €400,000 (2013) 
Bulgaria Commission for Public Oversight of Statutory 
Auditors (CPOSA) 
State budget €631,077 (2013) 
Czech 
Republic 
Audit Public Oversight Council State budget (possibility to increase 
income by fines) 
Not public 
Croatia Audit Public Oversight Committee (APOC) State budget €53,000 (2013) 
Denmark Danish Supervisory Authority on Auditing 
(DSAA) 
Fees from audit profession €2.5 mn (2013) 
Estonia Auditors Activities Oversight Council (AAOC) State budget €200,000 (2013) 
Finland Auditing Board of the Central Chamber of 
Commerce (AB3C) 
Fees from audit profession €1.75 mn (2013) 
France Haut Conseil du Commissariat aux 
Comptes (H3C) 
Fees from audit profession €8.8 mn (2012) 
Germany Auditor Oversight Commission (AOC) Fees from audit profession €5.2 mn (2012) 
Greece Hellenic Accounting and Auditing Standards 
Oversight 
Fees from audit profession Not public 
Hungary Auditors’ Public Oversight Committee 
(APOC) 
State budget and fees from audit 
profession 
Not public 
Italy Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la 
Borsa (CONSOB) 
State budget and fees from a audit 
profession 
€128 mn (2013) 
Ireland Irish Auditing & Accounting Supervisory 
Authority  
State budget (40%) and  
accountancy bodies (60%) 
€2 mn (2012) 
Latvia The Authority of Audit and Accounting State budget Not public 
Lithuania The Authority of Auditing and Accounting 
(3A) 
State budget €460,000 (2011) 
Luxembourg Commission de Surveillance du Secteur 
Financier (CSSF) 
State budget (90%), fees from audit 
profession (10%) 
€51 mn; 5.1 mn for audit 
oversight (2012) 
Malta Quality Assurance Oversight Committee 
(QAOC) 
State budget (50%), fees from audit 
profession (50%) 
Not public 
Netherlands Netherlands Authority for the Financial 
Markets ((AFM) 
State budget (33%), audit profession 
(60%) 
€77.7 mn (2012) 
Poland Audit Oversight Commission State budget (80%), audit profession 
(20%) 
€342,989 (2012) 
Portugal National Audit Oversight Board (CNSA) - No formal budget 
Romania Council for the Public Oversight of the 
Activity of the Statutory Audit 
State budget (40%), audit profession 
(60%) 
Not public 
Slovakia Auditing Oversight Authority (UDVA) State budget (33%), PIE, and audit 
profession (66%)  
Not public 
Slovenia Agency for Public Oversight of Auditing State budget (main proportion), and 
audit profession 
€353,500 (2010) 
Spain Accounting and Auditing Institute (ICAC) Fees from audit profession and 
publication revenues 
€6.9 mn (2012) 
Sweden Supervisory Board of Public Accountants Fees from audit firms €3.5 mn (2012) 
United 
Kingdom 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) Audit profession, listed companies, 
and state budget 
€31.7 mn (2013) 
United 
States 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) 
Fees from listed companies €190 mn (2014) 
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Appendix 4: Coding for Organisational Independence 
 
 ff fj esh coh esbm ipba pgp cobm to abmr 
AT 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 0.75 3.00 0.75 
BE 1.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.25 0.75 0.75 
BG 3.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 1.50 1.50 2.25 1.50 
HR 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 2.25 1.50 2.25 1.50 
CZ 2.25 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 1.50 0.75 3.00 0.75 
DK 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 0.75 0.75 2.25 0.75 
EE 3.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.50 2.25 2.25 0.75 
FI 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.50 0.75 1.50 0.75 
FR 0.75 1.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.50 0.75 3.00 0.75 
DE 0.75 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 2.25 2.25 3.00 
GR 1.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.25 0.75 1.50 0.75 
HU 3.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.25 1.88 1.88 
IE 1.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.75 1.88 0.75 
IT 2.25 3.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.75 3.00 3.00 
LV 3.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.25 1.88 1.88 
LT 3.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.50 1.50 0.75 
LU 2.25 3.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.75 3.00 0.75 
MT 1.85 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 2.25 1.50 0.75 
NL 1.50 3.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 0.75 1.50 2.25 0.75 
PT 2.25 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 1.50 0.75 0.75 0.75 
PL 2.25 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 3.00 1.50 1.50 2.25 0.75 
RO 1.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.50 0.75 1.50 1.50 
SK 1.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 0.75 2.25 2.25 1.50 
SI 2.25 1.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 2.25 3.00 0.75 
ES 0.75 1.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 0.75 0.75 0.75 
SE 0.75 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 1.50 0.75 1.50 0.75 
UK 1.50 1.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 1.50 1.50 0.75 
U.S. 3.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.75 0.75 2.25 1.50 
 
ff  Form of financing 
fj  Form of jurisdiction 
esh  Employment status of head  
coh Cooling-off requirement for head  
esbm Employment status of board members  
ipba Nomination and/or appointment under influence of professional body  
pgp  Practitioners involved in the governance of the board  
cobm  Cooling-off requirement for board members  
to  Term of office  
abmr  Appointment of board members renewable  
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Appendix 5: Coding for Functional Independence 
 
 rpie ipie arpie admpie ppie 
AT 3.00 0.75 3.00 3.00 0.75 
BE 1.00 1.50 1.00 1.00 0.75 
BG 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.75 
HR 2.00 2.25 2.00 2.00 0.75 
CZ 2.00 2.25 3.00 2.00 0.75 
DK 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.75 
EE 3.00 1.50 1.00 3.00 0.75 
FI 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.75 
FR 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 0.75 
DE 2.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 0.75 
GR 1.00 2.25 3.00 3.00 0.75 
HU 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.75 
IE 1.00 2.25 1.00 1.00 0.75 
IT 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.75 
LV 1.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 0.75 
LT 2.00 0.75 3.00 2.00 0.75 
LU 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.75 
MT 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.75 
NL 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.75 
PT 1.00 0.75 3.00 3.00 0.75 
PL 3.00 2.25 3.00 3.00 0.75 
RO 2.00 2.25 2.00 2.00 0.75 
SK 2.00 1.50 2.00 2.00 0.75 
SI 1.00 2.25 3.00 3.00 0.75 
ES 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 1.50 
SE 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
UK 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
US 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.25 
 
rpie Registration of audit firms with PIE clients  
ipie  Responsibility of inspections of audit firms with PIE clients  
arpie  Responsible authority of inspection reports of audit firms with PIE clients  
admpie Operating authority of disciplinary measures for audit firms with PIE clients  
ppie  Publication of inspection results of audit firms with PIE clients  
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Appendix 6: Values of Organisational Independence 
 
Countries Profile value 
IT  0.85  
HU  0.85  
LV  0.83  
LU  0.81  
BG  0.80  
HR  0.78  
BE  0.75  
DE  0.75  
SI  0.74  
UK  0.73  
NL  0.73  
AT  0.73  
SE  0.72  
US  0.69  
CZ  0.68  
EE  0.66  
PL  0.66  
SK  0.65  
ES  0.62  
FR  0.61  
LT  0.60  
MT  0.59  
PT  0.58  
RO  0.56  
GR  0.55  
DK  0.49  
IE  0.44  
FI  0.39  
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Appendix 7: Values of Functional Independence 
 
Countries Profile value 
SE 1.00 
UK 1.00 
US 0.98 
ES 0.95 
DK 0.92 
MT 0.92 
LU 0.92 
IT 0.92 
NL 0.92 
PL 0.83 
FI 0.84 
HU 0.84 
FR 0.78 
DE 0.69 
BG 0.72 
SI 0.67 
GR 0.67 
AT 0.63 
CZ 0.63 
EE 0.64 
HR 0.58 
RO 0.58 
LV 0.60 
SK 0.57 
LT 0.57 
PT 0.50 
IE 0.39 
BE 0.32 
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Appendix 8: Ranking of Material Independence 
 
Ranking Country 
Organisational 
independence 
Functional 
independence 
Material  
independence 
1 IT 0.85 0.92 0.89 
2 LU 0.81 0.92 0.87 
3 UK 0.73 1.00 0.87 
4 SE 0.72 1.00 0.86 
5 HU 0.85 0.84 0.84 
6 US 0.69 0.98 0.83 
7 NL 0.73 0.92 0.83 
8 ES 0.62 0.95 0.78 
9 MT 0.59 0.92 0.75 
10 FI 0.66 0.84 0.75 
11 PL 0.66 0.83 0.75 
12 DE 0.80 0.69 0.74 
13 BG 0.75 0.72 0.73 
14 DK 0.49 0.92 0.71 
15 SI 0.74 0.67 0.70 
16 RO 0.83 0.58 0.70 
17 FR 0.61 0.78 0.69 
18 LV 0.78 0.60 0.69 
19 EE 0.73 0.64 0.68 
20 CZ 0.68 0.63 0.66 
21 AT 0.66 0.63 0.64 
22 SK 0.65 0.57 0.61 
23 GR 0.55 0.67 0.61 
24 LT 0.60 0.57 0.58 
25 HR 0.56 0.58 0.57 
26 PT 0.58 0.50 0.54 
27 BE 0.75 0.32 0.53 
28 IE 0.44 0.39 0.41 
 
 
Note: the independence levels are calculated as the sums of the values of the organisational and functional 
independence values. The higher the value in the table, the higher the level of agency independence from influence of 
the accounting profession. All values used for the calculation of independence levels are ordinal so that the values 
cannot be compared with each other on a metric base. It would therefore wrong to conclude that the CSSF in 
Luxembourg, for instance, is almost twice as independent as the oversight system in Belgium. The values merely serve 
to rank the various audit oversight systems from the most to the least independent. 
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“It seems doubtful whether quality control systems can prevent members of the profession from 
engaging in malpractice. The pursuit of a free profession is, in the end, an attitude. The latter can 
only to a certain degree be enforced with the aid of organisational procedures.” 
(Niehus, 1985, p. 299)  
 
Chapter 3 
Maintaining, disrupting and destroying: (un)intended consequences 
of parallel institutional works in a local context. 
 
Abstract 
This study analyses the introduction of the public audit oversight system in Germany. While in 
the U.S. the professional self-regulatory system was replaced by government oversight in a matter 
of months, the German regulatory system underwent multiple symbolic adjustments and 
incremental changes over the course of more than a decade. This study draws attention to the 
reasons and mechanisms that explain why the introduction of public oversight mechanisms in 
Germany was greeted with such intense and protracted reluctance. By mobilizing the concept of 
institutional work, this longitudinal case study shows how the auditing profession managed, with 
the aid of a process of institutional de-coupling, to adjust to external pressures (e.g. the 
establishment of a system of oversight that was independent of the profession) without 
relinquishing either its dominant role or the system of self-regulation. It demonstrates that new 
institutional rules cannot be established unless the frameworks that precede them are 
deinstitutionalized. Discussing how the self-regulatory tradition was disrupted by severe intra-
professional conflicts, the paper sheds light on the unintended consequences of multifarious 
modes of institutional work.49 
Keywords: audit regulation, audit oversight, institutional work, institutional decoupling 
  
                                                     
49 This chapter benefited from extremely helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper: Yves Gendron, Sebastian 
Botzem, Robert Day, Markus Grottke and Reiner Quick. I would also like to acknowledge the comments of 
participants at: the Doctorial Consortium of the 2013 European Auditing Research Network Symposium (EARNet), 
the 11th Workshop on European Financial Reporting (EUFIN), the 2015 Emerging Scholars Colloquium of the 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Accounting Conference (IPA), the 2015 Doctoral Conference of the British 
Accounting and Finance Association (BAFA), and the I&O Research Seminar of the Department of Accounting at the 
University of Groningen. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Traditionally, the auditing profession has itself  been responsible for ensuring compliance with 
standards and accounting practices within the framework of  professional self-regulation. 
Serious accounting scandals in the past, however, have brought the profession’s self-regulatory 
ability under scrutiny. In the U.S., the period of  self-regulation came to an end when the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act replaced the U.S. AICPA peer review system, with direct inspections 
implemented under the PCAOB (Casterella, Jensen, & Knechel, 2009; Daugherty & Pitman, 
2009).50 The U.S. paradigm shift triggered a global regulatory wave through which formally 
“independent” public audit oversight systems were established to monitor and ensure the 
legitimacy of  financial auditing (Canning & O’Dwyer, 2013; Caramanis, Dedoulis, & Leventis, 
2015; Hazgui & Gendron, 2015; Malsch & Gendron, 2011). In this way, audit oversight 
developed into a basic mechanism for tackling perennial problems in corporate financial 
reporting (Caramanis et al., 2015, p. 12) and into one of  the key elements of  a contemporary 
dogma that promotes the diffusion of  accounting and auditing standards to both foster and 
demonstrate global financial stability (Caramanis et al., 2015). Comprehensive and universal 
standards and global codes of  conduct are, in this context, overseen and enforced by formal 
and informal regulatory institutions (Bengtsson, 2011; Humphrey, Loft, & Woods, 2009; Perry 
& Nölke, 2005). By mobilizing the concept of  institutional work, this study shows how initially 
the German auditing profession managed, with the aid of  a process of  institutional decoupling, 
to adjust to external pressures without relinquishing its dominant role within the regulatory 
context, though later intra-professional rivalries increasingly undermined the profession’s self-
regulatory ability. 
While other European countries, such as Spain or the UK, were quick to adopt an independent 
monitoring system (Gabor, 2005; Marks & Schmidt, 1998), in the case of  Germany the idea of  
establishing public oversight mechanisms was greeted with a protracted and persistent 
reluctance. The intention of  this study is therefore to address the following questions. How did 
the auditing profession impact the implementation of  public oversight? What forms of  
institutional work took place to ensure, facilitate or prompt this development? How and why 
did the regulatory reform shift the balance of  power within the organizational field?  
The German case is representative of  both institutional continuity and institutional change, 
demonstrating how different actors are intertwined within the organizational field. The fluid 
German context is particularly suitable for the concept of  Institutional Work, as in this specific 
context actors are more likely to be fully aware of  – and become engaged in – acts of  
institutional agency (Muzio, Brock, & Suddaby, 2013, p. 709). In this way, Institutional Work 
                                                     
50 Please see Appendix 9 for a list of abbreviations.  
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abandons the neo-institutional assumption that actors embedded in institutional contexts lack 
agency. The concept offers a way to develop a deeper understanding of  institutional processes 
as being both fluid and uncertain, and it helps to account for variation within institutional 
processes, which is a central concern of  current institutional research (Battilana, Leca, & 
Boxenbaum, 2009; Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2011; Lounsbury, 2008; Malsch & Gendron, 
2013). Scholars such as Lawrence and others (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence, Suddaby, 
& Leca, 2009) have already developed a useful taxonomy of  institutional work, which associates 
specific types of  institutional work to institutional outcomes: institutional change, maintenance 
or disruption.  
The rereading of  the introduction and development of  external quality control mechanisms and 
public oversight elements highlight a case of  institutional work articulated around two key 
struggles, which are both interrelated and distinct at the same time. The first struggle emerged 
as a result of  the attempt by the “auditing establishment” to preserve the profession's self-
regulatory model with the help of  a wave of  regulatory reforms between 2004 and 2010. The 
second involves the emergence of  a new actor, which successfully disrupted the traditional role 
and functionality of  the established actors. By demonstrating the unintended outcomes of  
power, mobilization and disruption, the main theoretical contribution made by this study is to 
flesh out a deeper understanding of  both the intended and the unintended dynamics of  
institutional work.  
This analysis aims to adopt a locally embedded perspective that is sensitive to the political and 
economic context in which the regulatory intervention took place. In examining audit 
regulation, it posits the institutions as constituting the outcomes of  the interactions between 
actors who are themselves positioned within a structure of  politico-economic relations that is 
“simultaneously united and divided by internal contractions, tensions and struggles” (Puxty, 
Willmott, & Lowe, 1987, p. 282). With a view to linking the accountancy profession’s micro-
level actions, and its interaction with both its members and the state, to the macro-level 
dynamics of  institutional change, the analysis draws from both document analysis and 
qualitative interviews conducted with experts in the field, including relevant actors within the 
German audit oversight system and European political actors.  
In this way, the study seeks to contribute to a field of  literature that analyses the processes 
through which professional audit regulation is shaped, developed and formulated. This is 
achieved in three ways:  
First, the study offers a contribution to the literature on audit and professional regulation. 
Although the establishment of  audit oversight bodies has been the subject of  increasing 
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scrutiny (Blavoukos, Caramanis, & Dedoulis, 2013; Canning & O’Dwyer, 2013; Caramanis et al., 
2015; Hazgui & Gendron, 2015; Malsch & Gendron, 2011), research on the processes through 
which new regulatory arrangements are interpreted in different national contexts remains both 
limited and contradictory. While Malsch and Gendron (2011) identify for the Canadian case a 
“form of  allegiance” between the largest accounting firms and the oversight body and conclude 
that self-regulatory logic is more influential than might have been anticipated, Canning and 
O’Dwyer (2013) find only limited evidence of  agreement between the regulators and the 
regulated in their analysis of  the Canadian oversight board’s establishment.  
Second, the paper represents a response to recent calls for studies focused on small auditors 
(Ramirez, Stringfellow, & Maclean, 2015). Although others have already noted the sustained 
segmentation of  the accounting profession (Caramanis, 2005; Richardson, 1987, 1989; Yee, 
2012), literature on audit regulation has a tendency to remain focused on the centrifugal force 
and influence exerted by larger firms (Arnold, 2005; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Humphrey 
et al., 2009). This paper challenges the dominance of  large audit firms by shifting the focus 
away from powerful, centrally positioned actors to those on the margins of  the organizational 
field and by demonstrating the impact that small auditors can have on audit regulation in the 
institutional setting.  
Third and last, the paper aims to make a contribution to developing a coherent theoretical 
framework for institutional work, a field which has been previously described as an “umbrella 
concept and a rallying point” (Hwang & Colyvas, 2011, p. 62). As such, aside from the empirical 
findings presented, the theoretical contribution made by this study lies in its use of the concept 
of institutional work within a highly regulatory context at times of crisis and uncertainty. In 
particular, the paper seeks to extend the usage of the concept of institutional work by identifying 
the modes of institutional work aimed at institutional maintenance and disruption, which is 
something that, unlike research into the process of institutional creation, has received relatively 
little scholarly attention (Lawrence et al., 2009). In particular, a rereading of the case highlights 
the impact of the use made by actors of rhetoric in their efforts to affect the institutional order, 
and it demonstrates the extent to which institutions require constant “work”. (Zilber, 2007, p. 
1038), which is to say that it envisages institutional work as an ongoing effort. In addition, the 
study illustrates how institutional work can produce unanticipated institutions in unintended 
ways, among other things, “disrupting those institutions or creating ones very different from 
those originally conceived of by the actors involved” (Lawrence et al., 2009, p. 10). This study 
thus demonstrates how, on the one hand, the established actors tried to preserve the 
institutionalized model of audit regulation. One the other hand, however, it shows how the 
attempt made by small audit firms to disrupt the traditional dominance exercised by the large 
accounting firms eventually resulted in an unintended disruption of the profession’s self-
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regulatory institution, which triggered political actors to take a more active role, and might mark 
the start of a process of a de-professionalization of the German audit profession. It thus 
responds to calls for the role of power to be analysed and for work to be done on the role played 
by a series of various simultaneous, linked and unlinked dimensions of institutional work in 
sustaining the dynamics of institutional change (Malsch & Gendron, 2013). 
In order to engage in this discussion, this article is structured as follows: in the next section, the 
research methods employed are explained. Subsequently, the theoretical framing of the study is 
outlined. The following sections discuss the development of the German audit oversight system 
and its theoretical interpretation. Lastly, concluding remarks and comments are presented.  
3.2 Research method 
The analysis aims to adopt a locally embedded perspective that is sensitive to the political and 
economic context in which the regulatory intervention took place. On the basis of a longitudinal 
case study (Stake, 1995), an analysis is undertaken into the interplay between, on the one hand, 
global influences and pressures and, on the other, local socio-political characteristics and the 
institutions that have conditioned how the German system of oversight has evolved at the state 
level. To gain a profound understanding of the chain of events, the analysis is based on a variety 
of data sources and triangulation research methodology (Denzin, 2009; Jick, 1979; Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985). The data sources include a whole number of publically available archival materials: 
all of the public pronouncements and presentations made by the POB and the APAK since their 
respective foundation, all of the press releases emanating from the relevant actors over the period 
studied, the official proceedings from public hearings associated with legislative procedures, 
articles in professional journals, and media reports commenting on local regulatory changes.  
Although the German parliament is the decisive legislative organ, draft legislation is primarily 
discussed, prepared and formulated within the ministerial bureaucracy and in close cooperation 
with the relevant associations (Rudzio, 2011, p. 76). As the regulation of the audit profession has 
not been the subject of controversial debate in the Federal German Parliament, the analysis has 
consequently laid the emphasis on the minutes of the technical committee (e.g. from public 
hearings) and on the comment letters submitted by distinct organizations from the auditing 
profession to the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy. Of particular importance 
for the analysis is, moreover, the journal of the Chamber of Auditors (the “WPK Magazin”, 
previously “Wirtschaftsprüferkammer – Mitteilungen”), which is regularly sent to all the 
members of the profession and the members’ emails sent by the second professional association, 
which were collected and analysed.51 Minutes from meetings of the Chamber of Public 
                                                     
51 The publicly available sources are available on request. 
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Accountants’ Executive Board are not published. However, various minutes were provided to 
the author. 
The written evidence is supplemented by semi-structured face-to-face interviews with 22 key 
actors involved in audit regulation (Table 12).52 As the impact exerted by individual auditors on 
regulatory matters is limited, the interviews focused on representatives of professional interest 
groups, on the Big Four’s departments for regulatory matters and on the relevant government 
agencies. Accordingly, the interviewees were not randomly selected, but were instead chosen on 
the basis of their involvement in the organizational field. The interviews were conducted between 
March 2014 and September 2015 and lasted between 35 and 200 minutes, with an average length 
of 60 minutes. Depending on the interviewee’s personal knowledge and background, the 
interviews covered a series of issues related to how the audit oversight system has evolved in 
Germany. While the first interviews were used to evaluate how apt the theoretical assumptions 
were and to circumscribe the research questions, the later interviews were used to obtain answers 
on detailed issues. With the permission of the participants, all but nine interviews (marked with 
an *) were digitally recorded. All interviewees were assured that their responses would be kept 
strictly confidential.53 
For the analysis, all recorded interviews were transcribed and analysed with AtlasTi software. 
Following Gioia (2013), the coding is based on a three-step process. To gain both an in-depth 
understanding of the empirical material and a synthesis of the various issues raised by 
interviewees, the respondent direct quotes were grouped into first-order concepts (i.e. an analysis 
using informant-centric terms and codes).54 At the second level of analysis, key links and patterns 
(second-order concepts) within the different data sources were identified (i.e., an analysis using 
researcher-centric concepts, themes, and dimensions). In the course of focusing on, and dealing 
with, second-order concepts, it emerged that the various forms of institutional work related to 
institutional creation, institutional maintenance or institutional disruption were a relevant way to 
make sense of the data. To reinforce the reliability of the study, a large number of interviewees 
were provided with an overview of the research results (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  
The study shares the limitations inherent in any qualitative methodology.  
 
                                                     
52 The following actors and organizations declined to be interviewed: Deloitte, various members of the German 
parliament, former policy advisors of the Ministry and the Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für Wertpapierbesitz (DSW), 
which is the largest association for private investors in Germany. The PCAOB rejected the interview request by 
arguing that answering appropriately would require its disclosing confidential information, which would violate its 
confidentiality restrictions.  
53 After consultation with the interviewees, various quotes were allowed to add to the thesis. Appendix 12, Appendix 
13, and Appendix 14 show examples of the coding process, for both interview data and other sources. 
54 Gioa et al.’s 1st- and 2nd-order labelling is based on Van Maanen (1979).  
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Table 12: Interview details55 
 
Name Date Occupation(s) at date of interview 
      
Political Sphere   
   
Policy Officer*  02/2015 Policy Officer at European political institution  
Political Actor 02/2015 
Former Member of the European Parliament and Chair of Committee on 
Legal Affairs 
Policy Officer* 02/2015 Policy Officer at European political institution 
Policy Officer 02/2015 Policy Officer at the Federal Government 
Gisela Hammers-
Strizek 
02/2015 
Retired, former head of section at the Federal Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Energy responsible for the regulation of the auditing 
profession 
Richard Pitterle 02/2015 
Member of the German Parliament for Die LINKE, initiator of the brief 
parliamentary enquiry on matters pertaining to German audit oversight 
      Regulator   
   
APAK 
Commissioner* 
03/2014 - 
APAK 
Commissioner* 
09/2015 . 
APAK 
Commissioner* 
02/2015 - 
Tim Volkmanm 02/2015 Managing Director of the APAK (since 2005) 
Rudolf Steckel* 09/2013 Chairman of the Austrian Auditor Supervisory Authority (ASA) 
      Audit Profession  
  
Andrea Bruckner 02/2015 
BDO Audit partner, Board of Directors of the IDW, Member of the 
WPK Advisory Board 
Klaus-Hermann 
Dyck 
02/2015 EY Audit partner 
Michael Gschrei 02/2015 President and Founder of Wp.net, former WPK President (2011-2012) 
Peter Maxl* 02/2015 Managing Directors of the Chamber of Auditors 
Klaus-Peter 
Naumann 
03/2015 President of the IDW 
Wienand Schruff 02/2015 
KMPG Management Board Member, Chairman of the KPMG Global 
Regulatory Group, Member of the IFAC Board, Member of the WPK 
Board 
Ulrich Skirk 02/2015 EY, Audit partner, WPK Board Member 
Dieter Ulrich*  06/2015 Retired, former WPK President (2005-2008) and Audit partner 
Reiner J. Veidt* 02/2015 Managing Directors of the Chamber of Auditors 
      Others   
   
Georg Giersberg 02/2015 
Journalist, various articles on the German accounting profession and 
audit oversight development 
Reiner Quick 06/2015 Professor of Audit at the Darmstadt Technical University 
    
                                                     
55 In order to preserve interviewees’ anonymity, the exact positions and departments of various interviewees are not 
mentioned. 
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3.3 Theoretical Framing  
3.3.1 Agency in Institutional Theory 
Institutional work has its roots in neo-institutional thinking. Economic, social and political 
actions are embedded in larger institutional schemes. Institutions comprise all “regulative, 
normative and cultural-cognitive elements that, together with associated activities and resources, 
provide stability and meaning to social life” (Scott, 2008, p. 48). Early neo-institutionalist scholars 
emphasize institutional stability and change, both emerging despite, rather than because of, 
intentional action. Institutions were perceived to be templates for action, cognition, and emotion, 
and the identification of the mechanisms through which institutions constrained and determined 
the behaviour of actors was at the centre of neo-institutional studies (DiMaggio, 1988; DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1991). This cultural-sociological notion of “institutionalization” locates structures and 
practices beyond the reach of interests and politics. Hence, intentionality and the role, played by 
collective actions appeared to be incompatible with the traditional conceptualization of 
institutional theory. Sociological-institutional perspectives had “a hard time incorporating notions 
of conflict and power, and they (were) not particularly helpful in talking about change” (Thelen, 
1999, p. 387; similar Scott, 2008, p. 77). Over the years, however, scholars have increasingly 
begun to turn their attention to the way actors actively engage in processes of institutional 
creation, maintenance, disruption and change (Lawrence et al., 2011, p. 53; Scott, 2008, p. 77).  
DiMaggio (1988), DiMaggio and Powell (1991) and Oliver (1991, 1992) were among the first to 
rebut criticisms that accused institutional theory of assuming organizational passivity and of 
ignoring the notion of power and strategy (for example in Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988; Fligstein, 
2001, p. 111; Marti & Mair, 2009; Powell, 1985). DiMaggio (1988) attempted to combine a theory 
of agency with institutional theory. Introducing the concept of “institutional entrepreneurship”, 
(1988, p. 14), DiMaggio argued that some social actors were better at producing desired social 
outcomes than were others; he thus brought the notion of power and strategy back into neo-
institutional thinking. Oliver (1991) discussed and systematized strategic reactions that 
organizations employ in direct response to institutional pressure and factors that predict when 
these alternative strategies will occur. She argued that organizations were not only able to 
respond, but also to deinstitutionalize, something that she defined as the process in which the 
legitimacy of an established or institutionalized practice erodes or discontinues.  
These studies marked a shift in institutional researchers’ perceptions of how both individual and 
collective actors exert influence on institutions. By reversing the causality, they transformed 
institutions from explanatory factors into dependent variables and passive actors into “creators, 
maintenance workers, and destroyers of institutions” (Hwang & Colyvas, 2011, p. 63). As a 
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result, other scholars showed how institutional theory can, in fact, accommodate interest-seeking 
and active organizational action when actors respond to institutional pressures and aim at 
influencing their institutional contexts (Battilana et al., 2009; Beckert, 2010; Cooney, 2007; 
Fligstein, 1997; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Hoffman, 1999; Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 
2004; Rao, Morrill, & Zald, 2000). These studies have shown how actors are able to emancipate 
themselves, at least partially, from the influence and pressure of existing institutions. In order, 
however, to overcome the “somewhat stylized representations of the relationships among actors, 
agency, and institutions” (Lawrence et al., 2011, p. 3), Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) developed 
the concept of “institutional work”.56  
The concept highlights how and why actors work to “interpret, translate, transpose, edit, and 
recombine institutions, and how those actions lead to unintended adaptations, mutations, and 
other institutional consequences” (Lawrence et al., 2011, p. 55). While DiMaggio situated the 
“institutional entrepreneur” in the context of emerging institutions, institutional work extends 
the theoretical and empirical agenda to the rest of institutions’ life cycle, including persistence, 
deinstitutionalization and reinstitutionalization (Hwang & Colyvas, 2011, p. 62).57 With its 
emphasis on the action of actors within institutional theory, the concept is characterized by 
“neither determinism nor heroism and is potentially sensitive to both the oppressiveness 
of social, cultural, and material structures, and the potential for emancipation from some 
of those structures some of the time” (Lawrence et al., 2011, p. 56).  
Institutionalist scholars suggest that institutional work is accomplished through the coordinated 
and uncoordinated efforts of various actors (Lawrence et al., 2011, p. 55). The latter are located 
in what neo-institutionalist scholars refer to as “organizational fields” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 
1991; Fligstein, 2001) or “societal sectors” (Scott & Meyer, 1992, p. 108). These 
conceptualizations refer to a community of organizations which partake of a common system of 
meanings and whose participants interact more frequently with one another than with actors 
outside the field (Scott, 2008). The concept is central to institutional theory because it is 
perceived as intermediate level between actors and the their socio-economic contexts, through 
which socially constructed practices and expectations become continuously disseminated and 
reproduced (Greenwood, Hinings, & Suddaby, 2002). 
This study will focus, in particular, on the governance system, which is a relational feature at the 
field level (Scott, 2008, p. 185). It describes all the arrangements which support the regularized 
                                                     
56 The term of “institutional work” can also be found in earlier works, for instance, in DiMaggio (1988).  
57 In this way, the concept responds to calls to link institutional and network approaches (or critical approaches) so as 
to overcome the perceived theoretical and ideological segmentation dividing them (Beckert, 2010; Cooper, Ezzamel, & 
Willmott, 2008; also DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein & Dauter, 2007). Network analysts perceive fields to be compositions 
of specific structures of social networks, including hierarchies and power differences, which impact economic 
outcomes (Granovetter, 1985). 
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monitoring of the actions undertaken by one set of actors by another and combines all those 
actors who employ coercive or normative controls over activities and actors within the field. 
Actors with this function are public regulatory bodies, trade associations, unions, professional 
associations and judicial systems (Scott, 2008, p. 186; see also Fligstein, 1991, p. 314).  
3.3.2 Modes of Institutional Work 
Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) identified three modes of institutional work: work that maintains, 
work that disrupts and work that creates institutions. 
Institutional Work to create institutions  
The practices associated with creating institutions constitute the category of institutional work 
that has been most extensively examined in the literature (Lawrence et al., 2011, p. 8). Lawrence 
and Suddaby (2006) identified ten forms of institutional work associated with creating 
institutions.  
Table 13: Creating Institutions  
 
Modes Definition Key mechanism 
   
Advocacy 
The mobilization of political and regulatory support 
through direct and deliberate methods of social 
suasion. 
 
Creation of Institutions 
through political work in 
which actors reconstruct 
rules, property rights and 
boundaries that define 
access to material 
resources. 
  
Defining 
The construction of rule systems that confer status or 
that identity or define membership boundaries or that 
create status hierarchies within a field. 
  
Vesting 
The creation of rule structures that confer property 
rights. 
   
   Constructing 
identities 
Defining the relationship between an actor and the 
field in which that actor operates. 
Creation of Institutions 
through actions in which 
actors’ belief systems are 
reconfigured. 
  Changing 
normative 
associations 
Recreating the connections between sets of practices 
and the moral and cultural foundations for those 
practices. 
  
Constructing 
normative 
networks 
Constructing inter-organizational connections 
through which practices become normatively 
sanctioned and which form the relevant peer group 
with respect to compliance, monitoring and 
evaluation. 
   
   
Mimicry 
Associating new practices with existing sets of taken-
for-granted practices, technologies and rules in order 
to ease their adoption. 
Creation of Institutions 
through actions designed to 
alter abstract 
categorizations in which the 
boundaries of meaning 
systems are altered. 
  Theorizing 
Educating 
Developing and specifying abstract categories and 
elaborating chains of cause and effect.  
  Constructing 
normative 
networks 
 Educating actors in the skills and knowledge 
necessary to support the new institution. 
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Institutional Work to maintain institutions 
In contrast to the institutional work related to the creation of institutions, less is known about the 
about the processes of maintaining institutions (Scott, 2001, p. 110). Lawrence and Suddaby 
(2006) identified six types of institutional work (Table 14) which maintain institutions by 
“supporting, repairing or recreating the social mechanisms that ensure compliance” (Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006, p. 230).  
Table 14: Maintaining Institutions  
 
Modes Definition Key mechanism 
   
Enabling work 
Creating rules that facilitate, supplement and support 
institutions, such as the creation of authorizing agents 
or diverting resources. 
Maintenance of 
institutions by ensuring 
adherence to a rule 
system. 
  
Policing 
Ensuring compliance through enforcement, auditing 
and monitoring. 
  
Deterring Establishing coercive barriers to institutional change.  
   
   
Mythologizing 
Preserving the normative underpinnings of an 
institution by creating and sustaining myths regarding 
its history. 
Maintenance of 
institutions by 
reproducing existing 
norms and belief systems. 
 
  
Valorizing and 
demonizing 
Providing for public consumption positive and 
negative examples that illustrates the normative 
foundations of an institution. 
    
A related type of institutional work is the notion of “Dirty Work”, which aims to preserve 
institutions with the aid of strategic decoupling (Hirsch & Bermiss, 2009). It refers to a specific 
type of institutional work that “entails the actions undertaken by actors searching for ways to 
carry over norms from the previous regime into the construction of the new institutional order” 
(Hirsch & Bermiss, 2009, p. 263). This means that policies are adopted in order to conform to 
external expectations with regard to formally stated mechanisms and operational procedures, 
even though, in practice, the old rationales survive in practice (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Scott, 
2008). In other words, a strategic process by which formal policies are decoupled from actual 
practices (Bromley & Powell, 2012; J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In fact, research has shown 
that the implementation of externally triggered reforms in accounting regulation is often 
associated with “shallow” reforms or with “a mere facade” of reforms at the national level 
(Blavoukos et al., 2013, p. 153; Power, 1999), with the result that material regulatory changes are 
minimized, postponed or even averted (Caramanis et al., 2015; Humphrey, Turley, & Moizer, 
1992; Malsch & Gendron, 2011). 
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Institutional Work to disrupt Institutions 
While institutional theory was once primarily regarded as a theory of stability and similarity, the 
notion of change has increasingly gained attention (Beckert, 2010; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; 
Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). This shift in attention has occurred because the organizational field is 
not a static concept. The multiple constituents compete over the definition of issues and the 
form of institutions that will guide organizational action and behaviour. Most of the time, these 
actors are furnished with opposing perspectives, rather than with a common rhetoric, and these 
are exchanged through channels of dialogue and debate and represent the centre of a field 
(Hoffman, 1999, p. 352). The ability of one of the constituents to capture the rules of the field, 
by, for instance, inducing the state to introduce particular rules for the field, depends first and 
foremost on the organization’s resources and on its dependency relations and network relations 
(Fligstein, 1991, p. 314). Nevertheless, the field remains stable as long as its pivotal actors share 
the same understanding and agree on a particular definition of their field and as long all members 
benefit from the institutionalized, stable rules (Fligstein, 1991).  
Institutional change is therefore restricted as long as something erodes the mechanisms of 
reproduction that generate institutional continuity (Beyer, 2010, p. 4; Pierson, 2000). From this 
perspective, the argument that an institutional pattern is “locked in” (Mahoney, 2000, p. 515) or 
has “maintained its equilibrium” (Caramanis et al., 2015, p. 27) can therefore be unmasked as a 
metaphor for the on-going effectiveness of a stabilisation mechanism. That means that each and 
every continuity-ensuring mechanism offers opportunities for the termination of path-dependent 
development or for the abandonment of a chosen path. Actors driving this process will be actors 
whose interests are not served by existing institutional arrangements, and consequently, work to 
disrupt the extant set of institutions (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 235).  
Lawrence and Suddaby identify four forms of institutional work aimed at disrupting existing 
institutions (Table 5). Activities to disrupt institutional structures are largely discursive and relate 
to what Lamont and Molnar (2002) have described as “boundary work”. Hence, “actors appear 
to disrupt institutions primarily by redefining, re-categorizing, reconfiguring, abstracting, 
problematizing and, generally, manipulating the social and symbolic boundaries that constitute 
institutions” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 238).  
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Table 15: Disrupting Institutions 
Modes Definition Key Mechanism 
Disconnecting sanctions 
Working through state apparatus to 
disconnect rewards and sanctions 
from some set of practices, 
technologies or rules. 
Disrupting institutions by 
attacking or undermining 
the mechanisms that induce 
members to comply with 
institutions. 
  
Disassociating moral 
foundations 
Disassociating the practice, rule or 
technology from its moral 
foundations, as appropriate within a 
specific cultural context. 
  
Undermining assumptions 
and beliefs 
Decreasing the perceived risks of 
innovation and differentiation by 
undermining core assumptions and 
beliefs. 
   
 
Both institutional maintenance and institutional disruption constitute a political process that 
reflects the interests and power of organized actors within the field (DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 
1997; Maguire et al., 2004). A process of institutional change or evolution can be trigged by 
disruptive, endogenous events. These “shocks” (Zucker, 1988, p. 23) or “jolts” (Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006; A. D. Meyer, 1982) can take the form of technological disruptions, social 
upheaval or regulatory change (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). They can trigger the entry of new 
actors or changes in organizational interdependencies (Barnett & Carroll, 1993) and power 
structures (Brint & Karabel, 1991; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Oliver, 1991). If, in this process 
of institutional evolution or “deinstitutionalization” (Greenwood et al., 2002, p. 60), the 
dominant actors do not agree on a particular definition of their field, the field becomes unstable 
and organizational fields become “arenas of power relations” (Brint & Karabel, 1991, p. 355; 
similar DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Such  
“changes in power relations hold the key to creating the openings in which new scripts (or 
scripts previously only on the margins of an organizational field) can become more 
central” (Thelen, 2003, p. 217).  
 
In other words, they have the capacity to end what has become locked in institutional inertia.  
The next section introduces the relevant actors and outlines the politico-economic context of the 
politics of German auditing. 
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3.4 Setting the stage  
3.4.1 Actors of the German field of auditing 
The politics of auditing in Germany were traditionally considered to be a consensual procedure 
between the legislator and the auditing profession - one determined by the latter and discussed 
without much public debate (Ordelheide, 1999). The institutional arrangements governing audit 
regulation in Germany are based on the country’s strong tradition of societal corporatism 
(Schmitter, 1974). Corporatism is as a system of interest intermediation, or, in line with 
Schmitter’s definition, “a particular modal or ideal-typical institutional arrangement for linking 
the interests of civil society, as organised in associations, with the decision-taking structures of 
the state” (Schmitter, 1974, p. 86). As a result of the governance and administration being 
delegated to certain peak interest groups, various actors are involved in the politico-economic 
context of regulation in Germany (Puxty et al., 1987; Rudzio, 2011).58 The particular corporatist 
framework of audit regulation was institutionalized in 1961. After World War Two, the country’s 
division into four occupied zones triggered more than ten years of controversial debates over 
how the auditing profession should be organised and what its role vis-à-vis the government 
should be. The debates ended in 1961 with the Law Regulating the Profession of German Public 
Auditors (WPO). The law made two entities, the Institute of Public Auditors in Germany (IDW) 
and the Federal Chamber of Public Accountants (WPK), responsible for organizing and 
regulating the accounting profession. 
A body such as the Federal Chamber of Public Accountants is in Germany a “joint venture” 
between the state and the profession (Will, 2010) and is one of the decisive pillars of the 
corporatist political framework. The WPK is a public corporation (“Körperschaft des 
öffentlichen Rechts”) that is formally overseen by the Federal Ministry of Economics.59 The 
duties of the WPK include, in particular, its responsibility to organise the standardized, 
countrywide audit examination and the quality assurance procedure. In addition, the Chamber is 
responsible both for registering public accountants and audit firms and for striking them off the 
register, and it is responsible for disciplinary oversight (§ 57 WPO). Membership to the WPK is 
obligatory for all public accountants and audit firms. The governing body of the WPK consists of 
working auditors who are selected by the audit profession. To describe the WPK as a “state-
designed” organization (Puxty et al., 1987, p. 288) is thus misleading, as this ignores the degree of 
                                                     
58 The corporatist approach to integrating interest groups is an essential element of the German model of capitalism. 
In addition to the corporatist arrangements between the state and integrated interest associations, Germany’s “Rhine 
Capitalism” is characterized by long-term commitments and social and by a striving to find an economic consensus 
(Amable, 2003; Hall & Soskice, 2001). In contrast to liberal market economies, in which competitive market 
arrangements are much more prevalent, policy outcomes are thus more the result of discussions within and between 
interest groups, rather than being determined by state guidance or market principles. 
59 The German chamber tradition was born in the 19th century, when Western countries’ economies were subject to 
major transitions. While most Romanic countries incorporated the necessary competences into their civil service 
structures, Prussia transferred these tasks to the relevant profession (Hendler, 2002, pp. 10, 12). 
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direct control exercised in the WPK by the profession.  
The IDW was established as early as 1929 as fusion of several professional associations to 
strengthen the profession’s influence on the debates over introducing statutory audit. After the 
war, the IDW became the mouthpiece used by the profession to advising on, or lobby for, 
particular accounting and auditing policies (Dykxhoorn & Sinning, 1992, p. 84; Vieten, 1995, p. 
488). Today, the IDW is still responsible for the technical work (“Facharbeit”) done by the 
profession, providing technical guidance on accounting and auditing matters and offering 
educational and training seminars (Coenenberg, Haller, & Marten, 1999; Gietzmann & Quick, 
1998). It can thus be seen as a “parallel authority” representing the German auditing profession 
(Puxty et al., 1987, p. 284)60, not so much in the sense that it issues specific regulations, but more 
in the sense that it adjudicates or advises on fundamental principles. As a consequence of the 
“profession’s cosy relationship with the Chamber” (Dykxhoorn & Sinning, 1992, p. 86), the 
WPK is frequently described as a quasi self-regulatory body for the profession (Vieten, 1995, p. 
507), which tended to play the role of the accounting profession’s advocate, rather than its 
overseer (Dykxhoorn & Sinning, 1992, p. 85).61 This was reinforced by the close ties and 
cooperation between the IDW and the WPK. The interdependence was manifested in the fact 
that the two organizations used the same facilities, that public accountants simultaneously served 
on committees of both organizations and that they were occasionally headed by the same general 
manager (Markus, 1996, p. 153). As a result, the “monitoring function of the two organizations 
became practically inseparable and indiscernible” (Harston, 1993, p. 156).  
In line with corporatist traditions, the Federal Ministry traditionally maintained a certain distance 
to the profession. Its supervisory function vis-à-vis the WPK is demonstrated primarily by the 
fact that the ministry’s formal approval is necessary before changes or amendments can be made 
to the WPK’s constitution. In combination with the intermediate role played by the WPK, the 
auditing profession operated without any substantial interference by regulators, nor was the 
general public really aware of its activities (Niehus, 2000; Quick, Mertens, Blij, & Hassink, 1998). 
This is, in particular, the case when the quality of audit services might be at risk. Professional 
proceedings are discussed and decided within the Chamber of Auditors, without the results being 
disclosed. Likewise, court judgements that are directly concerned with fraudulent financial 
                                                     
60 Dykxhoorn and Sinning (1992), for instance, revealed how the German codified auditing standards were entirely the 
outcome of works within the IDW (Dykxhoorn & Sinning, 1992, p. 84).  
61 The Chamber itself describes one of its main responsibilities as upholding “the interests and positions of the 
profession vis-à-vis the public and policymakers as well as [fulfilling] the role of the WPK as a point of contact for its 
members” (WPK 2014). For a general discussion about the intermediary role played by German Chambers as advocacy 
groups, on the one hand, and as an organization with public authority, one the other hand, see Sack and Schroeder 
(2008) and Streeck and Schmitter (1985). 
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reporting are rare events in Germany (Wulf, 2005).62  
Apart from the WPK, the IDW and the Ministry, the group of large audit firms represent the 
fourth “actor” in the regulatory field. Traditionally, it was this particular segment of the auditing 
profession that defined the interests of the profession through its influence on the intra-
organizational structures of both the WPK and the IDW. The influence exerted by large 
accounting firms within the IDW is primarily based on their disproportionate involvement in the 
IDW’s technical committees. The main Technical Committee of the IDW 
(“Hauptfachausschuss”), for instance, consists predominantly of Big Four representatives, while 
small auditors are absent. In addition, the Big Four are frequently estimated to provide more than 
half of the Institute’s membership fees (Lenz, 2014). The dominance of large accounting firms 
within the WPK, was traditionally ensured through the traditional electoral system. The President 
and the Management Board, which is elected through regular ballots held by the profession, 
exercise the decision-making authority of the WPK. Until 2010, it was only those members who 
attended the Chamber’s general meeting who were able to vote. In addition, it was possible for a 
member attending the meeting to exercise the proxy votes of up-to six absent members. As large 
accounting firms were able systematically to collect absent colleagues proxies to vote at the 
general meetings, the system ensured that the big firms were able to retain their control over the 
WPK (Sack, 2011, p. 150). Hence, background meetings among the large accounting firms 
determined who became president of the chamber and “it was an open secret that the election 
winner had already been chosen before the election took place” (Interviewee, audit profession).  
3.4.2 National audit practices under international pressures 
From the 1970s, Germany developed into an advanced capitalist economy, and its strong 
industrial export orientation resulted in its being strongly intertwined with international financial 
markets (Hilger, 2003, 2008). The internationalization of the German audit firms has thus been a 
direct response to their clients becoming increasingly embedded in the globalized economy 
(Coenenberg et al., 1999, p. 379). To remain competitive, German auditors had to set themselves 
up on an international basis. As a result, a wave of mergers with both domestic German and U.S. 
audit firms took place in the course of the 1980s, and by the beginning of the 1990s, all of the 
large German audit firms had signed cooperation agreements with U.S. based accounting firms 
                                                     
62 The German accounting enforcement authority is the Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP). The FREP 
directly examines the financial reports of listed companies in Germany and publishes error findings in the Federal 
Gazette. Although its annual reports indicate material errors are identified in one out of four of its assessments (2010: 
25 %, 2011: 26 %, 2012: 16 %, 2013: 11 %, 2014: 13 %), the link to the audit firms remains unknown, as the WPK 
does not publicly reveal whether these cases have resulted in supervisory procedures against the these firms’ auditors. 
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(Ganster, 2000, p. 91; Markus, 1996, p. 163).63 
This trend was accompanied and reinforced by the transformation of the country’s traditional 
financial system; an institutional shift that started from the 1990s. Traditionally, capital markets 
had played a limited role in the German “bank-oriented” or “insider” model – in contrast to the 
“shareholder” or “outsider” model of capitalism (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
1998; Leuz & Wüstemann, 2003; Lütz, 2000). Key providers of funds, such as banks, had little 
need for public financial information, as their position in the corporate governance structure 
provided them with privileged access to financial information. As a consequence of banks 
holding large, long-term equity stakes in companies, and as a consequence of their concomitant 
representation on those companies’ supervisory boards, “a concern with external financial 
reporting has been missing” (Willmott, Puxty, Robson, Cooper, & Lowe, 1992, p. 43). Through 
this web of interrelationships, banks had far-reaching monitoring opportunities, which may 
provide at least a partial explanation for why the need for additional external control was felt to 
be relatively low (Quick, 2005, p. 338). When in the 1980s, the Eight Directive then disentangled 
the banks’ influence on audit firms, the latter successfully lobbied against the introduction of 
external quality controls (Quick, 2005, p. 338; Vieten, 1995, p. 492). The role played by 
accounting in the German model was less to deliver publicly relevant information than to 
“facilitate relationship-based financing [...] by limiting the claims of outside shareholders to 
dividends, which protects creditors and promotes internal financing” (Leuz & Wüstemann, 
2003). While the system was remarkably stable for decades, it slowly but steadily shifted towards 
the more liberal Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism from the early 1990s onwards (Amable, 2003; 
Höpner, 2001; O’Brien, 2005). 
Throughout the 1990s, Germany “was running persistently and unsustainably high 
unemployment rates, economic growth was anaemic, and the integration of the former East 
Germany had stalled badly and triggered a severe recession” (Cioffi, 2002, p. 358). In addition, a 
series of serious corporate scandals had erupted in the course of the mid-1990s, which indicated 
that there were systemic problems with Germany’s “insider”-based corporate governance regime. 
The traditional German financial model, based on strong banks, poor financial disclosure, 
underdeveloped securities markets, low levels of equity finance and corporate governance geared 
to the interests of the controlling shareholders and the creditor banks “had begun to look 
anachronistic” (Cioffi, 2002, p. 358).  
The institutional transformation was further fuelled when the country became a net capital 
importer, as a direct response to the country’s reunification and the subsequent immense volume 
                                                     
63 Markus (1996, pp. 156–167) provides a thorough review of the mergers of German audit firms with national and 
international audit firms. 
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of funding needed by its economy. The country’s capital imports began to exceed its capital 
exports, and the German economy could no longer rely on its traditional sources of finance 
(Leuz & Wüstemann, 2003; Nowak, 2001). Companies increasingly began to internationalize 
their investor base, and the role played by Anglo-American investors rose dramatically in the 
1990s (Höpner, 2001, p. 14). More and more of the largest German companies began to reorient 
themselves towards a more Anglo-American style of behaviour, with its greater shareholder 
orientation (Glaum, 2000; Jackson, 2001; Jürgens, Naumann, & Rupp, 2000). Quite apart from 
anything else, they had to comply with international accounting rules if they wanted to be listed 
on foreign stock exchanges. As Anglo-Saxon institutional investors made special demands on 
corporate governance, German firms also faced calls for more reliable public information to be 
provided in the German financial market (Nowak, 2001). Consequently, new laws and reforms 
were passed with a view to encouraging a more “shareholder‐friendly” corporate governance 
system and making it more feasible for German businesses to raise capital in the global equity 
markets (Nowak, 2001). For instance, the Securities Act 1994, aimed to improve the 
informational quality of annual reports. Another milestone was the Raising of Equity Relief Act 
that was passed in 1998, following pressure from multinational corporations (Nowak, 2001). The 
act permitted listed corporations to apply IAS as a real substitute for national accounting 
standards, making Germany one of the first European countries to make this possible.  
In the same year, the highly damaging collapse of a number of major companies triggered 
intensive debates over the narrow scope of the traditional statutory audit (Heck, 2006; Lenz, 
2011; Martens & Pauly, 2000). The revelations that accompanied these corporate bankruptcies 
triggered debate over the Corporation Control and Transparency Act (KonTrag), which was 
designed to further improve German financial reporting and corporate governance (Eierle, 2005, 
p. 292). The act diminished the power of the banks, curbing rent-seeking by corporate insiders, 
and shifted power to the supervisory board by requiring that in future the external auditor be 
hired by the supervisory board. In the course of the preparation of the act, the interministerial 
working group proposed implementing external quality controls for the accounting profession 
(Hammers-Strizek & Dannenbring, 1999, p. 19).  
External quality controls and public oversight emerged as a policy issue in Europe in the mid-
1990s, when the lack of harmonized quality controls among the EU Member States was 
identified as an impediment to the Single Market functioning effectively (European Commission, 
1996). In 1998, in the same year in which the KonTrag was debated, the International Federation 
of Accountants recommended for the first time the introduction of mandatory external quality 
controls (IFAC, 1998, p. 6). However, during the legislative process the accounting profession 
made it very clear that, in its view, questions relating to quality controls should be solved by and 
within the profession itself (Marks & Schmidt, 1998, p. 976). In the end, statutory provisions on 
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external quality controls were removed from the KonTraG, as the introduction of external 
quality assurance was (still) seen as being primarily the job of the profession (Hammers-Strizek & 
Dannenbring, 1999, article from the head of section at the Federal Ministry responsible for audit 
regulation). Hence, Germany remained among the very few Western economies, both in Europe 
and at a global level, that did not establish any form of external audit quality assurance controls 
or public oversight structures (FEE 1998; Marks & Schmidt, 1998, p. 980; Niehus, 1994).  
To sum up, two vital features characterize the context in which this analysis is undertaken. First, 
starting from the 1990s, Germany’s economic and financial structures were aligned to the Anglo-
Saxon model of capitalism in an effort to facilitate and support the use of capital markets. This 
macro-institutional shift directly impacted the accounting and auditing arena. The demand for 
reliable, public financial reporting information burgeoned, increasing the role played by financial 
auditing. This dynamic environment encountered the relatively stable field of audit regulation. 
The second feature, therefore, relates to the institutionalized understanding of audit regulation, 
characterized by the audit profession’s strong position vis-à-vis the political arena and by the 
dominant intra-professional position of the big audit firms.  
3.5 Case narrative: Institutional Works in the politics of auditing 
This section presents the results of the analysis. It is divided into three stages in which distinct 
modes of institutional work can be identified and traces the regulatory transition over the period 
from 1998 to 2014.64 Based on the different dimensions of institutional work outlined in the 
theoretical section, the following sections reconsider a major institutional shift in the field of the 
German audit profession. To explain this transformation, which did not occur in a sequential or 
progressive manner, institutional work is articulated along two interrelated struggles. The first 
struggle, divided into stage 1 und stage 2, is the attempt of the large audit firms, the Institute and 
the Ministry to secure the traditional mode of professional self-regulation. The second fight, 
which is a direct outcome of the first one, is the struggle of small auditors to disrupt the 
dominant actors.  
3.5.1 Institutional maintenance  
As outlined in the previous section, the German auditing framework operated without external 
quality controls or public oversight mechanisms until the late 1990s. In 1997, the system came 
under pressure from international developments, when the U.S. NASDAQ Stock Market 
changed its listing requirements. The new provisions stipulated that listed companies could only 
be audited by audit firms whose quality control systems had been externally monitored. With the 
                                                     
64 Appendix 11: The time line of events in the establishment of the POB and APAK presents the time line of major 
events in the history of POB and APAK.  
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deadline for implementation set for February 1998, large German audit firms put the IDW under 
pressure to campaign for the introduction of external quality controls as quickly as possible. 
Otherwise, these audit firms stood to lose their revenues from auditing companies listed on the 
U.S. stock market. Through their international networks, big German audit firms already 
underwent peer reviews, but the new stock exchange requirements made a formal German 
external quality control system necessary. Following internal debates within the IDW, which 
resulted in a first proposal being put forward to introduce a peer review system, a technical 
committee on “Quality Assurance” was established between the WPK and the IDW in order to 
explore how the international audit firms’ need for external quality controls could be realized 
(WPK President Hense in WPK, 1998a, p. 47, 1999d).  
The debates revealed that the WPK and the IDW were striving for different regulatory models 
(WPK President Hense in WPK, 1998b, p. 224). The IDW, whose priorities were rooted in its 
global orientation, favoured a system as close as possible to the U.S. AICPA peer review system. 
The WPK took a rather critical stance to the establishment of an external quality control system, 
as it felt this would run counter to its understanding of a free profession. Hence, in the intra-
professional debates, the WPK strove to limit, as far as it could, the scope of the IDW’s notions 
on the design, organization and implementation of a German system. Contrary to the IDW’s 
initial proposal, the WPK managed to ensure that review results were not made publicly available 
and that peer reviewers were selected and commissioned autonomously by the audit firms. The 
original suggestion by the IDW also proposed to encompass the entire organizational procedures 
of an audit firm, whereas the WPK argued that the scope of the review should be limited to just 
those parts of the firm associated with audit engagements. In spite of these modifications, the 
IDW prevailed successfully in the intra-professional negotiations, and in November 1998 the 
committee officially announced that it would be proposing the establishment of a peer review 
system, taking the U.S. system as its regulatory benchmark (Committee Chairman Volck in WPK, 
1999a).  
After the IDW’s and WPK’s management had reached a compromise, it was important that the 
auditing profession, in particular the local members of the profession without international links, 
be convinced of the merits of such a system. To this end, WPK board members frequently 
pointed out that discussions at a European level indicated that the European Commission would 
(in response to the U.S. developments) soon issue legal requirements governing external quality 
controls, which, once issued, would make it impossible for a system tailored to the specific needs 
of German auditing to be established.  
“If we [the profession] want to avoid the issue [external quality reviews] being initiated and 
organized by the legislator, we have to be prepared to tackle this question ourselves.” 
(WPK-President Hense 1998a, 224) 
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This created a perception in the profession that something had to be done. In March 1999, the 
WPK management board voted unanimously to introduce a peer review system under the formal 
supervision of a Public Oversight Board (POB). As such amendments required a so-called WPO-
Novelle, the WPK and IDW approached the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy 
(BMWi) and called for a legislative initiative (WPK, 1999a, WPK, 1999b).65  
The following legislative process was based on the close coordination of the WPK, the IDW and 
the Ministry (WPK-President Wah in WPK, 2001). As the notion of external quality controls was 
unknown to the Ministry, the latter depended on the international networks maintained by the 
big audit firms to “open the door” for it to make contact with the U.S. AICPA and the SEC 
(interview with the head of section responsible at that time). In November 1999, policy advisors 
of the BMWi, and representatives of the WPK and the IDW together visited the AICPA 
headquarters. The AICPA and KPMG explained the U.S. review system and, in particular, 
stressed the system’s ability to bolster confidence in financial auditing (WPK, 1999c). Shortly 
after, in April 2000, the Ministry issued its bill for an Act to Amend Auditing Regulations 
(WPOÄG) (Federal Government, 2000). The bill almost entirely mirrored the proposal made by 
the IDW and WPK. Hence, in the following debates over the bill, IDW and WPK demanded 
only marginal changes.  
Initially objections to the introduction of the POB were made by both the WPK and the IDW 
(WPK, 1999a). However, it soon came to be regarded as a necessary means for achieving public 
acceptance, and as a way to “demonstrate the system’s efficiency” to the public (WPK, 1999b, p. 
95). Likewise, the justification given for the Act stated that 
“Experts the [POB] have to be integrated in order to guarantee the credibility of the 
system [...] and they have to be personalities who are not only known to the public but 
who also enjoy an excellent reputation for integrity.” (Federal Government, 2000) 
It was of particular importance to the WPK that the POB would work on an honorary basis, as 
the slightest perception of its being a “regulator” had to be avoided (WPK-President Wahl in 
WPK, 2000b). Hence, in much the same way as its U.S. counterpart,66 the German POB was 
made up of five members from outside of the profession, who were bound strictly to observe the 
confidentiality of its deliberations. Although the Ministry formally appointed the members, it was 
the profession, above all the IDW, which approached and eventually proposed possible 
candidates. However, in informal discussions, the profession experienced difficulties in recruiting 
members for the Public Oversight Board, and so the field of potential candidates had to be 
                                                     
65 A “WPO-Novelle” describes regulatory amendments or changes to the WPO (Law Regulating the Profession of 
German Public Auditors) and can only be passed by the Federal Parliament. 
66 The U.S. POB was created in 1977 as an independent, private sector body charged with overseeing and reporting on 
the AICPAs peer review system (§ 2000.01 SECPS). The five board members represented a spectrum of business, 
professional, regulatory, and legislative experience. 
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extended. To this end, in the course of discussions on the bill, the WPK and IDW, speaking for 
the profession, demanded that the formal prerequisites for POB members be changed (WPK and 
IDW, 2000). Whereas the draft specified that members had to have a “legal background”, this 
was changed to the broader category of “academic background” (WPK 2000a, p. 113). 
Eventually in December 2000, the Act was passed by parliament (Deutscher Bundestag, 2000), 
without triggering controversial debates (WPK-President Wahl in WPK, 2001). It introduced a 
mandatory peer review system for all statutory auditors and established the POB to oversee the 
system.  
From the theoretical perspective, the two models of institutional work can be identified for the 
first stage: Mythologizing and Enabling Work. Both models are linked to attempts to preserve 
and maintain the existing institutional logics (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). “Mythologizing” 
refers to the way in which actors work to preserve the normative underpinnings of institutions by 
mythologizing their history (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). Mythologizing was used in a rhetorical 
way to legitimize material regulatory interventions being made unnecessary, and it centred on two 
main pillars on which the German auditing understanding had traditionally been based on: the 
perceived high hurdles to becoming a statutory auditor, on the one hand, and on the strong belief 
in the neo-corporatist Chamber system, on the other hand.  
The first line of argument departs from the (perceived) high quality of the education received by 
German statutory auditors, which relates to the theoretical knowledge examined, the minimum 
required amount of practical experience, and the different ways of entering the auditing 
profession. Although various European Directives had been passed as far back as the 1980s to 
harmonize the education and vocational training systems among European Member States, the 
educational systems in the various European Member States still differed considerably in the 
1990s (Margerison & Moizer, 1996, p. 29). Compared with other educational systems in Europe, 
audit education in Germany has been considered to be at the leading edge, and the demands 
made on the education of professionals were regarded as being “some of the toughest in the 
world” (Coenenberg et al., 1999, p. 386). For such a myth to be created and sustained, it has to 
have a “story” and has to be repeatedly brought to the public arena (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). 
The argument was frequently used and emphasized in official statements and in interviews in the 
media with representatives of the profession. In this context, the German statutory auditor was 
contrasted to the educational path taken by CPAs in the U.S., where the peer review system was 
seen as necessary tool to balance the “fast and superficial” educational system (Interviewee). 
From this understanding, the label “statutory auditor” was seen as a hallmark of quality, which, it 
was argued, made ex-post assessments in the form of external quality controls superfluous. The 
mythologization of the perceived high quality of audit services resulted in the audit profession 
initially being highly critical of quality checks and oversight elements. When the U.S. capital 
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market exerted pressure on the German system, the glorification of the “German statutory 
auditor” was one factor that ruled out any sort of material regulatory interventions. It is closely 
linked to the second argument, which refers to the strong belief, rooted in socio-political factors, 
in the German Chamber system. When the debate on quality assurance entered the professional 
arena, articles and statements in professional journals frequently declared it to be impossible that 
a government authority or independent regulatory agency, representing merely the “liberal 
design” of a profession-organized system such as that used in the U.S., could match the 
effectiveness of the German Chamber tradition (Dörner, 1999, p. 199; Lindgens-Strache, 1997; 
Ludewig, 2001, p. 2; Marks & Schmidt, 1998; Schmidt, 1997; WPK-President Hense in WPK, 
1998a). Maintaining the traditional division of responsibilities between the state and profession 
was also in the interests of the Ministry, which rejected governmental solutions, seeing them as 
being overly bureaucratic and too costly. Moreover, the Ministry made it clear that responsibility 
for quality assurance had to be given to the profession, if only because auditing was so technical 
and complex (Hammers-Strizek, 1999, p. 913). The mythologization of both the quality of 
statutory auditors and the neo-corporatist organization between the state and the profession 
secured that notion of self-regulation by ruling out any sort of radical regulatory intervention 
right from the very beginning.67 Even more, it was the impetus behind the specific design of the 
POB and peer review system that strengthened rather than weakened the profession’s position, 
which refers to the second model of institutional work that can be identified.  
Enabling work refers to the introduction or creation of rules, institutional arrangements and 
actors that facilitate, supplement and support institutions in order to ensure institutional survival 
(Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 230). In the case of the German oversight system, enabling work 
refers to the particular design of the peer review system and the POB: Although quality controls 
and public oversight boards are elements that are associated with a certain dilution and scrutiny 
of the profession’s self-regulatory ability, they were designed in a way that actually strengthened 
the profession’s traditional system. As the auditing profession strongly rejected the introduction 
of any sort of quality assurance mechanisms, the IDW and WPK had to find a compromise, 
which would meet international requirements, on the one hand, but would not question the 
institutionalized understanding of a self-regulated profession, on the other. The latter was 
important for the general acceptance of the auditing profession, and was eventually made 
possible because the auditing profession “installed some safeguards into this review system.” 
(Interviewee).  
The strongest safeguard was a “firewall” which prevented peer review findings being used in 
disciplinary court procedures against the audit firm. To this end, the disciplinary system and the 
                                                     
67 Similar rhetorics were used in the debates in the 1980s and early 1990s concerning the implementation of a peer 
review system (Niehus, 1980, 1982, 1985, 1994, 1995; R. Schmidt, 1995). 
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quality control system within the WPK were separated when the peer review system was 
introduced (Sahner, Schulte-Groß, & Clauß, 2001, p. 15). For the organization and evaluation of 
the peer review results, a Special Commission was founded within the WPK (Niehus, 2000, p. 
1136). The Commission consisted of members of the profession who were all registered as 
external reviewers. It assessed all peer review reports and decided what corrective actions should 
be taken in the event of errors in the firms’ internal control system being identified. The firewall 
was a vital aspect for the profession:  
“We had to discuss the issue of what the consequences would be in the event of the 
review result being negative. What would we do in such a case? It was not intended to 
publish this.” (Interview with Wienand Schruff) 
In order to guarantee the firewall and ensure that the WPK’s internal department for disciplinary 
actions and department for quality controls remained separated, the WPK hired a second 
managing director. From now on, the WPK was led and organized by two managing directors. 
The firewall was explained on the basis of the privilege against self-incrimination (“nemo tenetur 
principle”). It stood in sharp contrast to the recommendations made for the U.S. system, the 
recommendations of the IFAC (IFAC, 1999) and the European Commissions’ Recommendation 
“On quality assurance for the statutory audit in the European union: minimum requirements”, 
which was issued in 2000 (European Commission, 2000). Although, the Recommendation 
explicitly demanded that negative results from external quality controls should trigger sanction 
proceedings, the IDW frequently emphasized that “all international requirements had been fully 
met” by the German system (e.g. IDW, 2002, p. 12). 
The firewall was explicitly referred to in the official justification for the law (Federal 
Government, 2000). As Lawrence and Suddaby point out, the state and the professions often 
work together to maintain existing institutions (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 236). In fact, this 
first stage was characterized by the joint efforts made by the WPK, IDW and the Ministry to 
preserve the self-regulatory system of the profession. The justification for the law explained the 
legislative initiative with “international developments” rather than with any perceived 
shortcomings in national audit quality, which explains why the objective of the system was not to 
reveal the grounds a registered auditor being struck off (Federal Government, 2000). This 
understanding of the system was also voiced by the then Policy Advisor, who argued that “the 
introduction of quality controls should not be the equivalent of a dragnet investigation of the 
profession” (Hammers-Strizek, 1999, p. 913).  
The alliance between the profession and the Ministry is also evidenced in the creation of the 
POB as a new actor to ensure the existing institutional script. Beyond the profession’s 
boundaries, the POB was established to signal and reaffirm the system’s legitimacy. Within the 
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system, the fact that the POB operated on an honorary basis prevented concrete, individual 
review outcomes being in its focus (Interviewee). Moreover, as the profession itself took the lead 
organising the POB’s members, the chosen members shared a liberal understanding and agreed 
on the “ability and usefulness of the profession to regulate itself” (Interviewee). The combination 
of the shared politico-economic understanding and the honorary nature of the work has ensured 
that the POB has had no occasion to use its powers to overrule the decisions of the Quality 
Control Commission. On the contrary, in joint meetings with the Commission, review results 
have been presented and possible consequences discussed to such effect that the relationship 
between the Quality Control Commission and the WPK warmed swiftly (Interview, WPK 
General Managers). 
As a result of the strong, mythologized belief in the high quality of statutory auditors’ education 
and the effectiveness of the German Chamber system, new rules (external quality controls) and 
actors (POB) were implemented in a way that did not limit, but instead strengthened the 
profession’s self-regulatory capacities, thereby ensuring the survival of the self-regulatory 
institution. It also solidified the relationship between the dominant actors, the WPK and the 
IDW. In the late 1990s, unsolved questions regarding the general division of responsibilities and 
competencies did cause tensions between the IDW and the WPK. The President of the WPK 
therefore stressed the need for harmony to be maintained in order to “increase our (the 
accounting profession’s) political clout”, and the successful work on the peer review system, 
evidenced in joint statements on the course of the debate over the governments’ draft (IDW and 
WPK, 2000), was used as an example of what could be achieved if forces were united (WPK 
President Wahlt in WPK, 2000c). This enabled the profession to exert influence outside its 
national boundaries: On behalf of the Ministry, the WPK attended the European Committee on 
Auditing. Thanks to its political power, it was able to ensure that peer review and monitoring 
were defined as “equivalent” by the European Recommendation of 2000 (WPK 1999, p. 238).68  
3.5.2 Institutional decoupling 
In 2002, the collapse of Enron and WorldCom significantly changed the regulatory environment 
in a matter of months. When in July 2002 the U.S. self-regulatory system was replaced by 
government inspections under the new established PCAOB, the German peer review system lost 
its regulatory benchmark overnight. The PCAOB was equipped with a set of comprehensive 
information rights, which granted inspectors access to confidential documents from audit firms 
and their clients (PCAOB, 2004). As a result of this, the regulatory shift had a direct impact on 
German enterprises. It soon become apparent that the PCAOB’s sphere of influence would go 
                                                     
68 According to the text, quality assurance was the profession’s principal means of reassuring the public, therefore both 
considered were deemed to be methodologies of “equal stature” (European Commission, 2000, p. 3). 
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beyond its national borders, as Sections 102(a) and 106 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and PCAOB 
Rule 2100 required all non-U.S. audit firms to be registered at the PCAOB and thus subject to 
PCAOB inspections. This was particularly crucial for German companies as, at the time, German 
audit firms involved in statutory audits of firms listed in the U.S., were the second largest group 
of foreign auditors (WPK, 2004b, 2005b, p. 8). The PCAOB’s extensive inspection powers made 
German companies worry about economic and industrial espionage (Engelen, 2005, p. 32).69  
As a result, in the months subsequent to the establishment of the PCAOB, the alliance of the 
IDW, WPK and the Ministry made joint efforts to lobby against the obligatory registration of 
non-U.S. audit firms with the PCAOB (WPK 2002, p. 298). In addition, the WPK and IDW 
attempted to directly convince the SEC and PCAOB to renounce its inspection rights (WPK 
2002, p. 292) and publicly criticized the regulatory powers of the PCAOB (WPK 2002, pp. 292, 
297, WPK 2003a, WPK 2005c, p. 25). The German efforts were supported by the European 
Commission, which negotiated over the duty to register with the SEC (Engelen, 2005). However, 
arguing that U.S. investors demanded high-quality audits from firms listed on U.S. exchanges, 
regardless of their location, the PCAOB was adamant that its international inspections 
represented one of its top priorities and it was accordingly unwilling to renounce them (PCAOB, 
2003). After the PCAOB extended the deadline for registration twice more, first to April 2003, 
then to July 2003, the PCAOB made it unambiguously clear on October 28, 2003 that 
registration would remain necessary (PCAOB 2003; WPK President von Treuberg in WPK, 
2003b). The only way to avoid PCAOB inspection would be the recognition by the PCAOB of 
the German oversight system as an “equivalent” system (PCAOB Chairman Goelzer, 2004).  
At first, the profession’s strategy, as evidenced in press releases and joint statements (WPK and 
IDW, 2002), was based on the argument that the very design of the current peer review system, 
as assessed by the POB, would make regulatory changes to gain recognition by the PCAOB 
unnecessary.  
“The requirements of the public and of SOX are already met by the German system.” 
(WPK statement in WPK, 2002) 
“It can be concluded that the German system of professional oversight and external 
quality assurance already guarantee an independent and comprehensive oversight of the 
profession.” (IDW statement in IDW, 2002) 
To further emphasise the independent, public oversight elements in the German system, the 
Ministry issued the 5th WPO-Novelle in 2003, granting the POB members the right to attend 
meetings of the WPK’s management board, which was seen as a significant enhancement of the 
public element in the German oversight system (Manfred Schmidt & Kaiser, 2003, p. 163), as the 
                                                     
69 The Federation of German Industries (BDI) had already in August 2002 organized an information meeting for all 
listed German companies in order to discuss the consequences of the PCAOB’s establishment (WPK, 2002). 
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newly granted right of attendance would sufficiently guarantee the “public interest” (former 
Parliamentary State Secretary Schlauch, 2003). To further reinforce the system’s effectiveness, 
from 2005 on audit firms were not allowed to choose their reviewers autonomously, but rather 
had to propose three reviewers to the Quality Control Commission and then engage one 
reviewer who had not been rejected by the Commission. 70 
Nevertheless it soon became apparent that more material regulatory modifications were 
inevitable, since, parallel to the German national debates, the European Commission was 
working on a reform of the 8th EU Directive from 1984. After the transatlantic negotiations on 
the registration of foreign audit firms with the PCAOB had failed, it became clear to both the 
profession and the Ministry that the new Directive would include regulatory provisions, which 
the German system would not be able to fulfil; the POB had to be given a more relevant role in 
the German regulatory context.  
Informal discussions between the Ministry and the profession (in particular the IDW) resulted in 
a first draft on the Law on “The further development of oversight over statutory auditors” 
(APAG), being issued in July 2004 (BMWA, 2004). The main component was the transformation 
of the POB into the Auditor Oversight Commission (APAK). While the POB’s oversight was 
limited to the external quality reviews, the draft granted the APAK ultimate responsibility and 
decision-making power over all matters administered by the WPK, such as the quality assurance 
system, disciplinary investigations, professional exams and registrations of auditors (BMWA, 
2004). The final draft of the act did not contain material changes and was not discussed in the 
parliament to any great extent, as it had been accepted unanimously in the parliamentary 
committee (WPK President von Treuberg in WPK, 2005b). The German parliament passed the 
act on December 3, and the APAK came into force in January 200571 (Deutscher Bundestag, 
2004g).  
The APAK was composed of ten honorary members. All the members of the POB became 
members of the APAK. Technical and human resources were provided by the WPK. The only 
direct support for the APAK consisted of a secretary, which was felt to be necessary to 
communicate with international oversight entities abroad and to boost its acceptance and 
recognition (APAK Chairman Röhricht in WPK, 2007b). The first chairman of the APAK was 
Volker Röhricht, who was already member of the POB. He had been associated with the 
profession from the early 1990s, as he had served as a member of the examination boards for the 
statutory auditors exams and was known for his liberal attitude to regulation.  
                                                     
70 In later years, it came out that the in the majority of cases, only one reviewer was proposed to the Commission, 
which was not rejected by the Commission. 
71 The European Directive was eventually passed in October 2005 (2006/43/EG). 
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In discussions with European oversight authorities, Röhricht soon realized that his European 
counterparts viewed the German system with sceptical frowns.72 The final evidence that the 
POB’s transformation into the APAK would still not be enough to meet international standards 
was then brought by a PCAOB visit in February 2006. While the PCAOB welcomed the 
transformation of the POB into the APAK, it pointed out that in the absence of an inspection 
system, it would not be possible for it to recognize the German oversight system as equivalent 
(Warming-Rasmussen, 2006; WPK 2006a). In particular, the fact that inspections were still not 
part of the German oversight system and that the Commissioners were working on an honorary 
basis was viewed critically by the PCAOB.  
“With the [establishment of the APAK], we [the accounting profession] thought that we 
would not only fulfil the new EU Directive, which at this point was still evolving, but also 
fulfil the expectations of the U.S. with regard to a proper oversight system. In the 
meantime, we have received signals that this might not be the case.” (WPK-President in 
WPK, 2006b) 
For this reason, another regulatory amendment was prepared. The first draft of the 7th WPO-
Novelle, the Law on Professional Oversight Reform (BARefG), was published in March 2006 
(Federal Government, 2006). Its main component was the introduction of inspections for audit 
firms with clients of public interest (§§ 61a Satz 2 Nr. 1, 62b WPO). As the risk of PCAOB 
inspections was still omnipresent, it was a crucial issue for the WPK to have the legislation 
passed as quickly as possible (WPK Ulrich in WPK, 2007c).  
“We promised the Americans an equal system by 2007 in order to avoid PCAOB 
inspections in German audit firms.” (WPK President Ulrich in WPK, 2006c) 
“Our international firms need an equivalent to the U.S. oversight regulations.” (WPK 
President Ulrich in WPK, 2007d) 
Without having been debated either in the Federal Council (Bundesrat, 2006) or in Parliament 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2007), the legislation was eventually passed in September 2007, thus 
introducing inspections to the German audit oversight system. Nevertheless, the still strong 
organizational interrelationships between the APAK and the WPK continued to be a problem.  
In May 2008, the European Commission issued a Recommendation on external quality assurance 
for statutory auditors and audit firms auditing public interest entities (European Commission, 
2008), which laid down the criteria for an effective oversight system. To meet the independence 
criteria, the profession, the IDW, WPK and the APAK started to focus on the legal status of the 
APAK, and two legal opinions (Fachgutachten) were commissioned on this issue. According to 
                                                     
72 These discussions took place at meetings of “European Group of Auditors’ Oversight Bodies” (EGAOB). The 
EGAOB was established by the European Commission to coordinate the establishment of the oversight systems in the 
European Union. The preparatory meetings took place on 29.04.2005, 13.07.2005, and 12.12.2005, followed by a first 
meeting on 09.02.2006.  
 
  
 
127
the legal opinions, the APAK could continue to serve as a supervisory entity and fulfil the 
responsibilities of the European Recommendation by changing the chronological order of 
various procedures between the WPK and APAK. In particular, it would become necessary for 
the inspections reports to be submitted first to the APAK and then to the WPK’s “Professional 
Oversight” department, something that was still done the other way round at this time (WPK 
2009b, WPK 2010a). The debates between the IDW, WPK and APAK continued during 2009.  
As formal independence was still not assured, the PCAOB still did not recognize the German 
system as equivalent, and the fear of extraterritorial inspections was omnipresent. The 
discussions between the PCAOB and the APAK were characterized by informal discussions 
between Röhricht and the PCAOB’s Board Member Niemeier, who frequently demanded that 
the APAK’s formal independence be strengthened by means of further legal reforms. The 
pressure to rectify the APAK’s organizational dependence on the WPK increased after the 
PCAOB’s formally announced that it would conduct its first extraterritorial inspections by the 
end of 2009 (PCAOB 2009). The WPK and two of the Big Four firms that would have been 
affected immediately contacted the APAK and the BMWi and demanded that the debate over 
how the APAK was to develop finally be brought to a conclusion (WPK President Pfitzer in 
WPK, 2009a). Together, talks were held on how to enhance the German oversight board’s 
formal independence. With a view to reaching agreement on a common proposal, a meeting 
between the APAK, IDW and WPK took place in December 2009 (WPK Pfitzer in WPK, 
2009c). Consensus was reached in December 2009, and on January 20, 2010 the President of the 
WPK, the chairmen of the APAK, and the President of the IDW’s approached the BMWi to 
present the new proposals (APAK, 2011; WPK 2010b). However, these discussions were 
suddenly disrupted when the European Commission announced its intention to issue a Green 
Paper on audit regulation in autumn 2010.73 This brought German discussions to a halt since the 
BMWi wanted to await the outcome of the Green Paper before changing the regulatory 
framework once again (Oberrecht, 2011). This line was supported by the WPK, which, following 
discussions with the management board, decided to stop further deliberations over the oversight 
structure and instead await the results of the Green Paper. 
To sum, for the auditing establishment, key issue raised by the international embedding of big 
audit firms and their clients was to formally introduce a public oversight elements, while 
maintaining the traditional mode of professional autonomy. From a theoretical perspective, in 
the course of the transformation from the POB to the APAK and in the course of the APAKs’ 
further development, similar modes of institutional work to those seen in the first period can be 
identified. In particular, by means of a whole series of regulations, new rules and provisions were 
                                                     
73 The Green Paper was triggered when, in the wake of the financial crisis, the regulation of the auditing profession 
came into the global spotlight (e.g. ACCA, 2010; FSA and FRC, 2010; IFAC, 2010).  
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introduced with the explicit goal of ensuring the institutional survival of the self-regulatory 
system. However, while institutional maintenance had been relatively easy to accomplish in the 
first stage, pressures from both the PCAOB and the European Commission now posed a 
challenge for the actors. Again, as was the case when the peer review system and the POB were 
established, the WPK and the IDW had to find a compromise between the IDW’s need to 
possess an internationally accepted oversight system and the WPK’s critical attitude to any 
alteration in the way the profession was organized and regulated.  
Although endowed with rather weak powers, the APAK nevertheless represented a new actor 
and triggered debates on the roles, tasks and general understanding of the WPK.74 While there 
was a concurrent interest on the part of the IDW and the industry to create – formally –, with the 
APAK, a counterpart to the American PCAOB (IDW, 2004a, 2004c), the WPK tried to limit the 
powers of the new actor as far as possible, perceiving it to be a “frontal attack on its own 
existence” (Interviewee). This is evidenced in the discussions in the course of the APAK’s 
establishment. The WPK demanded that the APAK follow a rather “general oversight approach” 
without focusing on particular cases (WPK, 2004a, 2004c). Moreover, it argued that the 
profession should be directly involved in the governance of the APAK (Deutscher Bundestag, 
2004f). As formal independence was of particular importance for the IDW, this was adamantly 
rejected by the IDW.  
“For a system that is based on strong cooperation with a professional organization, which 
is the case in Germany, one can hardly argue that the necessary expertise could not be 
guaranteed unless the profession is directly involved [in the organization of the APAK], as 
this is precisely what is guaranteed through the cooperation [...]. It would be a very good 
argument in public debate to refer to the fact that the oversight authority consists 
exclusively of non-professionals.” (Naumann, 2004) 
Both the establishment and the further development of the APAK were therefore characterized 
by the on-going desire to find a balance between maintaining the institutional system, on the one 
hand, and finding international acceptance, on the other. To this end, a form of institutional 
decoupling of formal policies from actual practices had become necessary (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). Policies were adopted with a view to conforming to external expectations regarding 
formally stated mechanisms and operational procedures, even though, in practice, the old 
rationales were preserved (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Scott, 2008). As applied to institutional 
work, Hirsch and Bermiss (2009) have argued that the process of decoupling is particularly 
applicable for the institutional maintenance (Hirsch & Bermiss, 2009). While a loosely coupled 
organization was frequently framed as an unintended management failure or the gradual 
equilibrium to an organizational system that is exposed to contradictory institutional logics (e.g. 
                                                     
74 The marginal role played by the POB is further evidenced by the fact that the POB did not actively play a role when 
it was transformed into the APAK.  
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Brunsson, 2003; Weick & Orton, 1990), Hirsch & Bermiss (2009) point out that a loosely 
coupled system can be the result of careful strategic design by institutional actors. Likewise, 
Bromley and Powell (2012) state that decoupling can often be reduced to the self-interest of 
powerful actors (Bromley & Powell, 2012, p. 11). Especially during a period of change and 
deinstitutionalization, such strategic decoupling enables actors to more “creatively navigate” 
within their organizational fields (Hirsch & Bermiss, 2009; Oliver, 1991).  
Decoupling was facilitated through the passive role played by the Ministry. Although officially 
the POB was replaced by the APAK, the latter resulted more from a transformation of the POB. 
The APAG Act was formulated in general, vague terms, thereby leaving it to the profession to fill 
it with life. For instance, as the Act did not contain concrete independent requirements with 
regard to the members of the APAK, all POB members were nominated for the APAK without 
having to submit formal applications, which made it possible for the profession to “secure 
continuity through the transferal of the POB members into the APAK Commission” (Regulator). 
The Act neither defined the APAK’s role as an intermediary between the Chamber and the 
Ministry, nor did it specify its personal and organizational capacities.75 This resulted in the 
APAK, from its beginning, being involved in the intra-organizational structures of the Chamber, 
which in the first months even organized the APAK’s email correspondence. The APAK 
Chairman commented on the lack of any organizational substructure at a meeting with the 
Chamber: “Well, I might need my own secretary and an assistant who coordinates my activities” 
(Interviewee). In contrast, at the time the APAK was established, the PCAOB had an annual 
budget of 137m U.S. dollars and had more than 400 employees (WPK 2005a, p. 21).  
 Since the power and resources of the APAK were both limited and unspecified, all oversight 
matters very much resided within the profession itself.76 The first inspectors were recruited from 
the big accounting firms and employed directly by the WPK. As some of the APAK 
Commissioners did not possess special knowledge on specific auditing aspects, a certified 
accountant was hired who would “translate” the inspection results to the Commissioners. Above 
all, the APAK Commission was still working on a honorary basis, which made a deep and critical 
engagement with review and inspection results impossible and limited the APAK’s influence on 
superficial, procedural aspects. For instance, the APAK criticized the fact that various peer 
review reports were not assessed by the Chamber on a timely basis (APAK, 2008). Decoupling 
between formal and de facto oversight resulted in the initial doubts harboured by parts of the 
                                                     
75 When the draft of the APAK was discussed in the parliamentary committee, only one comment referred to the lack 
of technical and personal support provided to the APAK (Deutscher Bundestag, 2004b).  
76 The vague legislation caused also debates within the APAK, primarily caused by Schmidt, who was the head of 
section at the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs, and primarily responsible for the Act that established the APAK. 
After his departure from the Ministry, he became a APAK Commissioner in 2008. The debates centred on the fact that 
various aspects of the Act that established the APAK was implemented differently then intended by the former 
legislator.  
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profession over the establishment of the APAK, swiftly disappearing (WPK 2008c, p. 4). As with 
the previous relationship between the POB and the Chamber, the first years were characterised 
by close cooperation between the profession and the APAK. In its annual reports between 2005 
and 2010, the APAK confirmed that the Chamber’s organization and assessment of the 
inspections was both appropriate and efficacious, nor did it challenge the outcome of a single 
one of the latter’s oversight proceedings (APAK, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011).  
The APAK’s monthly meetings were also attended by the WPK-President and managing 
directors (WPK President Urlich in WPK, 2007a), and the then WPK-President publicly 
announced that: “It might sound strange when the overseen says that he is being treated well. 
However, the collaboration is really positive” (WPK President Urlich in WPK, 2007a). In this 
way, a sort of alliance between the profession and the APAK emerged (Malsch & Gendron, 
2011), both of whom worked together with the object of being deemed equivalent to the U.S. 
PCAOB.77  
“He [he APAK Chairman] again and again returned from international meetings and said: 
I have just managed to sell our system.” (Interviewee) 
By enhancing the formal independence of the APAK from the Chamber, the alliance between 
APAK and profession worked on the basis of the old system’s surviving at an institutional level. 
“Who gets the documents first, who signs first [...]. The Chamber did not resist that [the 
changes to enhance formal independence]. There was no passion about these things.” 
(Interviewee) 
The IDW was aware that the interweaving of the oversight structures with the WPK was viewed 
critically on the international stage. The recognition of the German system therefore depended 
heavily on how the role played by the WPK was understood. For this reason, it became 
important that the WPK should be perceived not as a second, pure interest group representing 
the profession, but as an entity acting on behalf of the public authorities. While it was the WPK’s 
perception that both aspects would belong to its inherent area of responsibilities (WPK, 2004a), 
it was the WPK’s original role and function within the neo-corporatist framework that the IDW 
emphasized in its official statements and in public hearings (e.g. IDW President Naumann in a 
public hearing of the parliamentary committee 2004).  
3.5.3 Institutional disruption  
In the shadow of the attempts made by the IDW and WPK to ensure the institutional survival of 
professional self-regulation, a new actor entered the stage when small auditors began to organize 
                                                     
77 International acceptance was stated in the APAK’s annual report to constitute the primary goal of its international 
activities (APAK, 2008). 
  
 
131
themselves. When the peer review system was introduced in 2000, it was important for the 
profession and the Ministry to have one and the same system in place for all statutory auditors in 
order to prevent the profession being divided into a “first class” of auditors with peer reviews 
and a second class of auditors without these (Federal Government, 2000, p. 24). To this end, the 
procedures and requirements demanded by the peer review system were designed identically 
across all auditors. Small audit firms without companies of public interest among their clients 
were given until the end of 2005 to prepare for their first review, while large audit firms had to 
pass their reviews directly. By the end of 2002, all of the 142 reviews, conducted both at large 
and at a number of medium-sized firms, had proceeded successfully (Kommission für 
Qualitätskontrolle, 2002).78 However, in contrast to large accounting firms, the vast majority of 
small auditors possessed neither the technical skills nor the financial and human capabilities 
required for a peer review process. When the deadline for small auditors was reached in 2006, a 
“shock wave” was triggered in the small auditors segment of the profession, as they realized that 
they would not be able to meet the review requirements (Gschrei, 2009, p. 5).79 As a result, at 
least one third of small auditors left the audit market.80 
The opportunities for small auditors to demand reforms were limited, nor did the intra-
organizational institutional setting provide access for small auditors to the regulatory arena: while 
large audit firms dominated the internal structures of the IDW, it was the specific electoral 
system of the WPK, outlined above, that prevented small auditors from participating in the 
politics of auditing. As the intra-professional opportunities to reform the system seemed to be 
blocked, a group of small auditors went to the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht) to 
challenge the “undemocratic electoral system” after the WPK’s general elections of 2002. 
Wp.net’s main objective was the introduction of a postal vote, which would have made it easier 
for small auditors to participate in the general elections. However, the Court opposed regulatory 
interventions, arguing that the design of the electoral system did in fact enable all auditors to 
participate in the elections and ruling that reforms had to be discussed within the profession 
(WPK, 2008b). In response to their perceived legal and professional discrimination, a group of 
small- and medium sized auditors established the Association for Medium-sized Auditing 
(wp.net) in 2005 (wp.net, 2005). For the first time since the auditing profession had been 
institutionalized in 1961, a second professional association had entered the arena.  
                                                     
78 In 133 reviews were unqualified, and nine qualified.  
79 The overwhelming majority of small audit firms postponed their first review until the deadline was reached. The 
annual reports from the Commission for Quality Controls indicate that in 2003 107 reviews (Kommission für 
Qualitätskontrolle, 2004) and in the year 2004 500 reviews (Kommission für Qualitätskontrolle, 2005) were conducted, 
with the number increasing significantly to 2600 review report in 2005 (Kommission für Qualitätskontrolle, 2006). 
80 It is difficult to determine the precise number of audit firms that left the audit market. While the WPK and IDW 
estimate that around 25 % left the audit market, 70 % left the audit market according to Wp.net.  
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The first President of Wp.net was its founder Michael Gschrei. He immediately positioned 
wp.net against the dominant actors of the field: The first members newsletters were composed of 
a series of intense personal attacks against the WPK and IDW, the WPK’s general elections of 
2005 were challenged and successful demands were made to be heard in public hearings, when 
oversight changes were discussed in the parliamentary committee (wp.net, 2006a). Nevertheless, 
the number of new members remained at a distinctly low level in the first three years, and 
regional meetings had to be cancelled due to the marginal number of participants (wp.net, 2006a, 
2007b). In addition, at the end of 2007, the Administrative Court dismissed the association’s 
challenge to the WPK election of 2005 (wp.net, 2008a). As the old electoral system remained in 
place, the group of large auditors won the WPK’s general elections in 2008 (WPK, 2008a). 
As small auditors were still stalemated within the intra-professional arena and as support from 
the judiciary had not been forthcoming, wp.net intensified its own political lobbying activities. In 
2009, wp.net sent its journal, in which the WPK’s “antiquated and anti-democratic” electoral 
system was described (Gschrei, 2009, p. 30) to all the members of the German Parliament 
(wp.net, 2009b). Eventually, in April 2010, representatives of Wp.net, the IDW and the WPK 
were invited by the Ministry to discuss possible electoral reforms. The WPK and IDW insisted 
that they could see no need for reforms, since the electoral system, they argued, already fulfilled 
democratic criteria. However, the Ministry was put under pressure, as it was easy for wp.net to 
communicate and convey the shortcomings displayed by a political system to the members of the 
German parliament:  
“I think it was clear to everyone that the electoral system had to be changed: it was 
necessary to make postal votes possible, only being able to vote if you attended the 
meeting no longer conformed with modern expectations.” (Interviewee, Political Actor) 
The Ministry agreed to change the WPK’s electoral system by introducing the postal vote. The 
German parliament passed the amendments to the WPO in October 2010 (Bundesgesetzblatt, 
2010), and in January 2011, and the Chamber changed the relevant articles in its own statutes 
(WPK, 2011b). As the next general elections, scheduled for June 2011, were imminent, wp.net 
intensified its attacks on the IDW and WPK. In particular, it benefited from its collaboration 
with a blog on auditing called “PRIMUS”, which enjoyed a nationwide readership. Since 2005, 
PRIMUS had used insider information to attack the IDW, the WPK and the Big Four in general. 
As personal links existed between wp.net and PRIMUS, the latter had access to confidential 
documents and minutes, which it published on its blog. 81 The mobilization of the small auditors 
was indirectly facilitated by the debates on the European level. The Green Book on the role of 
audit firms in the financial crisis, released by European Commissioner Barnier in 2010 (European 
                                                     
81 It is not possible to “measure” quantitatively the blog’s impact. However, the fact that all interview partners referred 
autonomously to the PRIMUS blog, is a strong indicator for the blogs impact and coverage within but also outside the 
audit profession. It relaunched its website in August 2015 and it is not accessible through www.wpwatch.de. 
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Commission, 2010), provided wp.net with ammunition in its attempt to position small auditors 
against the Big Four by casting doubt on the latter’s professional legitimacy:  
“Had the statutory auditors (Big Four) warned about the risks on the banks’ balance 
sheets, the financial crisis might have been avoided.” (wp.net, 2010b) 
The mobilization of small- and medium-sized auditors increased the election turnout at the 2011 
election to 50 percent, and the wp.net’s slate of candidates won the majority of the votes (WPK, 
2011c). Under the majority voting system, all 51 seats on the Management Board went 
exclusively to wp.net representatives, and Gschrei, the President of wp.net became the new 
President of the WPK. For the first time, the composition of the WPKs’ Management Board did 
not just turn out differently to what had been forecast – the board had actually come under the 
control of the small auditors. The election victory was expected neither by the established actors 
nor by the wp.net (Gschrei, 2011; WPK President Pfitzer in WPK, 2011d). The Big Four were 
“shocked” (Big Four interviewee):  
“To be honest, we [the Big Four] did not do much [to prepare for the election], we 
completely underestimated the situation. This all went completely wrong.” (Wienand 
Schruff, KMPG) 
In his inaugural speech, the new President of the Chamber immediately made it clear that the 
impact of the IDW on the politics of auditing had to be rolled back, as the latter would in future 
be “one among several professional associations” (WPK President Gschrei in WPK, 2011a). In 
press interviews, he publically supported the majority of the regulatory reforms that had been put 
on the political agenda by the European Commission’s Green Book of 2010 (e.g. in Börsen-
Zeitung from 29.11.2011 2011). This public support on the part of the national Chamber for the 
introduction of mandatory audit rotation and a rigid separation of auditing from consulting 
services was targeted directly against the core of the Big Four’s business models. In a direct 
response, the new President was attacked by the Big Four audit firms, which announced that they 
would take legal action if the Chamber continued to work against the “general and genuine 
interests of the profession”. Letters to the WPK’s President were sent by EY, PWC and KMPG, 
with copies being sent directly to the Ministry. In this way, the long-established coalition in the 
ranks of the audit establishment between the WPK, the IDW and the large audit firms was 
broken up. 
To sum up, the peer review system, which had primarily been introduced in order to preserve 
large audit firms’ competitiveness on the international playing field, became a serious problem for 
small audit firms in the local context. The “perfect marketing tool for the profession” (Interview, 
IDW) highlighted the gap between different parts of the profession and pushed small auditors 
out of the auditing market. Others have argued that a “peer reviews strengthens the logic of 
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confidence by unifying the accounting profession around the symbols of peer review” (Fogarty, 
1996, p. 260). In this case, however, it was the triggering moment for institutional disruption by 
the small auditors.  
The possibility of institutions being disrupted by the work of actors has been highlighted in 
institutional theory by several scholars (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Greenwood et al., 2002; 
Holm, 1995; Maguire et al., 2004). From prior studies on the dynamics of organizational fields, it 
is known that actors whose interests are not in line with the existing institutions work, when 
possible, to disrupt the existing logic (Abbott, 1988; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Implementing 
change, however, that breaks with existing institutions is challenging (Battilana et al., 2009, p. 78). 
When professions work to disrupt institutions, they are often observed to do this by challenging 
the prevailing regulatory structure (Abbott, 1988). Based on this observation, Lawrence and 
Suddaby (2006) argue that in most of these cases, institutional disruption takes place through the 
judiciary, as the latter is capable of directly invalidating previously powerful institutions 
(Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 236). In fact, the first attempts made by small auditors were 
aimed at challenging the Chamber’s electoral system, as this was identified as constituting the 
stabilizing mechanism that ensured the dominance of the establishment. However, the judiciary 
refused to support the small auditors, as the electoral system could not be challenged successfully 
on legal grounds.  
The only way for wp.net to disrupt the dominance of the establishment was by mobilizing the 
traditionally silent majority of small auditors. As the definition of a clear identity is of central 
importance when one is mobilizing others within a field that is characterized by high levels of 
institutionalization (Rao et al., 2000), a vital success factor for wp.net was its explicit positioning 
against the IDW and WPK from the very beginning. The formation and development of wp.net 
is thus an example of what others (e.g. Mahoney, 2000) have identified as typical reasons for 
deviation from an institutional system that is itself stuck in inertia: An opposing group which had 
initially been at the periphery of the organizational field emerged and positioned itself in relation 
to the “institutional defender” (Battilana et al., 2009; similar Malsch & Gendron, 2013, p. 876), 
eventually disrupting the latter’s dominance by challenging the prevailing institutional 
foundations.  
The disruption of the establishment’s dominance was based on the solidarity that existed among 
small auditors and on the articulation of a vision for the divergent change that it was promoting. 
The vision that was created by wp.net was the participation of small auditors in the politics of 
auditing and a new establishment, which would serve the interest of the whole profession. 
Having developed a vision, wp.net had to convince small auditors of the need for change and 
mobilize them behind it. Wp.net had to decrease the perceived risk of dissenting by undermining 
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the core assumptions and beliefs in the organizational field (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). This 
was done above all with the aid of a specific use of rhetoric that can be observed in the emails 
sent to its members (Table 16). 
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Table 16: The rhetorics used by wp.net for institutional disruption82 
 
Target  Story Examples 
    
Big 4 
“The Big 
Four are not 
part of the 
profession 
any longer.  
 “The auditors of banks would have been able to avoid the financial crisis and the global economic 
crisis [...]. However, in audits of systematic banks, such as the HRE [Hypo Real Estate], ‘political 
opinions’ were provided rather than true opinions, as according to the HGB.” (wp.net, 2009b, p. 3) 
 “Some of the high-flyers of the ‘Neuen Markt’ only made magic revenues on paper, but our 
amazing auditors blessed everything.” (wp.net, 2005) 
 “He who consults, cannot audit.. Who does not understand this principle, should try it out. The 
‘elite auditors’ prove this although despite their truehearted affirmations. [...] In 2006, KPMG 
received from its 20 DAX clients 321 Mio. € audit fees and on top of this additional 119 Mio 
consultancy fees.” (wp.net, 2008b, p. 7) 
“The Big 
Four take 
our clients.” 
 “Through Sarbanes Oxley, the large ones in our field had to retreat from their past lucrative 
benefices. They will, therefore, increasingly and with aggressive methods target the audits of 
medium sized companies.” (wp.net, 2005) 
  “With the introduction of inspections, the brutal bloodletting also started in the segment of the 
‘elite class’. With disproportionate measures, the banishment of small audit firms with public 
interest began.” (Gschrei, 2015, p. 22) 
    
IDW 
“The 
structures of 
the IDW are 
dominated 
by Big 
Four.” 
 “The quality control system which was passed by the Federal Parliament and which designed by the 
IDW and WPK is amazing. It did not improve the audit quality of bank auditors [Big 4], but 
expelled 75 % of audit firms out of the audit market.” (wp.net, 2009a, p. 13) 
 “Although the EU-Directive does not require a Commission for Quality Control [...], it was, 
however, created by the German legislator under the leadership of the WPK and IDW, which threw 
around 70 % of small auditors and 90 % of sworn auditors out of the audit market” (wp.net, 2008b, 
p. 6) 
 “Some in the Chamber and, in particular the IDW, feel as they would be the Ludwig XIV: ‘L’État, 
c’est moi!’.” (wp.net, 2010d) 
.   
Ministry 
“The legal 
initiatives are 
against small 
auditors.” 
 “The quality controls were designed for the Big 4 and not for the 5000 small auditors.” (wp.net, 
2006c) 
 “Why did the Ministry translate the “Quality Assurance REVIEW” in the Directive of 2016 with 
“Quality control ASSESSMENT” [germ. Prüfung] and not with “Quality Review”? The result: With 
the support of the IDW, U.S. SOX was handed over to the German auditors.” (wp.net, 2014b) 
WPK 
“The WPK 
is captured 
by the 
interest of 
Big 4 and 
IDW” 
 “We have known for years, that it is a nice habit of the WPK, that the name of the next WPK 
president is clear years in advanced” (wp.net, 2007a, p. 9) 
 “The WPK and the big ones are very much afraid of the post vote, like the devil hates holy water.” 
(wp.net, 2007a, p. 9) 
 “Until today, the majority of the management board of the WPK consists of honorary officials or 
employees from the IDW.” (Gschrei, 2009, p. 6) 
 “The two “Chief-Professor”s [IDW-Naumann and Chamber President Pfitzer] now demonstrate to 
the public and the legal supervision, how no single paper fits in between IDW and WPK. A 
common letterhead!!! It can not be more obvious.” (wp.net, 2009d) 
“The rights 
of small 
auditors 
have to be 
protected.” 
 “The WPK breaks fundamental electoral principles.” (wp.net, 2009a, p. 12) 
 “In our next journal, Germany will learn that it was wp.net and its members who fought for this 
fundamental right.” (wp.net, 2010c) 
 “We wanted democracy to enter the Chamber and we wanted a Chamber that works in the interest 
of everyone. That was more important to us than personal benefits.” (wp.net, 2014d) 
 “We can announce the holy news to our members,, that after 50 years of darkness, democracy will 
enter the Chamber in 2011.” (wp.net, 2010a) 
 Without diluting, we work in the interest of the small and medium sized auditors. Without being 
pretentious, it can be said that in 20 years before our establishment, interests of small and medium 
sized auditors were not de facto represented.” (wp.net, 2006b) 
   
APAK 
“The APAK 
is captured 
by the Big 
4.” 
 “The APAK-Commissioners took the PCAOB as a role model, but somehow strangely completely 
forgot that the PCAOB has very strict independent rule.” (wp.net, 2013) 
 “That is just bold or done in bad faith! The ‘Holy Trinity’ of IDW, WPK and APAK added even 
the logo of the Minister of Economic Affairs and the ‘IDW/Chamber state supervision’ is ready. 
This bias problem damages the APAK’s reputation!” (wp.net, 2010d)  
 “The whole organization of the inspections is done by the Chamber through the employment of 
worn-out, former Big 4 auditors.” (wp.net, 2009b). 
 “In the first year of the inspections, the small audit firms with public interest clients were inspected 
and not the Big 4 auditors, although they have to be inspected annually; the small ones only every 
three years.”(wp.net, 2009c) 
     
                                                     
82 Total number of member wp.net letters: 2005 (1); 2006 (5); 2007 (5); 2008 (8); 2009 (9); 2010 (16); 2011 (12); 2012 
(15); 2013 (20); 2014 (20). 
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The use of discourse was vital for the success of wp.ne, as narration is a potent tool for sense-
making and in the ongoing construction of reality (Zilber, 2007, pp. 1038, 1047). The “rhetorical 
strategies” (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) applied to legitimate the institutional change sought 
by wp.net aimed to undermine the moral underpinnings of the audit establishment by 
communicating how and why an adoption of the articulated vision would improve the situation 
for small auditors (Fligstein, 1997; Holm, 1995; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). To this end, the 
use of “institutional vocabulary” (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) was necessary. By frequently 
making reference to a “free profession”, “the core values of a profession” or 
“commercialization”, wp.net linked its rhetoric to familiar templates, while at the same time 
demonstrating the need for change, as the underlying contradictions inherent in the established 
system were exposed. The rhetorical identification of contradictions inherent in the prevailing 
logic, and their constant repetition, were the means by which the institutional shift was achieved 
(Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005, p. 59).  
Of similar importance for the success of the institutional work was the development of “stories”, 
which, as identified by others, can play a vital role in the processes of institutional change (Zilber, 
2007). Through storytelling, past events were linked to easily understandable quasi-causal 
connections, and fixed roles were attributed to the actors in the organizational field. The stories 
called for changes in the institutional order and for a new balance of power within the politics of 
auditing, casting the role of “heroes” to small auditors and the role of “villains” (Morrill & 
Owen-Smith, 2002) to the establishment and charting a sequence of past events that were 
connected up in such a way as to form a plot. 
At the same time, the IDW and WPK were hampered in their attempts to defend their dominant 
positions, as they could not publically work as “institutional defenders” (DiMaggio, 1988): the 
IDW’s legitimacy was based on the premise that it was working in the profession’s overall 
interests, which restricted the IDW’s opportunities to counter the ongoing attacks by the new 
actor: 
“Wp.net has an advantage compared to us [the IDW]: We perceive ourselves as 
representing the whole profession […]. If I, as Wp.net, only represent a fringe group, then 
I can raise my voice more loudly, as I do not have to show consideration to everyone.” 
(Naumann, IDW) 
This became more evident when the small auditors successfully lobbied for the electoral system 
to be changed in 2010. Although it was clear that the IDW opposed electoral reforms, it was 
unable to officially oppose reforms, and official statements only “welcomed” reforms while 
strongly emphasising that their “detailed drafting” should be left to the profession (IDW, 2010). 
In addition, it was also rhetorically hampered in the Green Book debates, which enabled wp.net 
to craft its vision that institutional changes needed to be implemented. While wp.net was able to 
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clearly identify and support various proposals, the IDW first rejected the European initiatives on 
the whole (IDW, 2011), and it later remained silent on aspects that would lead to changes in the 
audit-client relationships (e.g. through joint audits) (IDW, 2012). The WPK was similarly unable 
to react, as it is formally committed to neutrality (WPO § 57 II Nr. 6). Hence, the WPK and 
IDW ignored the harsh and often personal attacks. It was not until 2010 that the first official 
statement was issued in the WPK-magazine responding to some of the various attacks made by 
the wp.net in the preceding months (WPK 2010c, p. 16). As a result of the WPK’s inability to 
react directly to wp.net, the latter was eventually able to push through the electoral reforms.  
While the number of wp.net members remained low in the first years, solidarism increased after 
the applied rhetoric used by wp.net succeeded in creating a sense of discrimination among small 
auditors, on the one hand, and in attacking the IDW for no longer working in the interests of the 
public, on the other. The advent of the new player undermined the institutionalized assumptions 
and belief that the IDW was serving the needs of one profession. The disassociation of the moral 
foundations was achieved through a combination of mobilized political energy and appeals to the 
“higher ideals” of the profession. The institutional work that was pursued by wp.net, and that 
was founded on solidarism and claims to equal rights in the way the profession was organized 
ultimately proved successful. The 2011 election outcome turned the traditional understanding 
and organization of the profession upside down:  
“At a single blow, everything [the traditional mode of professional organization] 
disappeared. That was a shock for everyone.” (Interviewee IDW President Naumann)  
3.6 Epilogue: institutional destruction?  
Professions have been identified as being particularly influential, as they influence other actors by 
diffusing expertise and norms in the field (Greenwood et al., 2002; Suddaby & Viale, 2011). 
Professions possess what scholar define as “formal authority” (Battilana et al., 2009) or 
“institutional capital” (Oliver, 1997). This describes the rights or capacities of actors to engage 
directly in creating, maintaining or disrupting institutions and to mobilize other actors to build a 
coalition to that end. As a result of the allegiance between the “accounting establishment” (e.g. 
professional institute and largest accounting firms) and the Ministry, the oversight authority was 
working on a honorary basis and was provided with limited power and resources, which was not 
scrutinized much by the oversight commission itself. While at first sight the profession’s 
autonomy appeared to be threatened by the establishment of the APAK, and while the IDW 
frequently emphasised how “strongly” the APAK intervened in the self-administrative structures 
of the profession (IDW, 2014), in practice the APAK had been culturally captured by the 
auditing establishment, which resulted in the boundaries between overseer and overseen 
becoming blurred (similiar Malsch & Gendron, 2011). Hence, at this first stage, with the aid of 
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multiple “cosmetics of response” (Power, 1993, p. 199), the audit establishment added rules and 
organizational structures to the oversight system in order to preserve the traditional mode of 
professional self-regulation. 
To this end, it was vital to preserve the perception that we were talking about a “profession”, as 
the “self-regulation of professions is intrinsically connected to the legitimacy of the profession” 
(Fogarty, Zucca, Meonske, & Kirch, 1997, p. 168). Professionalism refers to the attempt by the 
audit profession to publicly promote the perception of its being an effective “guardian of the 
public good” (Robson, Willmott, Cooper, & Puxty, 1994, p. 531). As outlined above, the rhetoric 
of wp.net maintained the notion that we were dealing with a profession, which supports the idea 
that institutional change is not possible without maintaining certain institutions that make 
possible the desire for such a change (Malsch & Gendron, 2013, p. 873). Hence, from this 
perspective, the takeover of the Chamber by small auditors is an example of Thelens’s (2003) 
“institutional conversion”, which relates to a situation in which the change of actor constellation 
fundamentally transforms the character of an institution – without the actors involved calling the 
institution itself into question (Thelen, 2003). However, a question that remains open at the 
present moment is whether wp.net, while it has successfully disrupted the dominance of the 
establishment, might not at the same time have unintentionally opened up the status of the 
occupation as a “profession” to scrutiny. 
Table 17: Multifarious modes of Institutional Work  
 
Actors Institutional Work Mechanisms 
   
IDW, WPK, 
Ministry 
Maintaining: the profession’s self-
regulation institution 
Mythologizing: Preserving the normative underpinnings of 
the institution by the 
 use of rhetorics to demonstrate the high quality of 
statutory auditors’ education. 
 use of rhetorics to demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
German neo-corporatist Chamber system. 
  Enabling Work: Creating rules that supplement and support 
institutions: 
 Introduction of a peer review system. 
 Introduction of a Public Oversight Board. 
      
IDW, WPK, 
APAK 
Maintaining: the profession’s self-
regulation institution 
Mythologizing: Preserving the normative underpinnings of 
the institution by the 
 use of rhetorics to demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
German neo-corporatist Chamber system. 
  Preserving the institution by strategic decoupling:  
 Establishment of the APAK. 
 Various regulatory amendments with a focus of formal 
independence.  
      
wp.net 
Disruption: the institutional 
dominance of the establishment 
Disruption by undermining the moral underpinnings of the 
audit establishment by the  
 use of rhetorics that mobilize small auditors around 
wp.net. 
 use of rhetorics to create a sense of solidarity.  
 use of stories and myth to underpin the legitimacy of 
the establishment. 
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The intra-professional battles may have depleted the professional institutional capital (Oliver, 
1997), and the institutional work to preserve the self-regulatory institution through strategic 
decoupling (Hirsch & Bermiss, 2009) may have become difficult. In particular, in the course of 
the elections in 2011 the profession became highly politicized, and, the eventual takeover of 
wp.net in 2011 was viewed critically by the Ministry, which doubted whether wp.net would have 
the skills needed to lead the Chamber (WPK President Gschrei in WPK, 2011a). The conflicts 
intensified once more when the debates on the European Directive governing the statutory 
audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts (EU Directive 2014a), and the Regulation 
on specific requirements regarding the statutory audit of public-interest entities (EU Regulation 
2014b) added additional fuel to the flames. Wp.net supported the regulations’ objective to break 
the Big Four’s market power, (wp.net, 2014a, 2014c) and apodictically demanded that the Big 
Four’s impact on the APAK be removed by transferring the APAK’s responsibilities to the 
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) (wp.net, 2014c). Tension between the 
establishment and wp.net grew further when the APAK annual reports revealed more errors and 
omissions than in previous years and, in particular, accused small and medium-sized audit firms 
of employing unsatisfactory auditing practices (APAK, 2013, 2014). This triggered once again 
heavy attacks from wp.net, which accused the APAK of not possessing sufficient expertise 
(Gschrei, 2014). In turn, the IDW publically defended the APAK from these “attacks”, 
emphasizing the latter’s vital role as it “protected not only the audit profession, but also the 
German economy from coming under the sway of foreign regulators (IDW, 2014, p. 2). The 
vehemence with which this conflict was waged in public drew the attention of both the media 
and the public. 83  
“We have conflicts in other free professions as well. But this level of dispute, this level of 
conflict, in part very personal […] this is completely unknown.” (Political Actor) 
The debates for the first time- resulted in various press articles being published which informed 
the public about the regulatory developments within the profession (Becker, 2014a, for instance 
2014b; Giersberg, 2014). In addition, these conflicts led to two parliamentary questions in 2014, 
in which the organization of the audit profession, the intertwining of the Big Four with the 
APAK and the intra-professional conflicts were addressed and critically scrutinized (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2014a, 2014b).84 Thus, it could be argued that political awareness was raised not by a 
perceived insufficient audit quality, or by the role of the audit firms during the financial crisis, but 
instead by the intra-professional conflicts, which increasingly turned the spotlight onto questions 
                                                     
83 One important factor that made the conflicts visible to the public was the fact the Gschrei resigned as WPK 
president in March 2012 in the wake of internal conflicts. However, he was still member of the Chamber’s 
Management Board. In the following months, confidential information from meetings of the management board were 
communicated, via the PRIMUS blog, to the public.  
84 The inquiry was made by the leftwing party DIE LINKE, and consisted of 51 questions concerning the German 
audit oversight system, the role of the Big 4 during the financial crisis, the procedure of appointment for the APAK 
and the caused and impact of the intra-professional rivalries.  
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about the status of statutory auditors as a profession and about its ability to regulate itself, which 
was particularly perceived by the audit establishment. 
“Of course, the standing of the profession is negatively impacted if different segments of 
the profession express different opinions in public.” (Interview IDW President Naumann) 
“The intra-professional conflicts have been and still are a risk for the self-administration of 
the profession.” (Interviewee, audit profession) 
Bromley and Powell (2012) emphasise that some policies, initially established as window dressing, 
have the potential to evolve into a meaningful aspect of regular activities (Bromley & Powell, 
2012). At this point, it is too early to draw conclusions about the outcome of the intra-
professional conflicts and their impact on audit regulation in Germany. However, the debates in 
the course of the European Directive and Regulation from 2014 indicate that the Ministry is 
likely to play a more active role. Although the IDW, the WPK and the APAK all argued that the 
APAK’s core design should be maintained, the new oversight entity will be integrated into the 
Federal Office of Economics and Export Control (BAFA), without maintaining the 
Commissions model of the APAK. In addition, the peer review system’s firewall will be 
removed, which will allow the use of review reports in proceedings against an auditor (BMBWi, 
2015). Whether this results in a process of “re-coupling”, i.e. to the establishment of a powerful 
agency, is a question that has to be left open for future research. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This study has examined the establishment and development of the German audit oversight 
system from 2000 to 2014. To frame the analysis, the paper has mobilized Lawrence’s and 
Suddaby’s synthesis of various modes of institutional work.  
The paper contributes to the literature in three ways.  
First, this study has demonstrated how external pressures were initially internalized by the 
established actors in such a way as to make it possible for the traditional self-regulatory system 
essentially to maintain its ex ante equilibrium, and substantive reforms were not considered a 
priority. Prior studies have challenged the suitability of exogenous-induced change modelled on 
the Anglo-American mode of regulation (Arnold, 2012; Wade, 2007). Due to politico-economic 
factors, the implementation of audit oversight boards is associated with significant gaps between 
the intended purposes and the actual regulatory outcomes, not only in political-economic systems 
characterised by traditional reform incapacity problems and state ineffectiveness (Blavoukos et 
al., 2013; Caramanis et al., 2015), but also in contexts characterised by functioning institutional 
traditions (Malsch & Gendron, 2011). This study supports these prior findings by demonstrating 
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the difficulties of establishing new frameworks that are disassociated from the deinstitutionalized 
“older” scripts and legacies. In Germany, the legacies were derived from the belief that the 
auditing profession was able to regulate itself, a belief which is interlinked with the country’s 
chamber system. On this account, the auditing profession and the political actors forged a 
strategic alliance, with the goal of preserving the reputation of the German financial sphere on 
the international stage, rather than establishing an independent and powerful audit oversight 
regulator.  
Second, in response to recent calls made in prior research (Ramirez et al., 2015), this study has 
highlighted the reciprocal relationship between audit regulation and small practitioners. Initially, 
the main driver behind the establishment of the German audit oversight system was the strong 
international embeddedness of German industry, as this increasingly affected national accounting 
and audit matters. The strong historical system of self-regulation, which for decades had ruled 
out public supervision and external quality controls, had become problematic for large German 
audit firms by the end of the 1990s, as the need for a formal oversight system that was 
independent of the profession arose. For this reason, the oversight system carried the signature 
of the IDW, which was put under pressure by large accounting firms to introduce an 
internationally recognized system of external quality controls under public oversight. Institutional 
studies have documented actors holding key strategic positions located within a “dominance 
hierarchy” within organizational fields have the ability to significantly impact the way in which 
existing institutions evolve (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence 
& Suddaby, 2006, p. 216). In other words, institutions reflect and reproduce power relations. The 
analysis provides a counterpoint to prior research by demonstrating how actors who were initially 
at the periphery of the organizational field increasingly impacted the development of German 
audit regulation. A key to understanding how the German case developed lies in the intra-
professional conflict that, on the one hand, changed the power structures in the organizational 
field, but on the other, raised the awareness of both the public and the media concerning the self-
regulatory ability of the profession. 
Third, a rereading of how the German oversight system was established, and how it developed, 
illustrates that institutional change is a complex process involving different types of process and 
agents. The process of institutional change and disruption can occur abruptly - which was the 
case in the U.S., with its shift from self-regulation to government regulation within months - as a 
smooth transition or as a mixture of continuity and discontinuity (Thelen, 1999). It demonstrates 
how both intended and unintended effects have the ability to maintain, change and ultimately 
disrupt traditional legacies. Others have argued that institutional work can emerge from multiple, 
distributed actors that are engaged in parallel or uncoordinated activities (Lounsbury & Crumley, 
2007, p. 1003). This case demonstrates that multifarious dimensions of institutional work do not 
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always occur in isolation, but are mutually dependent and interlinked, which can result in 
outcomes that were not intended by the actors involved. While prior work on power and agency 
in an institutional setting suggests that the link between actors, strategies and outcomes is 
traceable and deterministic, the picture is more complex when account is taken of the fragility 
displayed by organizational fields and of the duality of institutional stability and disruption. 
Institutional work is a fragile and vulnerable process. Whether as result of the struggle for 
domination, the audit profession will lose sight of its historical reference points and of the key 
privileges associated with the notion of professionalism remains a subject for future research. 
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3.8 Appendices 
Appendix 9: List of abbreviations 
 
AICPA 
 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (USA).  
APAG  Auditor Supervision Act (Abschlussprüferaufsichtsgesetz, Germany). 
APAK  Audit Oversight Commission (Abschlussprüferaufsichtskommission, Germany). 
BARefG Law on Professional Oversight Reform (Berufsaufsichtsreformgesetz, Germany). 
BMWA  Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Labour (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und 
Arbeit, Germany).  
BMWi  Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und 
Energie, Germany). 
CPA  Certified Public Accountant (USA). 
DSW Association for private investors in Germany (Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für 
Wertpapierbesitz, Germany) 
EGAOB  European Group of Auditors’ Oversight Bodies. 
EU  European Union. 
EY  Ernst & Young. 
FREP Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (Deutsche Prüfstelle für Rechnungslegung, 
Germany)  
IDW  Institute of Public Auditors in Germany (Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer, Germany). 
IFAC  International Federation of Accountants. 
KonTrag  Corporation Control and Transparency Act (Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im 
Unternehmensbereich, Germany). 
PCAOB  Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (USA). 
POB  POB (Qualitätskontrollbeirat, Germany). 
PwC  PricewaterhouseCoopers.  
SEC  Securities and Exchange Commission (USA). 
SOX  Sarbanes-Oxley Act (USA). 
WPK  Federal Chamber of Public Accountants (Wirtschaftsprüferkammer, Germany). 
wp.net  Association for Small and Medium-sized Auditing (Verband für die mittelständische 
Wirtschaftsprüfung, Germany). 
WPO  Law Regulating the Profession of German Public Auditors (Wirtschaftsprüferordnung, 
Germany). 
WPOÄG  Act to Amend Auditing Regulations (Wirtschaftsprüferänderungsgesetz, Germany). 
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Appendix 10: Analysed archival sources 
 
Sources Time period 
  Minutes of parliamentary debates. 1998 - 2015 
Ministerial legislative proposals and laws. 1998 - 2015 
Annual reports of the POB. 2002 - 2005 
Annual reports of the APAK. 2005 - 2104 
Annual reports of the IDW.  1998 - 2014 
Statements of the IDW and Wp.net. 1998 - 2015 
Statements of Wp.net. 2005 - 2015 
Letters to the Ministry by the professional associations. 1998 - 2015 
Member Newsletters (emails) from Wp.net. 2000 - 2015 
Annual reports of the Chamber of Auditors. 1999 - 2015 
Statements of the Chamber of Auditors. 1999 - 2015 
Minutes of board meetings of the Chamber of Auditors. 2011 - 2013 
Newsletters from PRIMUS blog. 2005 - 2015 
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Appendix 11: The time line of events in the establishment of the POB and APAK 
 
Date Content 
  
February 1998 
IDW and WPK establish a technical committee on “Quality Assurance” to discuss a 
system of external quality controls in Germany.  
  November 1998 IDW and WPK agree on establishing a U.S. AICPA-like system.  
  
April 2000 
The Government issues the first draft of the Act (4th WPO-Novelle) introducing a 
quality control system under formal supervision of a Public Oversight Board (POB).  
  October 2000  The Federal Parliament passes the Act.  
  
January 2001 
The WPK changes its professional statues and introduces a mandatory system of 
external quality controls and public oversight board (POB).  
  
January 2004 
The 5th WPO-Novelle is passed by the parliament, which enables POB members to 
attend the meetings of the management board of the WPK. 
  
July 2004 
The first draft of the 6th WPO-Novelle is issued. The main element is the 
transformation of the POB into the Auditor Oversight Commission (APAK).  
  November 2004 The Federal Parliament passes the 6th WPO-Novelle.  
  January 2005 The APAK comes into force and replaces the POB. 
  January 2005 Foundation of wp.net. 
  
March 2005 
The first draft of the 7th WPO-Novelle is issued, which introduces inspections for 
audit firms with public interest clients.  
  November 2005 The Federal Parliament passes the 7th WPO-Novelle. 
  December 2009 WPK, IDW and APAK agree on the further reforms of the audit oversight system.  
  
January 2010 
WPK, APAK, and IDW approach the Ministry to present the regulatory reforms, 
which would strengthen the APAK’s formal independence.  
  
January 2010 
The BMWi stops the discussion on further regulatory changes because of the EU 
Green Book. 
  Fall 2010 Change of the WPK electoral system. 
  June 2011 Wp.net wins in the WPK general elections. 
  
March 2012 
The WPK agrees to transfer the organizational responsibilities of the inspection to 
the APAK. 
  March 2012 Gschrei resigns as president of the WPK. 
    February 2015 The Ministry issues proposals for regulatory reforms of the APAK. 
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Appendix 12: Coding for Institutional Work in Stage 1 – Institutional Maintenance 
 
Source 1st-Order Quotes 2nd-Order  Modes 
    
OF 
“A professional independent oversight body must not question the long-
established structures of self-regulation [...] therefore it is the 
responsibility of the legislator to meet the international requirements and 
at the same time to maintain the role of the WPK as a self-regulatory 
entity.” (Hammers-Strizek, 1999, p. 913) 
National 
belief in 
efficiency of 
Chamber 
system 
Mytho-
logizing 
    
I 
“This is linked to the philosophy of a “free profession”. Basically, we 
[the Ministry] take the view that they have to do this [to guarantee audit 
quality] by themselves. A profession, which, as it is perceived, has so 
much autonomy, so much quality and experience, has to be able to 
establish a quality control system [...]. In the [political] philosophy of this 
liberal age, there was a desire to avoid the establishment of a powerful 
regulatory authority.” (Interviewee, political actor) 
    
OF 
“In our opinion, the U.S. should consider recognizing European 
professional oversight systems as being equivalent to, and as effective as, 
that exercised by the PCAOB in the U.S. Equivalence of these systems 
does not require that the systems be identical. Due to historical and 
cultural differences and the different legal environment in the U.S. and 
the EU member states, an appropriate and effective professional 
oversight system can be organized in various ways.” (WPK & IDW, 
2003) 
    
I 
“The Americans do not have these concept of a “liberal profession”, 
they [the profession] do not have, how should I put it, this esprit de 
corps.” (Interviewee, political sphere) 
    
I 
“We made sure that the external quality controls in Germany would not 
be established as a monitoring-procedure, but as a peer-review 
procedure [...]. That is important for us, because our colleagues actually 
know what they are monitoring. He is not a civil servant.” (Interviewee, 
audit profession) 
    
L 
“The special design of this system makes it possible to limit the 
bureaucratic costs to the minimum amount necessary.” (Federal 
Government 2000) 
    
L 
“With that [the organization and implementation of quality control 
system], the self-administration of the free auditing profession [...] is 
strengthened.” (Federal Government 2000) 
      
I 
“The professional training route taken by a German auditor cannot be 
compared to the Anglo-Saxon, American CPA training, because the 
training itself takes place after the CPA exam. [...] and of course I have 
to look something up when the auditing company is not training me 
well, but it is different when I have done five years training, become an 
auditor at the age of 33 and have 10 years of auditing experiences.” 
(Interviewee, audit profession). 
National 
belief in high 
quality of 
educational 
system  
    
I 
“I think no training in Germany is more complex and complicated than 
the training for auditors. And a person who has two state examinations 
in law or a business diploma and a tax advisor examination, followed by 
an accountancy exam afterwards, numbers among the best qualified 
people. No question about it.” (Interviewee, audit profession). 
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I 
“The fundamental professional career and the conception of the 
professional access to becoming an auditor is very different compared to 
other European countries [...]. When I look at the professional career 
who is going to inspect on top? That has been a debate among 
colleagues who could not understand that in line with their self-image.” 
(Interviewee, audit profession). 
  
    
L 
“The peer review approach is chosen, because the profession, which 
conducts the quality controls, possesses the relevant and recent [...] 
knowledge of auditing methods.” 
        
OF 
“If we [the profession] want to stop external quality controls being 
initiated and organized by the legislator, we have to be prepared to tackle 
this question ourselves.” (WPK-President in WPK, 1998b) 
Imple-
mentation 
of a POB 
including 
external 
quality 
controls 
 
Enabling 
Work 
    
S 
“We agree with the profession that the external quality controls 
represent the final brick in the house of quality assurance in the 
accounting profession.” (Hammers-Strizek, 1999, p. 913) 
    
S 
“The organization and the supervision of the system are undertaken by 
the WPK [...]. Thus, safeguarding quality remains a core task of the 
profession.” (Hammers-Strizek, 1999, p. 913) 
    
OF 
“[With the new regulatory changes], the installation of an additional 
entity on top of the WPK will be explicitly avoided [...] in order to avoid 
a supervision of supervision.” (Hammers-Strizek, 1999, p. 913) 
        
OF: Official statement, S: Speech, I: Interview, LT: Legal text  
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Appendix 13: Coding for Institutional Work in Stage 2 – Institutional Maintenance 
 
Source 1st-Order  2nd-Order  Modes 
    
SP 
“A profession independent oversight body must not question the 
grown, long-established structures of the self-regulation [...]. The 
newly established APAK will not increase the regulation of the 
accounting profession. In truth, the APAK serves to fulfil European 
expectations – and thus of course also the expectations of the U.S. 
and its PCAOB – regarding an objective, profession-independent 
oversight system with final decision-making authority.” (Report 
Schmidt, former head of section in the Ministry, in Schmidt, 2005) 
Trans-
formation of 
the POB into 
the APAK 
Enabling 
work 
    
PH 
“Based on the proposed model, the APAK should cooperate closely 
with the Chamber and use its existing technical expertise. We 
support this [model] and we hope, that the self-administration of the 
Chamber will not be impaired.” (IDW President in IDW, 2004) 
    
I 
“The attempt was to secure continuity through the maintenance of 
the POB members into the APAK Commission.” (Interviewee) 
    
I 
“The idea was to intervene as less as possible into the self-
administration of the profession. For that reason, the APAK was a 
special creation [...] somehow related with the profession, but 
independent, but at the same time, close to the WPK.” (Interviewee, 
political actor) 
    
I 
“The aim was the recognition of the German oversight system by 
the Americans.” (Interviewee, audit profession)  
    
OF 
“It was not about breaking down existing and proven structures and 
to reinvent the wheel, but to find a useful addition and advancement 
for the existing structures.” (APAK Vice Chairman) 
              
LT 
“[The APAK] is not a governmental regulatory solution, and a new 
agency or administrative office is neither necessary nor conducive 
[...]. With that model, we keep on relying on the proven Chamber 
principle.” (Federal Government, 2004) 
National belief 
in efficiency of 
Chamber 
system 
Mytho-
logizing 
    
I 
“What we are talking about is a free profession with self-
administration of the Chamber. The implementation of a regulatory 
agency would have not met with enthusiasm by the profession, nor 
did we [the Government] saw the need for it.” (Interviewee) 
    
MPD 
“With the new oversight committee, we [the legislator] do not want 
to come up with a government solution [...]. This would be against 
the current strategy of bureaucracy reduction.” (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2004c, similiar 2004d) 
    
MPD 
“The profession’s representatives warn to touch the profession’s 
system of self-administration in the course of the new legislation. 
This concern is absolutely supported through the CDU. The system 
of self-administration of the free occupation of the public 
accountants is, as well as the self-administration of the other free 
occupations, a historically developed successful form of professional 
regulation.” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2004e) 
    
MPD 
“It is common conviction of the government and the profession, 
that the new oversight system should not result in the abolition of 
the established structures of self-administration, based on the 
Chamber.” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2004a) 
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Specific design 
of the APAK 
 
Dirty 
Work 
    
I 
“That [the APAK] was somehow a weird constellation. That was 
neither one thing nor the other.” (Interviewee, Political actor) 
    
I 
“Oversight in concrete cases was not possible, but – and they did 
that very well – they evaluated the system in an abstract, general 
way.” (Interviewee) 
    
I 
“I expected a powerful PCAOB-like agency, and then we saw one 
tiny little office within the Chamber of Auditors.” (Interviewee, 
political actor)  
    
I 
“If you want that the APAK is doing things right, than this a full-
time job.” (Interviewee, audit profession). 
    
I 
“In order to save the self-administration of the profession as much 
as possible, a lot of artifices were made when the APAK was 
established.” (Interviewee) 
    
I: Interview, LT: Legal text, MPD: Minutes from parliamentary debate, OF: Official statement published 
in Professional Journal, PH: Public Hearing (Technical Committee of the Parliament), SP: Speech 
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Appendix 14: Examples of Interview Coding for Institutional Work in Stage 3 – Institutional 
Disruption 
 
Source 1st-Order  2nd-Order  Modes 
    
I 
“As I said, it all escalated with the protest vote by WP-Net. 
All the APAK representatives are in the advisory board 
and when they are constantly exposed to attacks, instead 
of discussing other topics, cooperation is impossible. I 
think that is how it must been seen.” (Interviewee) 
Change of voting 
system of the 
WPK 
Dis-
associating 
moral 
foundations 
 
      
I 
“The extent to which it (intra-professional conflicts) exists 
in Germany right now for the auditors, [...] does not exist 
in other professions.” (Interviewee, Political actor) 
Establishment of 
second association 
and 
    
I 
“The WPK [under the leadership of small auditors] held 
positions which were not consistent with the interests of 
the Big Four. That means they have faded out one part of 
the professional group and taken different positions.” 
(Interviewee) 
        
I: Interview 
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“The small auditor does not meet the reality of today’s business anymore […] Small auditors have 
become outdated and should vanish from the market.” 
 (German Executive Board member of a Big Four company) 
 
Chapter 4 
From small auditor dissatisfaction to active resistance: a practice 
theoretical perspective on the “palace revolt” in the German auditing 
profession. 
 
Abstract 
For decades the German auditing profession was governed under the relatively sedate 
supervision of two professional bodies the German Institute of Public Auditors (IDW) and the 
German Chamber of Public Auditors (WPK), both of whom worked in cooperation with the 
Federal Ministry responsible for these matters. This state of affairs was transformed, however, 
after wp.net, a third professional body, was set up in 2005 for small auditors and after it 
subsequently staged a takeover of the WPK, an event since termed a palace revolt by the media 
that reported on it. Based on a practice theoretical perspective, we trace the process that led up 
to these events. We show how the events are related to the differing practices pursued in the 
working environments of small auditors and large audit firms, and in the profession as a whole, 
and we demonstrate, moreover, the role played by a range of knowledge claims that were posited 
in the profession at that time. The most important of these was the successful implementation of 
the peer review in the German audit profession, which represented the decisive knowledge claim 
that got the ball rolling. We also discuss some important implications that might follow from the 
events for small auditors, large auditors, and the auditing profession worldwide.85 
Keywords: small auditors, audit profession, resistance, practice theory, knowledge claim 
  
                                                     
85 This chapter benefited from David Alexander, Jörg-Markus Hitz, Martin Schmidt, and from participants at the 
EUFIN in Paris 2015.  
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4.1 Small auditors: dissatisfaction, resilience or resistance? 
For decades, the German auditing profession was discreetly and sedately represented and 
organized by the German Institute of Public Auditors (IDW) and monitored on a self-regulatory 
basis by the German Chamber of Public Auditors (WPK), working in cooperation with the 
Federal Ministry responsible for these matters. All this changed, when in 2005 small and mid-
sized auditors successfully established a second, separate ‘professional association’, the 
Association for Small and Medium-sized86 Auditing (wp.net) which subsequently led to the 
takeover of the German Chamber of Public Auditors (WPK) in 2011; an event that has since 
been termed a “palace revolt” by the media that reported on it (Jahn, 2011; Wadewitz, 2011). 
Representing as they do a completely unexpected turn of events in the history of the German 
auditing profession, these two interconnected developments, when analysed, seem likely to 
provide us with remarkable academic insights: the two events, taken in combination, are indeed 
so unique and, at the same time, so far-reaching that they merit closer academic scrutiny (Collier, 
2011; Hayek, 1979).  
The events are unique because a glance at the literature on the rivalries existing between small, 
local auditors, on the one hand, and large transnational audit companies, on the other, shows us 
that – quite apart from the fact that these rivalries are still largely under-researched (Ramirez, 
Stringfellow, & Maclean, 2015, p. 201) – local dissatisfaction with, and resistance to, the trend 
towards globalisation, standardisation and adaptation was widespread among small auditors 
(Daugherty, Dickins, & Tervo, 2011 for peer and PCAOB inspections in the US, respectively; 
Durocher, Gendron, & Picard, 2014 for Canada; Fogarty, 1996; Ramirez, 2013 for the UK). 
Given the economic and political power wielded by the Big Four, it is not, moreover, at all 
surprising that the few additional case studies have tended to highlight how transnational audit 
firms have been privileged over local firms in intra-professional conflicts (Caramanis, 1999, 2005; 
Gallhofer, Haslam, & Kamla, 2011; Ramirez, 2010). Our study, by contrast, provides an example 
of more active resistance and an alternative outcome to this intra-professional ‘battle’: despite the 
economic and political dominance enjoyed by the large accounting firms – both at a national and 
an international level – this study describes how an at least temporarily successful mobilization of 
the previously "silent majority" of German small- to mid-sized auditors, culminated in the 
profession's self-regulatory supervisory body, the WPK, being taken over in 2011. Hence, this 
paper provides a counterweight to the vast volume of literature highlighting the national and 
international dominance enjoyed by the Big Four (Suddaby, Cooper, & Greenwood, 2007). 
Almost as an aside it also provides some insights into whether and to what extent, trends in the 
auditing profession such as commercialisation (Brivot, Cho, & Kuhn, 2015; e.g. Citron, 2003; 
                                                     
86 It is important to distinguish medium sized from second-tier audit companies. In this case, medium-sized refers to 
audit companies that are smaller in size than second-tier audit companies. 
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Gendron & Spira, 2010) or the increasing links between economies of scales or size, on the one 
hand, and audit quality, on the other, are inevitable or whether they might not , instead, be 
attributable to the economic and political power exercised by the Big Four and to the latter’s 
increasing evolution away from constituting a profession and towards becoming a (regulated) 
industry.  
At the same time, the two events described are more far-reaching than they might seem at first, 
as they permit us to shed a bright light on what the developments are that are taking place in the 
profession and on how sustainable a unified and self-regulatory audit profession worldwide is. 
The capacity of the Big Four to influence and determine governmental policies at a national level 
and their far-reaching market dominance have been identified by many scholars (Arnold, 2005; 
Boyd, 2004; Caramanis, 2002; Francis, Michas, & Seavey, 2013; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; 
Roberts, Dwyer, & Sweeney, 2003; Suddaby et al., 2007). Increasingly, recent research has begun 
to emphasise the significance of large accounting firms as self-contained actors and their site as 
playing an important role as a generator from which accounting practices first emerge and then 
become standardized (Carnegie & Napier, 2010; Cooper & Robson, 2006). Suddaby et al. (2007) 
predict the onset of an era of post-professional regulation, in which the historical regulatory 
bargain on accounting issues struck between professional associations and nation states "is being 
superseded by a new compact between conglomerate professional firms and transnational trade 
organizations" (Suddaby et al., 2007, p. 334). That said, other voices have pointed to the 
persisting segmentation of Western accounting professions (Richardson, 1987, 1989; Yee, 2012). 
Such debates show that there is still a considerable degree of uncertainty over how the 
accounting professions worldwide will evolve in the future, and this highlights how important it 
is for further research results to be gleaned which, as in our case, permit us to gain insights into 
what the key factors will be that determine which of the potential alternative routes is taken by 
professional bodies.  
Finally, the events are also far-reaching insofar as they have taken place at a particular place in the 
world. Scholars have for a long time argued that the interactions between the accounting 
profession and the state, and between the profession and its various different members, may take 
different forms not only at different times, but especially in different countries (Caramanis, 1999; 
García-Benau & Humphrey, 1992; Puxty, Willmott, & Lowe, 1987; Yee, 2012). Yet, the debate 
over the evolution and revolution witnessed by the accounting profession has been almost 
exclusively dominated by analyses of the professions in Anglo-Saxon countries (De Beelde, 2002, 
p. 448; Ramirez, 2013). As a result, not much is known, either at a theoretical or an empirical 
level, about continental Europe (Caramanis, 2005; Hopwood, 1994). Yet, the forces of global 
standardisation may have entirely unexpected and very different side-effects in different parts of 
the world (for the importance of bearing in mind the side effects arising from the range of 
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professional practices that have not been taken into account by regulators see also Humphrey, 
2008; Humphrey, Kausar, Loft, & Woods, 2011). Moreover, such insights could mitigate fears 
that …”the global promotion of Anglo-American audit methodologies is …undermining the 
capacity to learn from valuable, but less visible, governance traditions” (Humphrey, Loft and 
Wodds, 2009, p. 822). 
Several features make the German case, in particular, interesting in this respect. First, unlike in 
the Anglo-Saxon setting, an accounting profession does not exist in Germany: instead,a strong 
and specialised auditing profession exists that insists on its members undergoing a lengthy period 
of education and on their acquiring vocational experience before they are permitted to begin 
working as an auditor. Moreover, the fact that similar events have taken place in Canada, the US 
and UK allows us to draw particularly insightful comparisons which deepen our understanding of 
the underlying processes and help us take theorising efforts one step further. 
Second, the German economy is still characterised by a fairly strong backbone of small to 
medium-sized businesses which still prefer to use national German accounting standards rather 
than international accounting standards, but some of which, equally, are nonetheless audited. 
This German “Mittelstand” has proved in the past not only to be extraordinarily successful in 
commercial terms (Grottke, 2011; Langenscheidt & Venohr, 2010; Schildbach & Grottke, 2011; 
Simon, 2009, 2012), but also to be form backbone of the German economy at times of crisis. On 
top of this, it provides, in contrast to the situation in many countries, a large and profitable 
market for small auditors in Germany. 
Theoretically, our study is primarily based on a practice theoretical perspective (Nicolini, 2012; 
Schatzki, 1996, 2001). In particular, we demonstrate how the differences in the auditing practices 
displayed by small auditors with a regional or national orientation and those displayed by 
transnational audit firms have, on the one hand, led to their drifting apart from one another, even 
though the desire to maintain the vision of a uniform audit profession – a notion strongly 
imprinted inthe German auditing profession’s collective memory – has, on the other hand, 
persisted. We analyse how the knowledge claim that a peer review needed to be introduced was 
pushed through in the German auditing profession and how it was this that got the ball rolling. 
This knowledge claim seemed entirely legitimate when viewed against the background of the 
practices pursued by the Big Four firms, but it turned out to conflict with the practices pursued 
by small auditors and to pose an existential threat to their survival, or at least to put them at an 
enormous competitive disadvantage, and it consequently provoked their resistance. Based on a 
process perspective, we follow the key players who make up a mixed bag of parties, both within 
and outside the profession, and who are in conflict with each other in complex ways: initiatives 
from one actor produce immediate responses from other actors. As a result, a mutual interaction 
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constantly opens up new decision fields for the actors involved, while shutting down old ones 
(Caramanis, 2005; De Beelde, 2002; Miller, 1990; Puxty et al., 1987; Willmott, 1986).  
The remainder of this paper unfolds as follows. First, we outline the theoretical background to 
our study, our research methodology and the data material. Then we describe the practices that 
characterise the site of by the Big Four,, the site of small auditors and the site of the profession. 
Based on these practices, we show why over the last few decades the pendulum has increasingly 
swung towards the Big Four’s stance and, as a consequence, marginalised the small auditors in 
the market and in the profession. In a fourth chapter, starting with the knowledge claim that 
started the ball rolling, we present a detailed record of the process that led to the establishment 
of wp.net and the palace revolt in the WPK. Subsequent to this, there follows a discussion that 
focuses on the larger theoretical implications of our study before we conclude and point to 
limitations. 
4.2 Theoretical background, research methodology and data 
The basic idea of practice theory is to understand phenomena such as activity, power, language, 
social institutions and transformation as being the result of interacting fields of social practices 
and material arrangements (Schatzki, 1996). Material arrangements are common set-ups 
composed of material entities, such as humans, artefacts and objects (Schatzki, 2005, p. 472), 
with which practices are interwoven. This involves people acting in a way that seems most 
natural and sensible to them and choosing those actions that they perceive to be those that 
should be performed (Schatzki, 1996). Such a conceptualization makes it necessary for us to start 
with the practices that surround the people acting in the field so that we can understand why they 
have done what they have done. According to practice theory, any form of human activity has to 
be set against a certain background or prior understanding, which is basically the practice in 
which it is embedded (Nicolini, 2012). In other words, there first has to be a basis of common 
existence which is more or less unquestioned and against which everything else can take place.  
Our objective is, first, to reveal the key sites of small and large auditors, which are composed of 
practices and material arrangements that seem, at least to the individuals involved, to be beyond 
question and which at the same time structure the current setting (Schatzki, 2005, p. 473). In 
describing practices, we exclude what the literature - taken as a whole - reveals to be individual 
contingencies. Practice theory does not concentrate on contingent specific actions (Ahrens & 
Chapman, 2007) taken by individual auditors, but on the systemic features of a field of practice. 
Given the numerous practices prevailing among auditors, our focus will be on those practices on 
which small auditors and large audit firms take a contradictory stance to each other. Thus, even 
though we have analysed the practices used by mid-size and second tier audit companies, we 
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make no reference to them, as they turned out regularly to consist of a mixture of the practices 
prevailing among small auditors and large audit firms.  
Second, because different practices overlap and evolve over time, we analyse how the practices of 
large and small auditors overlap and in what relationship they stand to the practices used by the 
auditing profession and the practices recommended by their professional bodies (IDW, WPK), as 
well as to the practices seen in the wider regulatory arena.  
Schatzki distinguishes four different characteristics of practices. Practical understandings describe 
whether, in relation to a particular practice, the participants can agree on what the meaning of 
actions is. Importantly, practical understandings show that certain practices on ”how to do 
things” emerge and that they are automatically carried by human actors, who thus become active 
bearers of practices (Nicolini, 2012, p. 166). They form, indeed, a central part of our analysis, as 
practical understandings between small, nationally oriented auditors and large, transnationally 
oriented audit firms increasingly started to diverge, while in the auditing profession itself there 
continued to be a practical understanding that focussed on preserving the uniformity which, for 
so long, had been shared by nearly all of the profession’s members without any dispute (“an audit 
is an audit”) and which was explicitly formulated by the WPK and the IDW on several occasions 
(Lenz, 2014). “Rules are programs of actions that specify what to do” (Nicolini, 2012, p. 166). 
They make people take them into account in their actions. Rules traditionally form a central 
plank of the auditing profession, whose role it is to develop, translate and interpret auditing and 
audit quality control standards that have to be observed and followed by the profession’s 
members. The interesting question, then, is how rules, and thus practices, differed immediately 
before the foundation of the second professional body and how they interacted with the 
practices formerly pursued by small auditors, on the one hand, and large auditors, on the other. 
Teleo-affective structures, as a third form of practices, refer to the purposes which humans 
pursue in carrying out their practices, the set of ends pursued (Schatzki, 2002, p. 80) and the 
affective/emotional colouring that is attributed to these practices. However, this is, again, not 
understood to happen at an individual level; instead, it is seen as being learned with the help of 
instructions, corrections, socialization and a desire to make sense of things and as then being 
reinforced by repetition, sanctions and peer pressure (Nicolini, 2012, pp. 166, 167). Finally, a 
general understanding refers to the reflexive understandings of any given practice and then 
translates, again, into the way in which humans make sense of individual actions (Nicolini, 2013, 
p. 167). This refers particularly to the statements made in public by smaller and larger auditors, or 
by representatives of the profession with a background in fairly small or large audit companies.  
On top of the practices, though, it is also important to conceptualize at a theoretical level the 
events that got the ball rolling within the professional bodies and to see how the different 
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practices respond to major changes. For this purpose, we draw on the notion of the knowledge 
claim. A knowledge claim can be understood as a type of specialized and exclusively owned 
knowledge possessed by members of a profession (or segments of a profession) with a view to 
constituting and controlling a market for their expertise by establishing their cognitive 
exclusiveness (Larson, 1977; Shafer & Gendron, 2005, p. 455).87 
Prior literature has shown that knowledge claims have been strategically developed and deployed 
in the profession’s ongoing attempts to secure and expand its area of work (Shafer & Gendron, 
2005). To our knowledge, the idea that there is a relationship between knowledge claims and 
dominant groups within the profession was broached as long ago as Johnson (1972), who 
emphasized that knowledge claims will be accepted by the profession only when they have been 
accepted by its dominant groups.  
However, he did not reflect on the vital role played by the provenience of the knowledge claim. 
We argue that, when it comes to the question of whether or not a knowledge claim wins 
acceptance, a vital role is played by the origin of the structures contained in it, and in the 
procedures that guide its implementation, that is to say, the question of what field of social 
practices and material arrangements it is rooted in and to what degree it is compatible with the 
practices that prevail among other members of the profession,. In fact, it might even define the 
shape of the profession, in that knowledge claims translate into power claims, which are then 
actively resisted within the profession, and this may end up with the boundaries of the profession 
itself being redefined. Our analysis provides evidence in this respect, because it shows that the 
success of a knowledge claim was fully rooted in only one part of the profession. This got a ball 
rolling that ultimately redefined the boundaries of the profession, generating an ex post wave of 
resistance that ended up with the profession being split and with the still joint professional body 
being (at least temporarily) taken over by a group which turned out increasingly to have been 
harmed by the knowledge claim - a knowledge claim that had previously been successfully 
pushed through.  
Greenwood et al. (2002) argue that to push a knowledge claim through, it is necessary to show 
that there has previously been a failure and that the knowledge claim provides a solution to this 
failure. We argue that practices not only play an important role in pushing through knowledge 
claims, but that it is also vital to observe whether the content of a certain knowledge claim is 
rooted in common practices or merely in practices that are pursued by some members of the 
profession. In those cases where a knowledge claim is successful even though it is only rooted in 
the practices pursued by just some parts of the profession, while being in conflict with other 
                                                     
87 To increase acceptability and legitimacy for the profession it is often argued that the application of the specialized 
knowledge is in the public interest, based on scientific evidence, and that it is “codified enough to educate and 
standardize members” (Shafer & Gendron 2005, p. 455). 
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parts of the profession, this will invariably result in the emergence of a common “enemy” that 
can be addressed by that part of the profession which has been in conflict with the knowledge 
claim. From the viewpoint of this specific part of the profession this then reveals the “true” 
strategic character of the knowledge claim in unifying the forces for countermeasures to be taken 
not only against the knowledge claim but, increasingly, against any activity put forward by the 
professional group that initiated this knowledge claim in the first place. 
With respect to the research methodology, we have chosen a case study format for our analysis 
(Flyvbjerg, 2001; Flyvbjerg, Landman, & Schram, 2012; Silverman, 2013). This is because our aim 
is to provide a study that is at the same time empirically “thick” and richly detailed (Flyvbjerg, 
1998). Mintzberg (1971) suggests that such an approach is a useful tool to depict the life and 
behaviour of actors. Berry and Otley (2004) argue that such studies are particularly well suited to 
our “understanding and theorising the content, processes and context of practice.” As a result, 
they make it possible to be very informative for public policy on practices that prevail in a certain 
area and are useful to practitioners and policymakers (Stake, 2005).  
With respect to the data material, and in line with the literature (Denzin, 2009; Jick, 1979, p. 19; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985), our evidence is based on three different sources. First, we have relied on 
publications, newsletters, and e-mails from members of professional bodies. Second, we have 
taken recourse to publications by researchers and practitioners in professional journals, the press 
and public blogs that try to make sense of the events that have taken place. Third, we have 
carried out a series of interviews both with small, second-tier and large auditors and with 
members of professional bodies, in particular, the key players in the events that took place 
(overall 28 interviews). The interviews were conducted between January 2010 and September 
2015 and lasted between 35 and 200 minutes, with an average length of 80 minutes.88 
In organising the empirical data that emerged, we divided our methodology into two steps that 
basically correspond to the identification of practices and the knowledge claim and its impact as 
such, on the one hand, and to the identification of the relevant factors in, and, development of, 
the process that took place, on the other. With respect to the organization of the data material 
illustrating practices and the knowledge claim, we relied on the Gioia methodology (e.g. Gioia, 
Corley, & Hamilton, 2013). We make use of this methodology to organize empirical data material 
first into categories in the sources’ own terms and then into dimensions that can be derived by 
researchers as commonalities observable over a range of documentary sources. This ensures that 
                                                     
88 In addition to the interviewees listed in Chapter 3, the following individuals were interviewed: partner and founder 
of an audit company in Landshut (small auditor), an auditor in an audit company in Passau (small auditor), two 
partners from mid-size audit companies (Rölfs & Partner, Pöllath & Partner), the CEO of a second tier audit company 
(Senger von Warth und Klein), an IT partner from a second tier audit company (BDO), and a Big Four auditor for the 
banking industry (Deloitte).  
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the dimensions derived can claim to have reached a certain generalisability. In our case, we feel 
this approach is particularly suitable, as we should be able to observe both the characteristics of 
practices and the effects of the central knowledge claim across a range of different sources if they 
have played the role in the course of the events that the paper attributes to them.  
The process itself, however, was addressed by making use of process tracing methodology. 
Process tracing serves the goal of understanding the factual evolution of decision processes and 
their outcomes over time (Langley, 1999). To this end, the data associated with a process is 
systematically collected in order to identify the elements of causal chains, i.e., the causes, 
relationships and effects (Zürn, 1998). It is important to note that we understand causes in this 
respect as being necessary, but not necessarily already sufficient, to trigger certain effects (Mackie, 
1965). On the contrary, it may be true, and in our case is true on several occasions, that a whole 
bundle of mutually self-reinforcing causes is necessary, and that this then leads to a certain event. 
In our case, which is more focused on theory generation (Falleti, 2006), we carried out an 
exploratory and therefore data-driven process tracing (Langley, 1999). This means that we went 
back in time and identified all the links between the two events of interest, that is the foundation 
of wp.net and the palace revolt, with their potential causes presented in the data material. This 
analysis step made it possible to identify causal formations which, while creating a certain 
impression, did not change the fact that interpretation was deliberately avoided (Grottke & Kittl, 
2013). The next step consisted in weeding out apparently implausible causes. The remaining 
observable effects can then be traced back by their causal relationships to the factors that 
triggered them (Hall, 2006) – if necessary, taking into account mediating and moderating effects, 
too. With a view to increasing the insights beyond the individual case study, we have also made 
use of prior studies of a similar nature into small auditors’ reactions, such as Durocher, Gendron, 
and Picard (2014) and Ramirez (Ramirez, 2013). In doing this, we included reflective moments at 
those junctures that ultimately accounted for the differences in the way the German case 
developed, as opposed to the other cases. Our case has the advantage that it is an extremely 
unusual and highly developed case (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 79) which at the same time includes major 
stages of the other cases. This allowed us to take the first steps towards making generalizations 
on effects across several case studies (Humphrey & Scapens, 1996).  
In both steps, our data analysis was enormously enriched by the opportunity to take recourse to a 
mixture of action research formats and independent research (similarly, Gioia & Thomas, 1996). 
More precisely, we profited greatly from the fact that we constituted three authors, two of whom 
were not involved, while the third was involved in the case. While the first and the third author 
provided, independently of the second author, large parts of the empirical data base and drew 
first conclusions, the second author, having been involved in the events from the very beginning 
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and having maintained long-term personal relationships with all of the key players involved, was 
able to refine interpretations and often to shed a far more nuanced light on the events.  
 At the same time, the fact that two of the authors were unrelated to the case allowed us to allay 
concerns with respect to our impartiality and neutrality, as the entire research team discussed all 
deviating interpretations with respect to their plausibility Our further efforts to address such 
concerns involved us, besides accumulating vast quantities of source material, relying on an 
ethnographic approach that covered the different perspectives represented in the case and 
making extensive use of feedback from actors and colleagues before we finalized the text. By 
paying careful attention to the views and perspectives that existed across a wide range both of the 
actors themselves and among distanced outsiders, we were then able to further strengthen and 
deepen our understanding of the events that took place and to repeatedly test preliminary 
hypotheses that evolved during the research process (Hall, 2006). 
It is worth noting that caveats still have to be made over how this data should be interpreted. For 
example, decision relevant aspects like private or secret agreements cannot be captured via 
documents, even when the most intensive investigation process is applied (Langley, 1999). To 
mitigate such concerns, we undertook extensive interviews of the people involved. However, 
even interviews can only mitigate this issue. Interview participants must do more than just 
remember the events that have occurred. They must also understand ex post what exactly the 
significance of certain events was for the course of the resulting process. This may involve the 
causal relationships identified by the interview participants turning out to in fact be the result of 
rationalisations, so that the true mechanisms remain unknown (Bennett & George, 2005). 
However, action research has provided us, in many cases, with the opportunity at least to know 
that still secret areas do in fact exist and it thus helps us to avoid undertaking erroneous 
interpretations. 
4.3 Mapping practices in the professional terrain 
In the following, we first outline the differing sites at which the practices used by small and large 
auditors, and by the profession, take place: these are outcome of the data collecting process just 
described. Moreover, we provide evidence on how regulatory changes in auditing standards, and 
their associated enforcement, have increasingly led to small auditors in Germany becoming 
marginalised. Against this background, we then describe the structural features of the central 
knowledge claim that get the ball rolling and relate its features to the practices observed in all 
three sites. 
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The site of the German small auditors 
The site of small audit firms was characterised, according to our sources, as exhibiting several 
features. First, there was a shared understanding that these firms were regionally anchored in 
what they did. This was visible in a number of characteristics, which related mainly to their 
regional clients or topical foci (e.g. Lenz, 1996), to their regionally anchored audit partners and to 
the regionally anchored work done by their staff. A teleo-affective structure that characterised 
auditor-client relationships was often the value attributed to trust and a long-term relationship. 
As one small auditor put it, this auditor’s practice displays features typical of small auditors’ 
clients:  
“When our client is out there in the landscape with his business, then he occupies a 
position that is based on trust. This is why employees come and work for him, this is why 
he does not suffer high staff turnover. Such people are not interested in short term 
effects.” (Interviewee, small auditor) 
Furthermore, small audit partners follow a holistic approach. They continuously visit the client 
firms’ themselves and thus often have personal contacts, over and beyond the top management, 
with the client’s workforce, too. This is, for example, visible in this characterisation provided by 
one small auditor:  
“We have a SME’s approach to serving clients that is a holistic approach. In other words, 
we attend to our clients’ every need, in all the circumstances of life, and with respect to 
every and any issue that they may have – I am always the key contact person for my 
clients.” (Interviewee, small auditor) 
As these auditors’ staff are likewise regularly employed long-term, continuity is ensured at the 
level of audit assistance. Other important teleo-affective structures relate to explicit marketing 
strategies being avoided and to the status enjoyed by the auditor on the basis of his being – a 
trustworthy expert who has gone through a lengthy period of education before becoming an 
auditor. To a significant extent, there is also the shared practical understanding that one’s own 
judgments and expertise need to be applied in the course of an audit (e.g. recommending certain 
earnings management strategies within legal boundaries). With respect to the rules that govern 
the everyday work done by small auditors, recourse is taken, as a rule, to German GAAP and to 
the Auditing Standards set by the IDW, which are read in German, i.e. in the national language. 
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The site of the Big Four 
The practices characterising the Big Four audit industry differ markedly from small auditors’ 
practices.  
First, the Big Four are globally linked within their networks and therefore have an interest in 
achieving, as far as possible, globally uniform and standardized audit standards. They rely to a 
large extent on a division of labour, which often simply follows the principle of where labour can 
be found at the lowest possible cost. This is associated not only with their relocating part of their 
work to other places in the world and to centralising many functions, such as human resources, 
in departments, but also to their specialising audit practice itself in departments and redistributing 
certain audit tasks to specialists on complex audit issues. With respect to the latter, they have 
(according to Ramirez 2012) created “networks of knowledge-based experts […] articulating the 
cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems, helping states identify their interests, 
framing the issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies, and identifying salient points 
for negotiation” (Haas, 1992, p. 3). Because these Big4 expert networks play such a dominant 
role (see in detail also Humphrey, Loft, & Woods, 2009), Ramirez (2012) argues that the Big4 can 
already be understood as a sort of “shadow standard setter or rather a standard interpreter”. The 
reliance placed on these experts internationally homogenises the audit across countries, 
something that is illustrated by these “experts for high-quality transnational audits including the 
use of ISAs” forming part of an international Forum of Firms, a forum which explicitly aims to 
promote “consistent […] auditing practices worldwide” (IFAC, 2015; FoF Constitution 2011). 
Such standardisation procedures are accompanied with a positive teleo-affective structure, 
because they make it possible for cost savings to be achieved by making use of further economies 
of scale. Moreover, these firms are well placed to benefit from large capital investments, for 
example, in databases and IT-infrastructure, as they can amortise those investment across a large 
client base (scale effects) and different services (scope effect). Having “a considerable number of 
tools that support” them (Interviewee with Big Four Auditor) therefore results in Big Four 
practices becoming enmeshed into a range of different cost-reducing material arrangements. 
As a result, however, in the audit process standardisation and individualisation become divided. 
On the one hand, there are audit partners who have undergone a lengthy period education and 
who occupy a position of trust. However, in the course of the audit process, the latter have to 
coordinate a much larger number of specialists and to delegate work to their audit assistants. As a 
result, they are at the same time often less close to their client firms. On the other hand, there are 
“cheap labour white-collar workers” who do not stay with the auditing firm for long and whose 
task it is to record all the necessary information so as to make sure that standardised and 
predefined criteria are met in a tick box approach. Ultimately, the Big Four audit firms follow 
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much more the logic of industrialised commercialisation by actively pursuing a branding strategy, 
by engaging in efforts to bolster their firms’ public image and by selling, together with their audit 
services, a wide range of non-audit services.  
The site of the German auditing profession 
A third site of importance that deserves separate attention from that of the small and large 
auditors, respectively, is the profession itself. 
In Germany, the two main entities in the auditing profession were the WPK and the IDW. Both 
institutions’ roles are strongly imprinted into the profession’s collective memory. The IDW, a 
private sector organization, was founded in 1931 when the various professional associations that 
existed at this time merged. It serves as the profession’s mouthpiece, particularly in advising or 
lobbying the legislature (Vieten, 1995, p. 488). Although membership is voluntary, almost 83% 
(as of July 2015) of German Public Auditors are members of the IDW. The IDW is also 
responsible for providing technical guidance (‘Facharbeiten‘) by publishing accounting and 
auditing standards, commenting on vocational training issues and translating IFRS. The standards 
are not compulsory in a legal sense, but they are considered to be good practice.89 Departures 
from these standards by an auditor must be justified (Dykxhoorn & Sinning, 1992, p. 84; Vieten, 
1995, p. 488). It is noteworthy that at least in the past a contractual agency agreement 
(“Geschäftsbesorgungsvertrag”) between the IDW and the WPK existed, which ruled that the 
IDW would assist the WPK with respect to technical guidance problems (WPK President Hense 
in WPK, 1998b). The WPK was founded in 1961 as a public sector organization and was 
governed by elected auditors on a honorary basis. Legally, the Chamber’s responsibilities 
included both monitoring and promoting the professional interests of its collective membership 
(Dykxhoorn & Sinning, 1992, p. 85). It is supervised by the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Energy (BMWi), whose approval is required for changes to its constitution. However, as the 
Ministry usually maintained a fairly distanced position, commentators have described the WPK as 
a quasi-self-regulatory agency (Vieten, 1995, p. 507), which played the role of an advocate for the 
auditing profession rather than being an institution whose purpose was to enforce rules 
(Dykxhoorn & Sinning, 1992, p. 85). Until the 1980s, the affiliation between the IDW and the 
WPK was described as one of close cooperation (e.g. auditors served on the committees of both 
organizations) (Dykxhoorn & Sinning, 1992; Markus, 1996; Vieten, 1995). Thus, Harston stated 
that the “monitoring function of the two organizations became practically inseparable and 
indiscernible” (Harston, 1993, p. 156).  
                                                     
89 However, in joining the IDW, members commit themselves to complying with IDW releases which thus acquire a 
quasi-legally binding status (Sahner, Clauß, & Sahner, 2002, p. 16). 
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However, the auditing profession as a whole swiftly changed soon under the impact of European 
legislation. By significantly lowering the thresholds determining whether businesses had to be 
audited, the implementation of European legislation in the German Accounting & Reporting 
Law (Bilanzrichtliniengesetz) of 1985 increased the market for audit services overnight. The 
legislation had triggered major controversies over whether statutory audits should be restricted to 
the auditors’ profession or whether other professional groups such as tax consultants should also 
be entitled to carry out basic audits (Markus, 1996, p. 172). In the end, the auditors were not able 
to defend their turf, and the Act (re)created a second professional group; the group of sworn 
auditors (vBP), though the latter were restricted to performing only statutory audits of the annual 
financial statements published by mid-sized German companies with limited liability. As a result, 
the auditing profession became divided.90 This division also marked the end of the close ties 
between the IDW and WPK, since the WPK had now become the supervisory body for both 
professional groups, while the IDW continued to represent only the interests of the auditors. The 
ending of these ties was also spatially visible in a change of material arrangements: the IDW 
officially terminated the jointly used administrative headquarters in 1990 and moved from Berlin 
to Dusseldorf.  
 The German auditing profession was still united by a number of important practical 
understandings. The guideline “An audit is an audit (later modified to: an audit opinion is an audit 
opinion”) has been shared by many (macro-) actors in the German auditing profession for 
decades. It served as a kind of practical understanding for the auditing profession as a whole, was 
shared by representatives of both large and small firms and was designed to unify the different 
segments of the profession. The professional bodies, i.e. the WPK and the IDW, are prominent 
witnesses for the use of this key guideline in standard-setting disputes. 
 
The WPK has argued for decades with the notion of a unified auditing profession, something 
that can be nicely illustrated with a citation dating back to 1997: “The necessary audit quality 
should be always the same, irrespective of the audit client’s size, the legal form taken by his 
business or the extent to which he uses the capital market. This means that we should strive to 
keep the auditing profession unified and should prevent its becoming split into two” (WPK, 
1997, p. 101). The WPK has stuck to this normative guideline, with one slight modification, to 
this day. “ In this context, the principle applies that the reliability of an audit opinion … voiced in 
a mandatory audit should not depend on whether the audit client is a small or medium-sized 
business or a larger company that might even be of relevance for the capital markets” (WPK, 
2012, p. 24). The principle should not, however, be interpreted to mean that audit practices and 
audit documentation are entirely independent of the type, size and complexity of the firm being 
                                                     
90 Although as of 2004 it is no longer possible to become a vBP, the group of vBP are still represented by the WPK. 
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audited. “To mark this difference more emphatically than hitherto, the Chamber of Auditors 
would like to reformulate more precisely its former statement that ‘an audit is an audit’ so that it 
now reads ‘an audit opinion is an audit opinion’”(WPK, 2012, p. 25). In other words: irrespective 
of what kind of legal entity the audit practice is being applied to, each audit opinion should stand 
for the same audit quality, i.e. the same reasonable audit assurance. This is a view that the IDW 
has always shared, too (IDW, 2012b; IDW President Naumann in Naumann, 2012).  
 
“The application of the principle ‘an audit opinion is an audit opinion’ to audits 
emphasizes that they should be carried out in line with professional judgements and with 
the professional scepticism that should invariably be maintained in the profession. The 
unity of the profession follows from the issuance of audit opinions with the same 
judgement quality, irrespective of the kind, size and complexity of the firm being audited.” 
(IDW, 2012a) 
 
 
A second shared practical understanding within the profession was that self-regulation should be 
maintained and that the threat posed by outside regulation should be minimized (Dörner, 1999, 
p. 126; IDW, 2002; Lindgens-Strache, 1997, p. 262; Marks & Schmidt, 1998a, p. 976; Marten & 
Köhler, 2000, p. 1322). 
 “In the nineties […] the question was debated: introduction of a quality control 
procedure, and the profession’s answer in this debate was that we do that ourselves, and 
the lawmakers said: Okay, if they develop a self-regulatory solution, there is no need for 
statutory measures.” (IDW President Naumann) 
Finally, it was a shared practical understanding that the profession was to decide how auditors 
should be educated so that they attained a sufficient level of quality for them to represent the 
German auditing profession. Traditionally, the educational path took a long time, starting with a 
university degree, continuing with several years spent acquiring auditing experience as an assistant 
and culminating with the individual concerned taking and passing the German auditing 
examinations.  
Marginalisation of small auditors in the German audit industry  
The different characteristics displayed by small and large audit firms that have been outlined 
above have consequences for the way in which audit standards, accounting standards and, finally, 
the enforcement of these things with the help of peer reviews and monitoring systems affect 
both groups in the auditing industry. In this respect, it is important to be aware that the 
background to all of this is that the pendulum has increasingly swung towards favouring the Big 
Four’s practices in the past. 
This is associated, first, with the increasing internationalization of German industry, which had a 
major impact on the German audit profession. In the 1970s, German industry transformed itself 
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into an export industry. Audit firms had to reach a "critical mass" to meet the challenges of 
internationalization (Markus, 1996, p. 157). In order to remain competitive, German auditors had 
to set themselves up internationally - either by merging with international partners or by merging 
with national partners (Markus, 1996, p. 161).  
Second, regulation changed. With respect to accounting and auditing standards, the site of large 
firms is characterised by international standards which require specialist expert information for 
the meaning of the standard to be defined, but which, once the meaning has been defined, tend 
to demand that more non-expert work be done, since this not only allows economies of scale to 
be achieved, but also permits work to be delegated to someone who is merely required to tick 
boxes. In contrast, small auditors are more interested in standards which allow them to make use 
of concrete, tailor-made applications of their generalist expert knowledge that are based on their 
detailed knowledge of their client’s circumstances.  
With respect to audit norms, ISA norms were indirectly implemented in German audit practice as 
early as the 1990s, when the Big Five firms de facto implemented the international requirements 
in their firm-specific auditing guidelines so as to ensure that an identical standard of quality was 
being reached in their international networks (Coenenberg, Haller, & Marten, 1999). Translations 
of the ISA also formally entered the German audit market in 1998, making Germany one of the 
earliest countries in Europe to do this. These audit norms were also subject to formal changes 
and thus entered the scope of small auditors, as international audit standards were more and 
more replacing the formerly national standards set by the IDW. The effect of this transformation 
is, for example, described by the following interview:  
“And I remember that time very well [at the end of the nineties]. In the professional news 
bulletins from the IDW, you received in each issue a new standard that had been 
transformed – this was a gigantic change for the profession. Previously, you had three 
expert opinions and then you had a transposition of the entire ISA into German audit 
standards: that is a direct intervention in real audit practices.” (Interviewee, Big4) 
The structure of the audit market was not unaffected by the developments outlined above. 
Indeed, the consolidation of the audit market, characterised by an oligopoly of the "Big" audit 
firms (first Big Eight, then Big Five and then Big Four) 91 increased steadily. The studies of Lenz 
(1996), Lenz and Ostrowski (1999), Möller and Höllbacher (2009), Köhler et al. (2010), Wild 
(2013), Leidner and Lenz (2013) all show that the audit market became heavily and increasingly 
consolidated, especially for listed clients, banks and insurance companies. These markets are 
dominated by the large audit firms, especially the BigN-firms.  
                                                     
91 Markus (1996, pp. 156 – 167) provides a thorough review of the mergers between German audit firms and national 
or international audit firms. 
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Marginalisation and the teleo-affective emotion of feeling dominated describe exactly how small 
auditors felt about this, and that was mirrored in our interviews. In an interview carried out with 
a small auditor, the business environment for small auditors was felt to be dominated by the Big 
Four, while a certain sense of helplessness was widespread: 
“The Big four dominate the world of audit, they dominate the IDW, they dominate the 
WPK and often they dominate even within the ministry in which the adoption of 
accounting standards is discussed.” (Interviewee, partner in a small audit firm) 
 
It is interesting that the way these audit and accounting standards evolved, and the way small 
auditors felt about this development, largely run parallel to small auditors’ experiences in Canada, 
as exhibited in the study done by Durocher et al. (2014). Durocher et al. (2014) focus on the 
impact of a globalizing standardization movement on the sites of small practitioners, who can be 
seen as a marginalized group, and look at how the latter react. Their analysis indicates that small 
practitioners in Canada adopted a logic of resistance when dealing with global standards in the 
context of their everyday realities. This logic “sustains a climate that marginalizes small 
practitioners’ capacity to reflect on the ends of professional work” hampering emancipatory 
thinking and behaviour (Durocher et al., 2014, p. 5). The active resistance, i.e. the “refusal to 
accept new “standards of practice and [the] endeavours to fight against implementation” 
(Durocher et al., 2014, p. 8), undertaken by wp.net, which were triggered by the implementation 
of a disciplinary technology, can be interpreted – in stark contrast to the Canadian case – as an 
attempted emancipatory and reflective act by small auditors.  
 
There are some notable differences between Canadian and German small auditors that might 
account for why the resistance witnessed in the case of Canada went further in our case, 
progressing from resistance to outright opposition.. Thus, it should be noted that even today 
small auditors have a significant share in the German mandatory audit market, since the degree of 
consolidation seen in the audit market for privately held companies is much lower than in other 
countries. Based on a sample of 284 large privately held family businesses for the financial year 
2009, Dobler and Fichtl (2013, p. 169) calculated – that the market share accounted for by the 
Big4-firms stood at 43.66 % (number of clients), 57.85% (audit fees), respectively. More 
generally, it should be noted that with respect to the audit market for non-public interest entities 
(non-PIEs), which in Germany can be estimated to comprise between 33,000 and 50,000 
companies that are obliged to have their financial statements audited, small and mid-sized 
auditing firms in 2013 accounted for a market share that stood at the not inconsiderable figure of 
roughly 57% (based on the number of clients; database BvD Dafne). For the period from 2002 
to 2009, Loy (2013, p. 330) reports that mid-tier and smaller firms accounted for a similar market 
share of 59 % (based on the number of clients; database: BvD Dafne). These numbers should be 
interpreted cautiously, since in contrast to the audit market for listed firms, we do not have more 
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detailed studies showing the degree of consolidation in the statutory audit market for private 
firms. However, the figures do at least show that small auditors had certainly not been 
marginalised in the non-PIE sector during the time period investigated. Still it should be note 
that these differences are not sufficient to explain the differences between Canada and Germany. 
After all, in Canada, too, an association of small practitioners called Groupe Servicas was 
founded with the goal of developing technical tools and support for small auditors (“support 
mobilization”, Durocher et al. 2014, p. 22 et seq.). However, in contrast to Germany’s wp.net 
association, no explicit political lobbying strategy has been developed and only a few minimal 
signs of active resistance are reported in the data collected by Durocher et al. (Durocher et al., 
2014, p. 26 et seq.). In sum, the description of the site of the small auditors (the audit practice) in 
Canada is similar to Germany, but interestingly the reaction or “coping strategies” (Durocher et 
al. 2014, p. 22 et seq.) displayed by the small practitioners is different. Despite some similarities 
with respect to mobilization, the Canadian small auditors did not engage in forms of active 
resistance. In this respect, it is interesting to note that a predecessor of wp.net was established as 
early as 2002. However, shortly after its establishment it foundered as a result of internal conflicts 
over the organization’s strategy, as the two co-founders (one of whom was the later wp.net 
founder Michael Gschrei) disagreed (wp.net, 2008c, p. 11) over whether to choose a version of 
wp.net that would focus more on offering various forms of ongoing aid in the form of seminars 
and workshops, along broadly similar lines to Canada, or whether it should engage in active 
political lobbying on behalf of small auditors. Thus, a further step was needed, which then led to 
the establishment of wp.net.  
The emergence of the knowledge claim that got the ball rolling 
By the end of the last century, Germany was among the few countries in the European Union 
that had not yet established any form of external audit quality assurance mechanism (FEE, 1998). 
External quality assurance only existed in the form of checklists for the internal control system 
provided by the IDW (Hammers-Strizek, 1999; Marks & Schmidt, 1998a). However, at the end 
of the 1990s the German auditing profession came under pressure from both national and 
international developments.  
At the national level, the revelations exposed by the collapse of various domestic companies 
triggered intense debates over the scope and function of traditional statutory audits (Heck, 2006; 
Lenz, 2011; Martens & Pauly, 2000). The debates resulted in the Corporation Control and 
Transparency Act (KonTrag) being passed in 1998, an act aimed at improving German financial 
reporting and corporate governance (Eierle, 2005; Lenz, 2011). Even during the legislative 
debates on the KonTrag, a mandatory peer review system was debated, but the accounting 
profession made it clear that any questions related to quality controls should be solved by and 
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within the profession itself (Marks and Schmidt, 1998, p. 976), thus reaffirming the focus on self-
regulation that has already been outlined above as forming the self-perception of the profession 
that is shared generally by its members.  
Parallel to the debates at the national level, in the U.S. the NASDAQ stockmarket further upped 
the pressure to introduce a peer review system by changing its listing requirements. The new 
provisions required that listed companies had to be audited by firms whose quality control 
systems were externally reviewed. This was particularly crucial for German businesses, since at 
the time German audit firms involved in statutory audits of firms listed on the U.S. stockmarket 
represented the second largest group, after the UK (WPK, 2004b, 2005, p. 8). With the deadline 
for implementation set for February 1998, the IDW came under considerable pressure from the 
large audit firms to campaign for the introduction of external quality controls as soon as possible. 
Following internal debates within the IDW, a technical committee on “Quality Assurance” was 
set up between the WPK and the IDW to explore how the IDW’s demand for quality controls 
could be realised (WPK-President Hense in WPK, 1998a, p. 47). 
Initially, the WPK and IDW pursued different regulatory modes (WPK-President Hense in 
WPK, 1998b). Since its global perspective was a priority for the IDW, it favoured a system as 
close as possible to the AICPA system. This was viewed critically by the WPK, which favoured a 
system that would impact the traditional self-regulatory understanding of the profession as little 
as possible. In the initial committee on quality control responsible for this issue in the WPK, 
significant influence can be seen to have been exercised by the large audit firms (for example, at 
the meeting on November 5th, 1999 (WPK President Hense in WPK, 1999d)). The committee 
comprised 11 members (one member had permanent guest status), six of whom were 
representatives of the large audit firms. More important than mere numbers, however, is the fact 
that, basically, the Big Four were already acquainted with the peer review system, giving them an 
informational edge which allowed them to exert a strategic advantage in its design.92 When a 
consensus was then reached between the IDW and WPK, it thus came as little surprise that the 
committee followed the position taken by the IDW and announced that it proposed to establish 
a peer review in November 1998 (Committee Chairman in WPK, 1999a). In March 1999, the 
WPK management board voted unanimously to introduce a peer review system under the formal 
supervision of a Public Oversight Board. The introduction of the peer review system required 
amendments to be made to the WPO (Law Regulating the Profession of German Public 
Auditors) (WPO-Novelle). As changes to the WPO have to be passed by the Federal Parliament 
(Deutscher Bundestag), the WPK and IDW demanded a legal initiative from the Ministry (WPK, 
1999b). 
                                                     
92 It should be noted that this, of course, made later on also a difference for quality control auditors. Thus, it was 
recommended sometimes that quality control should be carried out by an auditor of similar size (e.g. Ludewig, 2001). 
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A peer review as a regulatory instrument was unknown to the Ministry, so the latter depended on 
the large audit firms’ international networks, which “the doors” to the AICPA and SEC 
(interview, Hammer-Strizek). In November 1999, policy advisors at the BMWi and 
representatives of the WPK and the IDW paid a joint visit to the AICPA headquarters and were 
introduced to the U.S. AICPA peer review system. The experience garnered with the system was 
further illustrated by representatives of KPMG (WPK 1999c, p. 235).  
The internal WPK/WPK board discussions were accompanied by attempts to convince the 
accounting profession of the need for such a system. This was rather difficult, because one 
practically shared understanding contradicted the other generally shared understanding. As one 
German auditor pointed out, from an educational viewpoint a peer review was seen to make 
simply no sense at all, given the selection and education process undergone by auditors in 
Germany:  
“The peer review, that is, the idea that someone is going to come and monitor the 
auditor, was never accepted. In the US that might be different, there people can take 
their CPA within three weeks. In such circumstances, it makes sense to check what they 
are doing, because this depends entirely on the practical experience provided by the 
audit company at hand in such a case. However, in Germany, when I have to have 
undergone a thorough, five year education, when I can only become an auditor at the 
age of 33 and when I need to prove that I have ten years practical experience in 
auditing, the situation is completely different.” (Interviewee, audit profession) 
Thus, an additional shared understanding of the profession was mobilised: In various essays and 
statements by the WPK board members published in the WPK-members journal it was pointed 
out that the debate at the European level (e.g. Green Paper) suggested that the European 
Commission would soon be issuing its own legal requirements. Thus, the time window for 
establishing a specific national system that at least ensured self-regulation in broad terms – rather 
than the profession becoming subject to European regulatory initiatives – would, it was argued, 
close soon, as becomes visible in the statement by the former WPK-President Hense: 
“If we [the profession] want to prevent the issue [external quality reviews] being initiated 
and organized by the lawmaker, we have to be prepared to tackle this question ourselves.” 
(WPK President Hense in WPK, 1998b)  
In addition, the establishment of a peer review system was seen particularly by the IDW and the 
large audit firms, but not infrequently by smaller auditors, too, as constituting a marketing tool to 
demonstrate high audit quality.  
“When these questions were addressed in the late nineties, everyone assumed that this [the 
introduction of the peer review] represented a perfect marketing tool for the profession.” 
(Interview, IDW President Naumann) 
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In April 2000, the government published the first draft of the bill (WPK, 2000, p. 113), which 
almost exactly mirrored the proposal made by the IDW and WPK. As both the initiative and the 
design of the legislation had been undertaken in line with the wishes voiced by the IDW, it was 
later described as a "law on demand" (Kluth, 2000). Eventually, in October 2000, the bill was 
passed by parliament without further amendments and without being the subject of controversial 
debates (WPK President Wahl in WPK, 2001, p. 38). The necessary amendments to the 
professional statutes of the WPK were passed unanimously at an extraordinary meeting of the 
profession (WPK, 2002).  
Under the law, the peer review was made mandatory for all statutory auditors and audit firms in 
two phases and it involved every auditor undergoing a peer review every three years. It is 
interesting to observe that this law went beyond the Recommendation made by the European 
Commission, which demanded quality controls only for audit firms with public interest clients 
and which envisaged a six year cycle rather than three years (European Commission, 2000). The 
Act stipulated, furthermore, that an attendance certificate (“Teilnahmebescheinigung”), 
confirming the auditing firm's successful participation in a peer review, should be made a 
prerequisite for conducting statutory audits. Auditors and auditing firms of stock corporations 
that were listed on a regulated stockmarket (formerly “amtlicher Handel”) required this certificate 
in order to be able to perform audits for the financial years beginning after December 31, 2001 
(phase 1). For all other statutory audits, the certificate was required for audits beginning after 
December 31, 2005 (phase 2). Moreover, after 2007, in the event of the annual financial 
statements being audited by a firm without this attendance certificate, the auditor’s approval of 
the accounts became invalid (§ 256 I Nr. 3 HGB). In other words, auditing firms that had not 
been peer reviewed were excluded from the audit market.  
Clearly the knowledge claim resonated well with the practices that we have observed in the case 
of the Big Four: It addressed public quality concerns and was a suitable marketing tool, and it 
even permitted improvements to be made to the firms’ own delegation-based auditing practices, 
which relied heavily on a systems-based delegation of tasks to less highly skilled workers. 
Moreover, a quality control system had already been introduced on the basis of the fairly 
standardised and uniform approach to undertaking audits worldwide that were offered by these 
companies, so in terms of the costs involved, it was a zero-sum game (Engelken, 2005). 
However, at the same time the knowledge claim conflicted with the practices pursued by small 
audit practitioners: Thanks to their long-term relationships with their clients, they did not need to 
restore lost trust or to rely on marketing tools. Moreover, since they were often one-person 
practitioners, they as a rule had neither any practice of quality control nor any system for 
documentation. For them, the peer review therefore often involved their having to build up an 
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entirely new, additional quality control system to document controls that had already functioned 
more or less efficiently previously (Heininger & Bertram, 2003), and this represented an 
investment that their clients were not willing to pay for.  
4.4 The foundation of a second professional body for small auditors 
The mobilization of small auditors was set in motion by several simultaneous developments. First 
of all, an institutional body was set up: In 2005 wp.net was founded. At first, the small auditors 
seemed to be sceptical: at the date of its foundation on January 22, the association’s first meeting 
was attended by just ten auditors and one sworn auditor (Gschrei & Lahl, 2015, p. 22), and 
regional meetings of the association were attended by only a handful of auditors (wp.net, 2006a). 
The newly founded wp.net swiftly took up the issue of the peer review and positioned itself in 
opposition to the IDW (wp.net, 2005).  
The speaker of the IDW board, Prof. Dr. Naumann in November 2005 didn’t expect any 
“significant consequences” for the market structure, since “only a few firms will withdraw from 
the statutory audit market” (IDW President Naumann in Engelken, 2005, p. 16) and the 
lawmaker even expected in 2000 that “the peer review would enhance the competitive abilities of 
small and medium sized auditors in comparison to large auditors […] in the medium-term the 
profession in its entirety will certainly participate in the system” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2000, p. 
24). Michael Gschrei, president of the newly founded association of small practitioners wp.net, 
by contrast feared massive economic consequences for small auditors: “With the help of the 
argument that the small (auditors) have not passed the peer review, the way will be paved for 
large (audit firms) to take over audit clients who will be available because of over-
bureaucratization” (Engelken, 2005, p. 13). 
As a result of the time lag until audit firms without issuer clients were obliged to be peer 
reviewed, the impact of the peer review system on the audit market was not immediately visible. 
There were nevertheless a few signs of what was to come. In December 2003, a WPK survey 
(with a response rate of 45.4 % of the 8,900 polled) of 4,040 audit businesses (1,262 audit firms; 
2,778 sole practitioners) indicated that 87.2 % of the audit firms (1,101) but only 49.1% of the 
sole practitioners (1,364), i.e. 61 % of all respondents intended to participate in the quality 
control system (WPK, 2004c, p. 11). 
Then, in 2006 the last chance came, and many auditors who up to this moment had not 
participated in a review missed their opportunity. Motivated by the shared practical 
understanding of the profession, the procedures followed in a peer review were identical across 
all auditors. Within the IDW, this had been explicitly demanded by those in the group of small 
auditors who had feared that different procedures could lead to perception arising that there was 
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a first class composed of auditors with peer reviews and a second class made up of auditors 
without these. However, it now turned out that this had a boomerang effect: unlike large 
accounting firms, the vast majority of small auditors did not possess the technical skills and/or 
financial and human capital needed to carry out the procedures demanded by a peer review. A 
"shock wave" was triggered in the profession's small auditors segment (Gschrei, 2009a, p. 5): in 
the years following the introduction of the peer review, widely differing IDW and wp.net 
estimates assumed that between 20% and 70% (Waldthausen & Gschrei, 2011, p. 100) of the 
audit firms93 and 90 % of the sworn auditors had left the audit market. 2006 then marked the 
final year of the first review round, an occasion which was used by wp.net to offer seminars on 
quality controls and on IFRS (Gschrei & Lahl, 2015, p. 22).  
Even earlier, the debates on the various different quality controls for different audit firms had 
received fresh impetus, after U.S. lawmakers had passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. The act 
introduced additional governmental PCAOB inspections only for audit firms with public interest 
clients. This did not, however, replace the peer review, as AICPA's peer review system was 
retained. 
The law stated that the specific provisions relating to the process and requirements governing 
peer reviews should be determined by secondary legislation (“untergesetzliche Regelungen”), and 
this took the form of a charter for quality assurance (§ 57c Public Accounting Act/WPO) issued 
by the WPK and adopted by the Advisory Board of the WPK (Beirat), which also required the 
approval of the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Technology, in consultation with the 
Federal Ministry of Justice, to become effective. Both the law and the bylaw were the legal basis 
for the new quality assurance system. Two things which, while not legally binding were of 
considerable practical relevance insofar as it represented recommendations backed by the WPK 
and the IDW were the joint statement “Requirements on Quality Assurance in Audit Practices” 
(VO 1/2006) and the auditing standard IDW PS 140: conducting quality controls in audit firms, 
implemented in 2008) released solely by the IDW. Small auditors demanded that the relevant 
standard should include and consider more explicitly the principle of proportionality 
                                                     
93 It is difficult to quantify the precise number of  audit firms, which left the audit market. While the WPK 
and IDW estimate that around 20 % left the audit market, WP.Net reckon that 70 % left the audit market. 
These widely differing estimates by the respective lobby groups cannot be validated, because the number 
of  audit firms who were operating in the audit business before the peer review was introduced is not 
known. What can be said is that by the end of  2006 only 31.8 % (4.180) of  13,134 audit firms (sole 
practitioners, partnerships or incorporated businesses or other entities of  professional accountants) 
successfully completed a peer review or obtained a temporally limited exceptional license. This percentage 
increased to 33.8 % in 2010 and dropped to 29.2 % in 2014 meaning that 70.8 % of  audit firms currently 
have no licence to do statutory audits. 61.81 % of  all German auditors (including 4,050 sworn in auditors) 
were working in these firms in 2006; this percentage remained more or less stable until 2014 (62.18 % of  
14,407 auditors). If  we conservatively assume that before the introduction of  the quality control system 
only 50 % of  all the roughly 13,000 audit firms (6,500) were actually in the audit business, an estimated 
decrease of  36 % to 4,180 can be calculated.  
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(Verhältnismäßigkeit). Indeed IDW PS 140 is conceptually based on a detailed audit (not review) 
of the quality control system with a strong emphasis on an evaluation of the appropriate 
performance of selected financial statement audits. Emphasizing the importance of the shared 
practical understanding in the profession ("an audit is an audit”), however, the IDW refused to 
make any changes (Müller, 2004).94 
In addition, it was argued that the “Requirements on Quality Assurance in Audit Practices” (VO 
1/2006) reflected the standards on quality control commonly used internationally (ISQC and ISA 
220). The difficulties were increased not just by the fact that the Institute’s first manual on quality 
controls was only published a couple of years later, but also by the fact that it was not perceived 
to be very helpful (interview with Michael Gschrei, founder of wp.net).  
The European Directive of 2006 heated up the debates on external quality controls even more. 
The fact that the Directive used the term “review” rather than “control” and that it did not 
require any form of “certificate attendance” was interpreted by wp.net as proof that the IDW and 
WPK had intentionally overstepped the mark when established the German peer review system 
in order to “purge” the audit market of small auditors. This accusation was then repeated 
constantly in members newsletters, annual reports, in discussions with political representatives 
and on the association’s website, which was launched at the end of 2006. It was fuelled still 
further when a further legislative change added to the conflicts: starting in 2007, additional 
inspections – undertaken either randomly or in the event of any signs of misconduct - for 
auditors and audit firms that performed statutory audits for public interest entities (§ 319a (1) 1 
HGB) were introduced. 
Moreover, wp.net started actively political lobbying: in 2006, the association was officially invited 
to the Ministry for a first consultative meeting, which was seen as a first political success (wp.net, 
2006b). In the course of the 7th amendment of the Law Regulating the Profession of German 
Public Auditors (WPO Novelle), the association received an invitation from the relevant 
committee of the federal parliament, which was seen as “the crowning of our political efforts” 
(similiar wp.net, 2007, 2008b). The discussion highlighted once more the differences that existed 
between the IDW and wp.net. With regard to the new introduced inspections for audit firms 
with public interest clients, the IDW demanded that inspections should be limited to audits for 
public interest clients (Deutscher Bundestag, 2007). Citing the increase in costs, the threat of 
even greater consolidation in the audit market and disproportionality, wp.net argued that all of 
these arguments should have been mentioned at the time when the debate had centred on 
                                                     
94 However, it should be noted that in the commission for quality control there was no unanimity on this issue. On the 
contrary, even quality control auditors from the Big Four emphasized that the size of the audit company played a 
central role in what could be expected with respect to the quality control system of an audit company (Müller 2004, p. 
118). And even in the IDW, at the very beginning of the discussions about the peer review system it was proposed to 
introduce a mandatory peer review only in the event of their being listed clients (Marks & Schmidt, 1998b, p. 987).  
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criticisms of the audit, when they would have been far more justified and necessary (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2007; wp.net, 2008a, p. 13). The political campaigns were accompanied by constant 
attacks on the IDW (e.g. wp.net, 2007). 
 
However, at the beginning of 2007, the mobilization of small auditors by the new association had 
still not reached a critical mass and meetings and gatherings had to be cancelled because of the 
low number of participants (wp.net, 2007). However, the effects of the peer review, which 
seemed to have been followed by exactly the effects feared by wp.net, in combination with the 
absence of proportionality, on the negative side, and the positive lobbying activities, on the other 
hand, led to the IDW being increasingly perceived critically by small auditors and to its being 
accused of working on behalf of large audit firms rather than for the profession as a whole. It 
should be mentioned that the Big Four contribute approximately 57 % of the IDW membership 
fees (Lenz 2014, p. 317). It makes sense to compare this juncture of the events with the 
developments in other countries, namely, the US and the UK. 
In the U.S., in 1976, the AICPA initiated a voluntary peer review programme (Giroux, Deis, & 
Bryan, 1995, p. 65) for member firms. The programme was opposed by smaller audit firms, 
which considered the costs of a review process to be excessive (Fogarty, 1996, p. 244). As a 
result, many firms left the program. Although the idea of a mandatory programme was frequently 
discussed (e.g. in the Anderson Committee of 1983), it was not implemented as it was argued that 
the costs would lead to a substantial erosion of membership (AICPA, 2005). This explains why 
the review programme never attracted a critical mass of practicing auditors, especially in the 
AICPA Private Company Practice Section (PCPS) (Niehus, 1993, p. 148 et seq.). In other words, 
small auditors in this region of the world, at that stage, did not need to organise themselves 
because there was no substantial threat that the peer review would become compulsory.  
In April 1987, however, the AICPA asked its members to vote whether the participation of the 
peer review programme should become mandatory for CPA firms auditing one or more SEC 
clients (White, Wyer, & Janson, 1988, p. 27). Again this was rejected by the profession because 
the necessary two-thirds majority has been missed but “61 percent of the 130,000 respondents 
voted affirmatively” (White et al., 1988, p. 27). But now peer review became a divisive topic for 
the auditing community, pitting small audit firms that opposed it against larger firms that 
supported it (Fogarty, 1996, p. 244). The latter became (in)directly supported by SEC, which 
threatened to launch a government review program in case the profession would keep on 
rejecting peer reviews. This caused the AICPA to start broad-based lobbying actions, which 
resulted in a second vote in January 1988. Now AICPA members voted to adopt a mandatory 
peer review system for members engaged in the practice of public accounting (Huff & Kelley, 
1989, p. 35). Nevertheless, a significant minority of almost a quarter of the members still 
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opposed the introduction of a mandatory peer review in the final ballot (Berton, 1988). However, 
the AICPA peer review for auditors of private companies considered the specific situation of 
small local practitioners. Within the responsible AICPA quality review committee 11 out of 12 
members were local practitioners, three were sole practitioners who “understand how local firms 
operate in the real world” (Huff & Kelley, 1989, p. 36). That may have contributed to a greater 
peer review acceptance by small practitioners.  
The U.S. profession developed over the years and in different phases also a more differentiated 
review system: a peer review for members of the AICPA division for CPA firms prevailed with 
respect to their clients subject to SEC regulations, SECPS (later on SOX regulations replaced 
peer reviews by PCAOB inspections) on the one hand, while non-SEC clients were reviewed 
under the Center for Public Company Audit Firms (CPCAF) Peer Review Program (PRP) on the 
other hand; audit firms with only private audit clients were subject to the AICPA Peer Review 
Program, either as a System Review for audits and similarengagements or as an Engagement 
Review for firms which perform other accounting work including reviews and compilations 
(Dennis, 1997; Freundlich & Webb, 2000).  
The U.S. case proved further that the real factor that drove out the small auditors from the U.S. 
public audit market was governmentally induced. In particular, research has revealed that 
PCAOB regulation drove many small audit firms out of the issuer audit market (Daugherty et al., 
2011; DeFond & Lennox, 2011; Hermanson & Houston, 2008; Read, Rama, & Raghunandan, 
2004). The PCAOB defines a small audit firm as an audit firm that regularly audits 100 or fewer 
issuers each year; these firms are inspected triennially. 95% of audit firms that are triennially 
expected have fewer than 10 clients (DeFond & Lennox, 2011, p. 25). Read et al. (2004) 
demonstrated that small audit firms were much more likely to cease performing SEC audits in 
the post-SOX period than in previous periods due to the perception of a more stringent 
oversight by PCAOB. 
Hermanson and Houston (2008) found that particularly small audit firms were not able to solve 
their quality control defects within one year. The vast majority of quality control defects were 
related to audit performance issues, followed by independence, monitoring and addressing 
identified weaknesses, partner workload, and review of interim financial statements. The results 
indicate that firms that inadequately addressed their quality control defects were among the 
smallest audit firms in terms of partners and employees per client. Daugherty et al. (2011) 
showed that PCAOB inspections are associated with voluntary client losses. The figures show 
that small audit firms voluntarily resigned from their clients because the costs associated with 
regulatory compliance outweighed the benefits of auditing publicly traded companies. DeFond 
and Lennox (2011) revealed that the audit market is not negatively impacted by the exit of audit 
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firms from the issuer audit market. They found that from 2002 to 2004 almost every second 
small audit firm left the audit market. The exiting firms were of low quality, less independent, and 
more likely to be the target of PCAOB enforcement actions than the remaining auditors. 
In comparison with the case of Germany it is interesting that some similarities exist: When the 
peer review was introduced for AICPA member firms this was done because the professional 
self-regulation and therefore a key shared value was at stage because it was threatened to be taken 
away by governmental action. What is different, however, is that (i) in the first stage the peer 
review was voluntary, (ii) in the second stage AICPA members voted in a democratic process 
with respect to compulsory peer reviews, and (iii) the AICPA seemed to consider more explicitly 
the implications of peer reviews for small practitioners (Huff & Kelley, 1989). Furthermore, 
whereas the AICPA is a private law body with voluntary membership (i.e. an exit option is 
available) which, by the way, may also explain the more democratic process, the WPK is a public 
law body with mandatory membership for every audit practice, i.e. German audit firms with the 
intention to perform mandatory audits can’t escape the quality control procedures and all official 
seal engagements according to Art. 57a Para. 2 Sentence 2 WPO (e.g. voluntary audits, reviews, 
compilations) are subject of a peer review.95 This increased pressure in Germany may have 
contributed to the mobilisation of small auditors. It should also be mentioned that since 2005 the 
German system should be described as “monitored peer review” because the law maker installed 
the independent German Auditing Oversight Commission which oversees and has the right to 
overrule the WPK according to Art. 66a Public Accounting Act (WPO). Moreover, it was rather 
the local U.S. SEC than outside pressures from a supranational body like the EU or the U.S. as in 
the German case in which the local government rather paved the way for the profession to 
decide on its own how to react to the international challenges. Later on, in the U.S. case a 
governmentally installed oversight system drove smaller auditors out of the public audit market 
and not a peer review system. The higher liability risk for auditors in the U.S. may have also 
contributed to a greater acceptance of the peer review (Fogarty, 1996, p. 248). The comparison 
between the U.S. and Germany shows that there are many different factors possibly influencing 
the reaction of small auditors on peer reviews and because no explicit study in the U.S. context is 
available we can only conjecture that the above mentioned factors may explain the different 
behaviour of auditors in the two countries.  
The German case also differs from the case of the UK. In a detailed descriptive and 
interpretative study without explicit reference to a theoretical framework of the ICAEW policies 
from 1961 to 2000, Ramirez (2009) illustrates the growing tension over the decades between the 
                                                     
95 It should be mentioned that in the US some State Boards of Public Accountancy require also the enrollment in a 
Peer Review Program for licensed firms performing audits if such firms are not members of the AICPA. For example, 
such a requirement was recently introduced by the Florida State Board of Accountancy as of January 1, 2015 
(www.ficpa.org/content/Members/PeerReview.aspx).National State Boards administer also separate Peer Review 
Programs, i.e. audit firms can choose between AICPA or national programs.  
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interests of small practitioners, who constitute the majority of the members, and the larger audit 
firms, who are said to dominate the Institute. However, unlike the German case at that stage, 
counter measures were taken by the professional bodies in the UK case. The ICAEW 
commissioned reports to explore ways to better realign the heterogeneous interests and also tried 
to maintain the privilege of self-regulation against the growing regulatory influences. The 
Institute did not pursue the possible option of dividing the membership into different divisions 
and setting up bodies to represent these divisions. Instead, in this phase (1983 – 1990) it tried to 
improve the communications with, and the education of, the small practitioners via the creation 
of a General Practitioners Board. “The small practitioners were no longer distant citizens of the 
ICAEW. They were now its lay citizens, who needed to be educated and taught to become good 
citizens” (Ramirez, 2009, p. 397). In other words, the small accounting firms were not, as they 
were in Germany or Canada, left stuck on the periphery, but instead they were re-integrated yet 
simultaneously stigmatized – something that never happened to the small auditors in Germany. 
 Inspired by the Eighth Auditors Directive, the ICAEW and two other professional organizations 
founded the Joint Monitoring Unit (JMU) for quality control purposes for registered auditors as 
early as 1987. This led to raucous complaints by small practitioners (“heavy-handed and 
unwarranted enquiry of audit regulation inspections”, inspectors behave like a “professional 
Gestapo”, Ramirez 2009, p. 398 and p. 400) over standards created by and for the larger firms; the 
latter issue is developed in a more general way in Ramirez (2012). According to Ramirez 2009, p. 
858), the introduction of the Joint Monitoring Unit (JMU) in 1987 led “to attributions of worth 
that are deemed unjust” by small practitioners, who get more or less the “bad or inferior auditor” 
label in comparison to the elite members (the BigN-firms). Such criticisms and a report 
undertaken by the academic Peter Moizer in 1994, however, resulted in a fundamental change in 
the inspection process. In other words, unlike the German IDW, the main professional body 
reacted to the emerging criticisms. However, despite these efforts to calm down small 
practitioners, the introduction of a quality monitoring mechanism made the formerly implicit 
hierarchy explicit and “demonstrated how small practitioners could collectively be associated 
with an image of ‘bad practitioners’ (Ramirez, 2009, p. 405). Therefore, rather like in the German 
case teleo-affective structures such as the feeling that they were being treated unfairly, incited 
anger and resentment and triggered the foundation of the Small Practitioners Association (SPA) 
in 1996 with the goal of increasing small practitioners’ influence at the ICAEW (Ramirez 2013, p. 
860). The association operates currently under the name of The Society of Professional 
Accountants (SPA) and represents about 1200 chartered accountants throughout the UK 
(http://www.spa.org.uk/about-spa/). As a result, we find that in the case of the UK, too, a new 
professional body emerges, albeit one which was much less aggressive than its German 
counterpart, probably because the ICAEW reacted much faster than the IDW and because it was 
more willing to compromise. In Germany, however, as a consequence the story was still not 
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over. At this point, the WPK, which was subsequently to be the scene of a palace revolt, moved 
to the centre of conflict. 
4.5 The Palace Revolt 
Membership of the WPK is mandatory for all German auditors. Every three years, all members 
have the right to vote on the composition of the Advisory Committee (Beirat), from whose ranks 
the Board of Management (Vorstand) is elected. Until 2010, only members who attended the 
Chamber's general meeting had the right to vote. In addition, it was possible for a member 
attending the meeting to exercise the proxy votes of up to six absent members. This electoral 
design resulted in very low voter turnouts. The general meetings were, on average, attended by 
around 5 % of all members.96 By virtue of the proxies granted, almost one fifth of all members 
elected the new WPK President.97 This system came to favour the large accounting firms (Sack, 
2011, p. 150), which were able to systematically collect absent colleagues’ proxies and cast these 
votes at the meeting. Thus, backroom meetings among the large accounting firms determined 
who was to be the president of the chamber: "It was an open secret that the winner of the 
election had already been chosen before the election took place" (Interviewee, Big4). The specific 
election system therefore represented a serious obstacle for the group of small auditors who 
wished to turn their political dissatisfaction into political participation.  
Even in the course of the general elections of 2002, a group of small auditors proposed (but at 
the last moment refrained from) going to court, and in 2005 the newly founded wp.net did 
indeed go to court (wp.net, 2009). However, on both occasions, the courts declined to intervene, 
as the design of the electoral system was seen as something, which ought rather to be discussed 
within the profession.  
At the end of 2007, the relevant Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht) dismissed the 
association's challenge to the WPK election of 2005 (VG Berlin, decision as of October 31, 2007, 
13 A 40.07 in WPK 2008a). Again, the new association seemed to be stalemated, as it seemed 
barely feasible to find intra-professional solutions. While the first political successes had been 
won, the profession still played a rather passive role, and because of the lack of political support, 
on the one hand, and the lack of support from the profession's association, on the other, the 
chances of initiating significant changes remained marginal. A new strategy had to be found 
(wp.net, 2007) that was capable of politicising the small auditors in the profession. 
                                                     
96 In the election of 2005, 400 members attending the meeting cast proxy votes for round about 2,000 auditor votes 
(wp.net, 2008b). In the election of 2008 622 members of the group of the auditors participated. This amounts to a 
participation rate of about 4.8 %. As each individual present could vote for up to six absent auditors, the 622 
represented around 2,656 auditors and 170 audit firms (WPK, 2008b, p. 7). 
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In 2008, the association officially announced its collaboration with PRIMUS, which was one of 
the leading national providers of training and workshops for mid-sized auditors. In addition, 
PRIMUS was enjoyed a nationwide reputation for its daily blog, which was written by a member 
of the auditing profession who obtained a good deal of insider information from various 
different sources and in which it spread news about the German auditing profession. It was 
regularly launching strong attacks on the IDW, the WPK and the Big Four. At the general 
assembly of 2008, members of wp.net proposed introducing a postal vote, something which was 
opposed by the WPK President (Gschrei, 2009b, p. 30). Although the proposal was rejected, 
40% did in fact vote in favour of the proposal even at this stage. The movement was slowly 
getting into gear. At the same time, the association intensified its own political lobbying activities. 
At that time, the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Technology (BMWi) responsible for 
this issue was headed by a member of the CSU (Christian Social Union), the Bavarian sister party 
of the Christian Democratic Union. As the new association was located in Munich, the natural 
material arrangements facilitated its communications with the Ministry. In April 2010, the 
Ministry invited the WPK and representatives of wp.net to discuss possible solutions with a view 
to calming down a conflict, which had already reached a fever pitch. The Ministry agreed to 
change the WPK’s electoral system and, after the German parliament had passed the 
amendments to the WPO (Bundesgesetzblatt, 2010), the Chamber changed its statutes and 
electoral regulations in January 2011 (WPK, 2011a). This huge success for wp.net was 
commented on in various national newspaper stories. Reacting to the inspections that had been 
introduced for statutory auditors with public interest clients, the association successfully 
challenged plans to have the resulting costs borne by the entire profession, rather by only that 
segment with public interest clients.  
In addition, the association received support from the European Commission. In October 2010, 
the Commission launched the EU Greenbook, a consultation on the role of the auditor in the 
financial crisis and potential remedies. In particular, critical attention was paid by the 
Commission to the fact that most EU Member States showed high levels of consolidation in 
their audit markets for listed companies (European Commission, 2010), and this marked the 
beginning of a regulatory process that ended with the Regulation and Directive of 2014. The 
European legislative proposals helped to mobilize wp.net because it had clearly positioned itself 
in opposition to the IDW. From the 700 comments which Commission received, the vast 
majority came from (identical) wp.net submissions (wp.net, 2011). While the IDW opposed these 
initiatives (IDW, 2011), wp.net welcomed major parts of the reform (Gschrei, 2015a). Unlike in 
previous years, the WPK and IDW were not able to reach a compromise supported by the entire 
profession (Lenz, 2014). At the end of 2010, wp.net had between 900 (Primus, Newsletter 18, 
January 2011) and 1,000 members (Gschrei & Lahl, 2015, p. 24).  
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The following months were shaped by intense election campaigns by wp.net, which were 
accompanied by attacks from PRIMUS. The main points pursued by wp.net were the 
introduction of a minimum fee scale to avoid price dumping (Honorarordnung), changes to the 
peer review system, and support for several proposals made by the Commission, such as those 
on joint audits and audit rotation. Moreover, it directly accused the WPK of intentionally 
understating the number of auditors who had left the market as a result of the peer review system 
(wp.net, 2009). The attacks from PRIMUS, on the other hand, not only added rhetoric to the 
election campaign, but also contributed a considerable degree of what one might call investigative 
journalism. They were essentially composed of five strategies, all of which were pursued at the 
same time:98 The first pillar was to present as much evidence as possible that was liable to deflate 
the reputation enjoyed by the Big Four as honourable members of the profession (“cartel”, 
“driven by greed”, “PwC betrays…”).99 The second pillar was to provide as much evidence as 
possible on network relationships between the Big Four and the IDW and WPK, with evidence 
being produced that both were flaunting professional values (e.g. “speaker of the IDW has 
provided the qualified opinion for KPMG”).100 The third pillar was to provide evidence that 
served to damage the reputation of key figures in the professional bodies (e.g. on the IDW 
president: “Sun King Klaus Peter”) creating the impression that they were driven by money and 
                                                     
98 To provide at least a scant impression of the way in which the four strategies were pursued see the following 
footnotes. In addition one has to take into account how enormous the effect of this newsletter was in a profession that 
had previously been characterised mainly by absolute understatement. 
99 E.g. Newsletter 15, 2010: p. 7-8: “the cartel of the Big Four“, “Lex Big Four“, (in the newsletter 19, p. 5: Lex Big 
Four & IDW”) “E & Y prosecuted because of Lehman Brothers“ “PwC is lending out staff to the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs (Wirtschaftsministerium), and now an investigation is being undertaken to see whether it has 
breached the professional values of the forbidden self-audit.“ p. 9: “Deloitte […] plays in the club of the Germany 
Corporation (Deutschland AG) – this has nothing to do with auditing, but it is good for business, market 
consolidation and the satisfaction of greed.“ Newsletter 14, p. 2: “Who has provided unqualified audit opinions to all 
the banks with their gambling business – our elite (PwC and KPMG) - the revenue billionaires” Newsletter 18, 2011, p. 
4: “PwC intends to have audits done in low-wage countries to save costs.”, p. 5: “Big Four have initiated an 
unprecedented war on audit fees that is to the detriment of the entire profession.” p. 6: “For years, extraordinarily risky 
derivatives have been booked erroneously (in this bank). An internal audit (not by E & Y, of course) has now detected 
57 errors that accounted for 121 million less profit.” p. 9: “Big Four were responsible two years ago for ensuring that 
no statutory regulations governing fees came and that advertising was allowed” and now: “discounts of 30% compared 
with the fees of the previous year. What makes this possible?-Unduly low staff levels, masses of inexperienced audit 
staff. […] Driven by greed and a deluded drive for expansion, they have destroyed the reputation of the entire 
profession,” Newsletter 20, 2011, p. 2: “Let us be very clear on one point: The false audit opinions during the financial 
market crisis all came from the Big Four and now the EU Commission will look at whether the representation of the 
interests of the Big Four (he means the IDW) wanted that or not.” p. 9: “PwC betrays the owners of Yukos […] How 
can this be reconciled with our professional values of conscientiousness and responsibility? What values are still 
supposed to apply at PwC?” 
100 E.g. Newsletter 16, 2010, p. 5: “From being an IDW president to being a crashed pilot […] he was formerly IDW 
president, […] career at KPMG […] was said to be a bearer of great hopes […] now the prosecutor is investigating“. P. 
11: “KPMG changes its auditor…For years the speaker of the IDW has provided the qualified opinion for KPMG, 
even though he was with the board of KPMG in the same committee […] I informed the professional supervisory 
body which did not, however, see a major problem in that.“ Newsletter 14, p. 3: “Do these people still reflect on the 
fact that they are jeopardizing even the little reputation that has been left to the profession? Big mouth, gigantic audit 
fees, 99% unqualified audit opinions – and no legal third party liability for anything.” Newsletter 17, p. 9: “E & Y 
prosecuted”. Newsletter 19, p. 2 (reacting to the Big Four being criticised by a second-tier audit company’s CEO: 
“That morning reading the newspaper was fun, because the Big Four “ were hit where it really hurts.”  
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the quest for luxury and that they relied on propaganda rather than transparency.101 The fourth 
pillar consisted in providing evidence on how small auditors, that is the “true profession”, had 
been marginalized, and the last pillar was, finally, a call for active resistance102 establishing wp.net 
as the association that is fast-growing and “without alternative” to be elected103 in order to 
pursue this resistance.104 Essentially it was this mixture of seriously good quality and the ever-new 
insights unearthed by investigations, scathing political rhetoric and the repeated assertion that the 
alternative was to spring into action that accounted for the Primus newsletter in the end having 
more than 5,000 subscribers, and over 2,000 clicks per day on its homepage (Newsletter 19, 
February 2011) from readers who were eager to hear about, and get worked up over, every new 
wave of scandals or at least the amusing rhetoric offered in the newsletters. 
The conflicts between the WPK and IDW, on the one hand, and wp.net, on the other, intensified 
when the IDW refused to compile a single electoral list. Hence, the accounting profession for the 
first time had to choose between two electoral lists. Directly before the elections, all 17,000 
members were mailed by the WPK and informed about the election and the electoral programme 
                                                     
101 E.g. Newsletter 16 „Sun King Klaus Peter“, Newsletter 17, p. 3ss: “fat six-digit salary for Klaus-Peter including 
driver and international stage” Newsletter 19, 2011: “driven by filthy lucre. Someone is finally unmasked and revealed 
to be a hypocrite, destroying his own reputation” Newsletter 18: “WPK spends millions on advisory agreement with 
EX-IDW member of the board […] which Ex-IDW will be the next one to get millions paid out of our membership 
fees?” p. 8: “survival in boasting and pomposity”, Newsletter 14, p. 3: “Propaganda department of the IDW (public 
relations)- Öffentlichkeitsarbeit”. Newsletter 17, p. 7: Difficult thing: On the one hand E & Y board member (the 
audit company that triggered the EU greenbook with its unqualified audits for Lehman brothers) and on the other 
hand president of the WPK, which represents the profession (mostly small and medium-sized auditors). Arguing 
against the greenbook would mean arguing in the interests of the market leaders. However, arguing for the greenbook 
would involve being clobbered by the Big Four at home.” Newsletter 19, p. 3: “Board members of the Big Four or our 
representatives of the professional bodies are quite clear: greed, holding onto market share, pension rights, power and 
influence. One of the best examples: The propaganda department of E & Y (our WPK president).” Newsletter 14, 
2010, p. 6: “Quiz: Who will be the next WPK president? […] Big Four and “approved” second-tier audit companies 
represent alternatingly the president […] in 2011 we would expect then a second-tier that lets the Big Four “do as it 
pleases”. […] The Big Four accept bets because they know the result of the election already.” Newsletter 14, 2010. p. 
11: “ You are highly motivated, have your career still ahead of you and want to engage in the profession? Forget it. If 
you are not part of the old boys network and are not tested and do not fit in with the strategy of the Sun King […] and 
the Big Four, then I’m afraid you are on a hiding to nothing.”  
102 E.g. Newsletter 16, 2010 p. 8: “I have said years ago: the Big Four will go their way! They don’t give a damned shit 
about the future of the profession. The IDW and WPK are used as an alibi if necessary. When will the time come 
when we understand that we cannot stay on the sidelines, but have to take our future into our own hands?“ Newsletter 
14, p. 10: “The Big Four will dominate the 11 billion audit market, purge the market, cross-subsidize etc. Other 
professionals must prostitute themselves at predatory prices, will be hectored on quality by the WPK and IDW, 
exposed to regulatory madness and then stalked by the professional oversight body.”  
103 Newsletter 20, p. 11: “In July there are elections – for the first time per mail. Thanks to the initiator of the mail 
election. Wp.net was not tired to fight against all obstacles of the WPK for the election […] And we will elect! 
Promised!“ 
104104 E.g. Newsletter 18, 2011, p. 10: Incredible from only 120 members in 2006 to 900 members now. On the way to 
true opposition […] wp.net is without alternative! Still one heres the arrogance of the network IDW –WPK – Big Four 
[…] but the times are changing”, Newsletter 16, 2010, p. 8: “My recommendation: Go to wp.net! There is no 
alternative!!!! It is time!“ Newsletter 14, 2010, p. 3: “After many members of the profession increasingly understanding 
that the IDW does not represent the interests of the entire profession wp.net has terrific increases in membership […] 
wp-net is without alternative for small and medium-sized audit companies.” Newsletter 19, p. 12: “wp-net without 
alternative. Therefore: You should also become a member to help to ensure our professional objectives. I am there: 
Membership number 131.” 
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(Gschrei, 2011). By contrast, IDW and Big Four remained fairly calm and trusted in their 
economies of scale.105 
Wp.net won the WPK election in 2011; the voter turnout was 50.2%, a sharp increase that was 
attributable to the postal ballot system and that provided a significant majority (WPK, 2011b). 
Under the majority voting system, all 51 seats on the Advisory Committee went exclusively to 
wp.net representatives. The Big Four were “shocked” (Interviewee, Big4). For the first time in a 
very long time, the composition of the Chamber’s Management Board did not turn out as 
forecast. This radical change in the Chamber's organization was so extraordinarily unexpected 
that it was dubbed a “Palace Revolt” (Jahn, 2011; Wadewitz, 2011) by the media. That the 
absolute number of votes for wp.net was higher than the number of its members shows that the 
new association was able to attract votes from all parts of the profession. However, the success at 
least of its key protagonist, Michael Gschrei, did not last for long. A mere six months later he 
was induced by internal conflicts106 to resign as the new president of the WPK. In the most 
recent election in 2014, candidates of wp.net won the most votes. However, the newly 
established electoral system of proportional representation allowed its opponent to form a 
coalition and thus to provide the next president, and wp.net members did not get any seats on 
the WPK management board.  
4.6 Discussion  
The following discussion will focus on five key topics. First of all, making use of case-based 
theorisation (Humphrey & Scapens, 1996), we will shed light on the theoretically interesting fact 
that in our case small auditors were able to organise themselves and to start actively resisting. 
Second, we will discuss the role played by the new media, in particular blogs, in this event. The 
last three points worthy of discussion focus on implications for both small and large auditors and 
for the profession(s).  
Were we to rely on standard political theory, then we would not have expected small auditors to 
have been capable of organizing themselves, while the few big audit companies might indeed 
have been expected to be able to organize themselves. The rationale behind this logic of 
collective action in the seminal work of Mancur Olson (1965) is precisely that the effort needed 
by small auditors in comparison to the effect reached, together with free-riding opportunities, 
                                                     
105 Probably the perceived superiority in terms of members - while more than 13.000 public auditors were member of 
the IDW, Wp.net still did not have more than 1000 members - made them feel safe. 
106 Two reasons lay behing the resignation. First, Gschrei rejected the proposal by the IDW and APAK to transfer the 
authority for the inspections of audit firms with public interests clients to the APAK. However, the majority of board 
members supported the proposal, which was why he resigned in March 2012 (wp.net, 2012). A second reason for the 
President's resignation was that the employment contracts for the WPK's managing directors were extended for 
another five years by the outgoing President (a Big Four partner) without his giving notice to the incoming President, 
an act that was (probably correctly) deemed by Gschrei to be a breach of trust. 
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create incentives that deter them from taking action, whereas a few large players both influence 
and simultaneously benefit events to an extent that they can organise themselves quite easily. 
When we analyse the developments from this angle, then we can identify several key factors that 
enabled the two events described above to happen. However, and this is an interesting point in 
comparisons drawn from a range of countries, they were all sufficient rather than necessary. First 
of all, it seems that there was already a climate for small auditors in which they exhibited signs of 
resistance. However, as we have seen, such a climate also existed in other parts of the world (e.g. 
Canada), but did not lead to similar events. Then it seemed as if it was, in particular, the success 
of the knowledge claim, that is, the introduction of a far-reaching mandatory peer review system 
for all auditors with statutory audits in 2000, that was the last straw that broke the camel’s back. 
While only a few small auditors suspected at first that the introduction of the peer review would 
lead to facing a further competitive disadvantage, it became increasingly obvious that the quality 
argument was far outweighed by the costs in the context of small auditors’ practices. However, as 
we learned from the comparison with the case of the U.S. the peer review while being again – 
together with other causally relevant conditions – a sufficient condition could not have played 
this role alone; rather it was important that it was enforced under public law and that within a 
short time period this made its effect visible. Only then did it lead to the foundation of a separate 
professional body. Finally, the comparison with the UK showed us that more than the 
establishment of a second professional body was necessary to produce the palace revolt that took 
place in Germany, but not in the UK. Three more elements were necessary to make that happen: 
First, the institutional requirements that allowed small auditors to vote in absentia needed to be 
installed. However, while this was certainly necessary, it was still not sufficient, because the 
ICAEW, too, allowed voting to be done online or by post, fax, SMS (text) or telephone 
(Paragraph 26, ICAEW Council: Election Regulation).107 Second, they needed to be mobilised by 
arguments. This happened because the IDW allowed wp.net to take counter-positions that were 
revealed to be valid. As was becoming all too clear, the German peer review confronted small 
German auditors with disadvantages and it imposed more and not – as previously argued by the 
IDW – fewer burdens on them. This gave wp.net additional credibility, as its prediction that the 
peer review would enormously worsen the situation of small auditors, and that large numbers of 
them would be swept out of the market increasingly materialized (at least partly). Each further 
step taken by the IDW and wp.net was then interpreted in the light of the previous events, so 
when inspections for audit firms with public interest clients were introduced in 2007, it was again 
argued that the disproportionate system tended to push small audit firms with public interest 
clients out of the auditing market (Gschrei, 2015b). Third, wp.net allied itself with PRIMUS and 
thus gained an invaluable partner that vociferously propagated it as being the one and only 
alternative left for small auditors – a message that reached even the smallest audit firm in the 
                                                     
107 Even the electoral system of the AICPA is based on a “mail ballot system”. 
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country. This finally mobilised the small auditors to an extent that allowed them to win the 
election at the WPK in 2011. 
At the same time, it is interesting from a theoretical perspective to see what role was played by 
the media in this case. As we demonstrated, the PRIMUS Blog played a big role in the course of 
events: Before this alliance, wp.net was well-nigh invisible, after this alliance it became widely 
known and rapidly gained new members among the small auditors. This was, moreover, done in 
a fairly polemical way that reinforced the already existing teleo-affective structures of resistance at 
the site of small auditors. Three roles are fulfilled by this aggressive means of communication: 
the role of surveillance (and this time not for the small auditors, but rather for the professional 
bodies and the large audit companies) and the role of dispersion and therefore politicisation and 
the role of interest representation. These roles were implemented along with the above 
mentioned five communication strategies.108 With respect to the first role, surveillance, we noted 
in the interviews with key players how cautious they had become and how they tried – in 
anticipation – to take potentially detrimental reactions to their own actions into account. Within 
the WPK, the WPK managing director noted:  
“There was a clear cultural change in terms of transparent structures and processes, for 
example, as reporting guidelines for the advisory and executive board were introduced.” 
(Interviewee, WPK managing director) 
Within the IDW this had, for example, the effect of mobilising small auditors on other occasions, 
too, in this institution, as in the case of joint audits:  
“The Big Four were against [joint audits]. And initially the IDW was also against joint 
audits, however, when the small and mid-sized auditors made it clear that they wanted 
them, we had to acknowledge that we had no mandate with respect to joint audits from 
our members.” (Interviewee, WPK managing director) 
Another example that demonstrates how wp.net has left its mark on the IDW is that in the latest 
IDW comment letter on the new EU Directive, the IDW itself argues (finally, after fifteen years 
of fighting against any relief for small auditors) that it is of the opinion that the attendance 
certificate represents a market entry barrier that should be eliminated (IDW 2014). This is 
particularly noteworthy when compared to the British case, in which the inspection process was 
“interpreted as a means for large firms to surreptitiously impose their conception of 
professionalism on other members of the profession” (Ramirez, 2013, p. 860). Here it was 
argued that the Big N-firms had an interest in legitimizing their dominant position because they 
were not the de jure standard setters (Ramirez, 2012). One way for them to do this is to suggest 
that they are members of a profession dedicated to the public interest, so the attempt to 
                                                     
108 The first three communication strategies can be assigned to the surveillance and politicisation role and the last two 
strategies address the role of interest representation. 
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attenuate the small practitioners’ criticisms and restore a new natural order was in the interests of 
the large firms, too. A decisive measure was to redesign the inspection approach along the lines 
of the proposal made in the Moizer report, e.g. decoupling the audit situation from the 
inspection situation (Ramirez, 2013, p. 864). “Peace was restored to a professional body where 
small auditors could be ‘great’ firms again” (Ramirez 2013, p. 862), but the price they paid was 
that they had to accept to a large extent the working patterns of the larger firms. In the German 
case, large firms and the profession likewise try to sustain the impression that they are part of a 
profession that is dedicated to the public interest. However, they were forced to learn that there 
was a small bull terrier whose only activity appeared to consist in sniffing around to see whether 
their honeyed words corresponded to their actions and to start aggressively broadcasting even the 
slightest potential violations far and wide across the entire profession.  
One recent example is the outcome of the election of 2014, which was used to point out once 
again the democratic shortcomings displayed by the Chamber: "If one Big Four member is 
elected onto the Management Board based on 892 votes, while the representative of wp.net with 
11,214 is not, then this illustrates a rather strange understanding of democracy" (wp.net, 2014). 
The second visible effect consists in politicisation. Before the palace revolt, the majority of public 
accountants employed in the Big Four or medium-sized audit firms showed no interest at all in 
the all too distant activities of the Chamber nor in the politics of accounting regulation in general 
(Interview with IDW President Naumann). Today the PRIMUS Blog (nowadays called WP 
Watch) and the wp.net newsletters have become a kind of a daily tabloid for auditors who are 
indeed able to raise topics that are subsequently discussed among auditors. What remains open 
so far is the quality of the newsletters and the Blog and the question of whether the subsequent 
discussions are still shaped by arguments or rather by surrounding teleo-affective structures on 
which, as Schumpeter (1992) famously put it, “less intellectual capacity is wasted than on a bridge 
game” (Schumpeter, 1992, p. 415). This might make such activities and their effects something 
that should be feared rather than desired. So far, the evidence is mixed: Points that are well worth 
discussing and transparency frequently alternate with wild, baseless accusations. 
Finally, the events described above do not just a bright light on the profession, but also raise 
many points worth discussing with respect to the sustainability of the business models used by 
both small and large auditors. We will address them in the following remarks, which will be 
structured to address the questions raised with respect to small auditors’ business model , with 
respect to large auditors’ business model and with respect to the implications of the future roles 
played by professions in the German audit industry. 
With respect to the small auditors’ business model the question has to be raised as to the 
significance of the events. Did the founding of their own, separate “professional body” imply 
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that small auditors can stop the increasing marginalization? For this to hold, they would need to 
ibe able to make a sustainable case for their remaining competitive. Over and beyond mere 
lobbying, they would have to demonstrate why it is still better to rely on small auditors, even 
though their services can probably not compete on price with services offered by the Big Four 
companies. Indeed, the site of small auditors indicates that there might be convincing arguments 
for the survival of small auditors. They include such arguments that small auditors may be able to 
provide long-term relationships not only at the partner level but also with respect to the 
workforce and that, as less delegation is involved, they possess a more holistic view of their 
clients’ business. Similarly, they have the advantage of being able to build up over the long term 
relationships of trust that are so characteristic for members of professions. In this respect 
Jonnegard (2012, p. 70) notes: 
 
“For smaller firms, the profession and support from the professional association are 
probably more important for the legitimacy of the auditor than they are for the larger 
firms. This might explain why auditors from smaller firms argued for balance in intra-
professional relationships.” 
At the same time, small auditors have to face up to the fact that economic and regulatory 
developments have promoted a situation in which the central knowledge claims of the auditing 
professions, i.e. the interpretation and application of IFRS and ISA, QC-systems characteristics, 
are defined by larger audit firms, and particularly by the Big4 networks, or national (IDW, WPK, 
AOC) and international (IFAC, IAASB) professional associations that are strongly influenced by 
the larger firms. Moreover, increasingly IT is employed in the course of audits to reduce audit 
costs. With respect to the regulatory environment, small auditors are therefore crucially 
dependent on the existence of a professional body that lobbies on their behalf and prevents any 
undue regulatory burden being imposed on them – a function which is now actively being taken 
on with more or less success in Germany by wp.net. Even then, however, it is open to question 
whether such a profession for small auditors has the capacity to ensure that a proper education is 
undertaken that can serve as a quality signal and that is able to lobby on behalf of its members on 
a credible basis. It is, after all, this that brings to the fore experts who are in a position to 
mobilise enough expert knowledge. Wp.net is in this respect at a critical stage now. On the one 
hand, it frequently manages to launch successful and well-thought out lobbying efforts and to 
reveal the disadvantages suffered by small auditors. On the other hand, it has also acquired the 
reputation of being a collection of grubby urchins within the audit profession, as it has on several 
occasions sought to engage the public by airing less well thought-out proposals and criticisms, 
which has consequently created the impression that a small group of people are engaging in a 
personal vendetta, rather than that professional politics can be pursued in this body. 
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With respect to economic developments, it is worth discussing whether small auditors can 
organise themselves so as to realise the benefits of specialisation and thus counter the price and 
margin pressures that they face at the market place. In this respect, it is interesting that the peer 
review triggered precisely such deliberations over specialisation and market-based cooperation 
between different small auditors with a view to reducing costs per unit (Engelken, 2005). 
With respect to the business model used by the Big Four companies, common practices raise 
questions which amount to exactly the reverse, that is to say, which focus on the degree to which 
further specialisation can take place without the audit firm losing the holistic view that is so 
decisive for its professional character and that allows it to portray itself as an expert beyond the 
pure industrialised market forces that compete on price. In this respect it has often been stressed 
that in the US the former audit profession has already turned into a common or garden, regulated 
audit industry (Catasus, Nellman, & Humphrey, 2013, p. 46). Moreover, it is fair to ask how far a 
business model that is based more on capturing an ever large market share from small auditors 
and on increasingly generating additional work by successfully lobbying to increase the 
complexity of financial statements, and thus the amount of work that has to be done by auditors, 
can really be said to be successful. After all, it is not inconceivable that there may be a backlash 
once those who prepare the accounts realize more and more that the benefits do not justify the 
costs. Indeed, it should be noted that some years after the introduction of IFRS, preparers of 
accounts at index listed companies engaged in a widespread change in their audit opinion 
commissioning practices that resulted in an enormous decrease in audit fees (Manager Magazin, 
2010). What is also worrying is the fact that compared with other industries, there is an absence 
among large audit firms of more than just incremental innovations that secure the long-term 
survival of the industry (Catasus et al., 2013). In this respect, it might be one important aspect 
that “innovation means learning to be different” – and that it is important to ensure that global 
convergence does not end up creating pressures to conform that eliminate any scope for auditing 
practice to learn from differences (Humphrey, Kausar, Loft and Woods, 2011). 
Taken together, all of this raises questions about “one size fits all” measures. We believe that one 
reason for the at least temporary success enjoyed by wp.net might have to do with small auditors’ 
unwillingness to accept the notion that “one-size fits all” measures are in fact appropriate. 
Different types of audit firms might be valuable for different companies, and this should be 
communicated lucidly without reaching judgements on the question of whether an audit is first 
or second class. As our interviews revealed, for example, small auditors are regularly better at 
offering tailored solutions, as they approach their clients more from a generalist perspective than 
from a specialist’s perspective. The opposite is true of large audit firms, which certainly provide 
better and more uniform quality when it is a matter of complying with separable and complex 
laws and providing cost-efficient tick-box audits. Such differences provide, in our view, 
  
 
204
promising avenues for research on whether the trend towards market consolidation are, in fact, 
desirable or not, and whether they are market driven or more politically driven (Humphrey, 
Kausar, Loft and Woods, 2011). 
Last, the events are important when it comes to the future of the auditing profession and its self-
regulatory bodies. In this respect, it should be noted that the attractiveness of the audit 
profession as an employer has suffered enormously in the recent past.109 Given that practices 
increasingly differ between small auditors and large audit companies, it must indeed be asked 
whether a division of the profession into different specialised professions is not a necessary 
consequence of the different interests (Lenz, 2014) that arise as a result of the practices that 
prevail at the different sites. We might face here what Nicolini (2012, p. 167) characterised as a 
trigger to changing practices: “It is through such disputes that practices continually evolve in 
response to changes of circumstance. Conflict can continue until there is at least a basic 
agreement about what is acceptable or not in practice. When such an agreement falters, practices 
cease to exist, or the camps split, and the practice is divided in two or more distinct practices.” 
These disputes – with the introduction of a peer review system into the German audit profession 
being the trigger that got the ball rolling – could explain how a palace revolt could take place in 
the end and how a division between different segments of the audit profession could happen. 
Before the introduction of the QC-system, starting in 2002, every certified public accountant 
(Wirtschaftsprüfer) could do an audit of the financial statements; every member of the German 
audit profession could benefit from the knowledge claim of the whole profession. Since the 
introduction of the QC-system, the profession has been split up into two parts: one segment 
which has passed the QC-test and obtained the certificate it needs to do audits of financial 
statements, and another segment which does not participate. The introduction of an additional 
inspections system by the Auditor Oversight Commission (AOC) for auditors of PIE-clients has 
further segmented the audit profession into specialized auditors for PIE-clients and non-PIE-
clients. In practice, the knowledge claim for the PIE-segment, which since 2005 has had to set up 
its financial group statements in line with IFRS, is more or less dominated by the Big4-firms 
(Ramirez 2012). As a result, a once unified audit profession – in the eyes of the public and the 
profession – which argued that an “audit is an audit” and that in principle every member could 
do an audit is now clearly separated into different segments with different and conflicting 
knowledge claims. Such developments nurture the suspicions of Humphrey, Kausar, Loft and 
Woods (2011) that “an audit is an audit” will only remain true at the most basic level of 
specification, while the audit itself can be expected to differ very much depending on the context 
                                                     
109 Three different indications can be put forward in this respect. First, whereas 1,141 examinees have participated in 
the German CPA exam in 2004, ten years later this number decreased by 48 % to only 596 examinees (WPK, 2004a). 
Second, also the number of newly appointed auditors has decreased. This has even led to the IDW initiating an image 
campaign among pupils and students ((Klein & Naumann, 2015).Finally, also the attractivity of the discipline auditing 
at universities has decreased (Klein & Naumann, 2015, p. 568). 
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in which it is undertaken, the professionals who deliver the service and the regulation of the 
profession. However, even then a comparison between Canada and Germany – which both 
provide evidence of the observable and well-documented fragmentation within the audit 
professions – reveals that small auditors might end up very differently. Small practitioners in 
Canada “were reportedly marginalized and virtually expelled from the audit market” (Durocher et 
al. 2014, p. 29) and if they tried to stay in the audit business they were increasingly seen as 
“second-class auditors” who should be closely monitored, “especially through bureaucratized, 
panoptic-like controls” (Durocher et al. 2014, p. 32). This conclusion can be applied to the 
German audit profession, too, but in stark contrast to Canada, where small auditors “willingly 
accepted to be monitored and to monitor themselves in the conduct of their professional 
activities” (Durocher et al. 2014, p. 33), we document in our paper a very strong form of 
opposition and resistance to the above mentioned bureaucratic controls. Durocher et al. (2014, p. 
37) found small practitioners’ “propensity to accept their peripheral and marginalized status”, 
while we found that small auditors emancipated and – unlike the case of Canada – distinguished 
themselves clearly as “the true profession” from the audit practices seen in Big Four companies 
and the traditional professional bodies. Indeed, they started themselves to monitor and if 
necessary to discredit audit practices in large companies as being unworthy of the members of an 
audit profession. Generally, these audit professions can, then, be best understood as “segments 
in movement” (Bucher & Strauss, 1961) which can collide and for which outcomes might be 
different. 
The still frequent use of the mantra “an audit (opinion) is an audit (opinion)” in regulatory 
debates in the auditing profession has , then, changed its meaning. Previously, it was a necessary 
and widely accepted general understanding that was used to hold together the different audit 
practices of small local firms and large transnational audit practices within one profession. This 
benefited both practices, because smaller firms are part of the same profession as the more 
reputable and better known larger elite firms. On the other hand, larger firms benefit because as 
a profession it is easier for them to use the public interest argument in regulatory debates, i.e. 
economic interest can be masked behind the public interest (Ramirez 2013, p. 860). With 
practices drifting apart, however, it becomes increasingly a form of symbolic power that “can be 
exercised only through the complicity of those who are dominated by it. This complicity is all the 
more certain because it is unconscious on the part of those who undergo its effects – or perhaps 
we should say its more subtle extorted from them. […] the element of arbitrariness at the heart 
of its functioning […] remains unrecognized” (Bourdieu, 1987, p. 844). The big firms which 
dominate the leading professional bodies WPK and IDW, and which via these bodies define to a 
large extent the ‘rules of the audit (quality) game’, can use the common assumption to force their 
definition of audit quality on the audit practices of small auditors. Stringfellow et al. (2015, p. 97) 
argue for the UK that the Big4 used symbolic power and violence “subjecting smaller firms to 
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systematic monitoring and scrutiny of their practices. They are increasingly judged according to 
the standards set by the Big Four who are ‘quais-exclusive’ producers of accounting and auditing 
standards and the de facto voice of the profession” (see also Ramirez, 2009). Whereas Bourdieu 
assumes that symbolic power is not recognized by the dominated agents, Stringfellow et al. (2015, 
p. 97) argue that in the audit field the increasing and well-documented divide between the Big4 
and the remaining firms “makes it unlikely that dominated agents will not be conscious, to some 
degree, of their subjugation” and that is exactly what we can observe, in a more pronounced 
guise than in UK, in the German context. 
4.7 Summary & Limitations 
In the previous sections, we analysed the emergence of a second professional body for small and 
mid-sized auditors, which subsequently led to the palace revolt in the German auditing 
profession. As such, these events present a case in which resistance by small auditors against the 
overwhelming dominance of Big Four auditors is demonstrated to have been successful. We 
showed that, very much like in other countries, the situation facing the small auditors had already 
deteriorated over decades and we demonstrated how the introduction of the peer review, which 
effectively swept many of them out of the market for audits, in the end led to their mobilisation. 
However, we also show that several other factors were needed to allow the association to make a 
difference. Unlike the U.S. case, for example, quality control did not tighten over decades, but 
instead within a short period of time, and it was extended to the private audit client segment. 
Thus, small auditors proved to be able to organise themselves. Unlike the UK case, small 
German auditors proved also to be able to take over, at least temporarily, the professional 
regulation in Germany. Three factors might have accounted for this: the first factor was that the 
counterpart of the large auditors, the IDW, showed little inclination to take care of the interests 
of the small auditors. The second factor was that wp.net was soon successful in political lobbying 
and thus provided small auditors with the feeling that it was looking after their interests. Finally, 
the collaboration between wp.net and PRIMUS furnished wp.net with a loud speaker which 
somewhat resembled a ship’s klaxon and which soon seems to have awakened with its roar even 
the last rural audit practitioners’ office.  
Our discussion has revealed that the case raises a whole number of further questions: questions 
about the future of a unified profession, about the existence of an audit profession or its possible 
relegation to the status of a regulated industry, and about the sustainability of the business model 
used by small auditors and by large audit practitioners. Moreover, while it has revealed that even 
among such highly educated people as German auditors, it is the rhetorically gifted loud-speaker 
rather than the refined argument that makes a big difference in complex business activities: 
whether this is a desirable development has been left open to debate. 
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An important limitation to our study is that we did not ourselves engage in observations or even 
carry out ourselves practices at the sites of small and large firms. This contradicts Schatzki’s 
recommended empirical work to some extent:  
“Incidentally, identifying practice-arrangement bundles requires considerable ‚participant 
observation‘: watching participants‘ activities, interacting with them (e.g. asking questions), 
and – at least ideally – attempting to learn their practices” (Schatzki 2005, p. 476).  
As a consequence, we can only rely on statements made by the parties involved. This is a 
limitation that many studies in auditing have, as “there is very little of what is called “field work” 
in auditing” (Power, 2003, p. 308). However, as outlined above, we have tried to mitigate this 
problem by taking recourse to a vast number of different sources that describe practices from 
different angles. The usual limitations of studies that are to a large extent based on the 
interviewer, on the one hand, and the distortions created by interviewees using their opportunity 
to paint favourable self-portraits, on the other, (cf. the latter also Kornberger, Justesen, & 
Mouritsen, 2011) apply here, too. Another problem can arise insofar as interviews were not 
conducted to the point of theoretical saturation. In our case, we cannot guarantee that there may 
not exist some further insights beyond our interviews. To counter these problems, we have 
searched for additional information in order to triangulate the interviews’ findings as far as 
possible.  
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